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✓
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REVIEW.

By Whom, all things; for Whom, all things.

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JULY.

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
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PROGRESS OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

“Westward the course of Empire takes its way ;
The first four Acts already past,
A fifth shall close the drama with the day ;
Time's noblest offspring is the last.”

THESE lines of the philosopher, Bishop Berkeley, inspired by his noble missionary and educational zeal for the British Colonies in the western hemisphere, are often quoted as a prophecy of the future greatness of America, and express a general law of historical progress. Civilization and religion follow the course of the sun from east to west, encircling the globe, until they shall reach again the lands of their birth. Asia is the cradle of the human race. Europe is an advance upon Asia ; America ought to be, and will be, in due time, an advance upon Europe, unless the world should come to a sudden end.

But it may be said with equal propriety, especially at this time :

Eastward the course of empire takes its way.”

The West acts back upon the East. As Alexander the Great carried Greece to Syria, and as Napoleon carried France to Egypt, so Russia and England are now transplanting their sceptre and institutions, the one to Siberia, the other to India. America, too, by her politics, commerce, letters, useful arts, and religion, exerts a growing influence upon older nations.

The whole civilized world, by the wonderful inventions of

the press, the power of steam, and electricity, is becoming more and more one international and intercontinental community. Time and space are annihilated. An American gentleman reads at his breakfast what was said and done the evening before in London, Paris, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Constantinople, and Calcutta.

EUROPE AND AMERICA.

Europe is in the prime of manhood, America in her fresh youth. Manhood has moderation, wisdom, and experience; youth has its levity, vanity, and conceit, but also its buoyancy, elasticity, and hopefulness; and while it has much to learn and to unlearn, it may with its peculiar gifts teach a good lesson even to old age, as Elihu did in the poem of Job.

Dean Stanley, of Westminster, who has in his keeping the venerable mausoleum of English history and literature, was struck with the remark he often heard during his recent visit from American lips in a tone of plaintive apology: "We are a young people," and "We have no antiquities;" but he adds (reversing Lord Bacon's "*Antiquitas sæculi juvenus mundi*"): "The youth of a nation is also its antiquity."

America has, it is true, no pyramids like Egypt; no colosseum like Rome; no venerable cathedrals like Westminster and Cologne; no libraries like the Vatican and the British Museum; no Universities like Oxford and Berlin; no art collections like Paris and Florence; no poets like Shakespeare and Milton, or Goethe and Schiller; no philosophers like Plato and Aristotle, or Leibnitz and Kant; no historians like Gibbon and Macaulay, or Neander and Gieseler; no theologians like Augustine and Calvin. She lives on the immortal works of genius which older countries and former generations have produced. She was discovered by an Italian sailing under the Spanish flag, and named after another Italian; she derived her language, laws, customs, and religion from England; her idea of a republican confederation from Switzerland and Holland; her population, books, and works of art from all parts of the globe. Without the preceding history of Europe she would be still an unknown wilderness inhabited by savages.

But America—by which, of course, I mean here the United States—has learned a great deal in a short time, and claims a joint inheritance in the potent traditions and historic memories of all Christian nations, from whom she gathered her own population. Her few historic spots, such as Jamestown, Plymouth Rock, Independence Hall, Mount Vernon, touch English history in some of its most important epochs, and are as inseparably connected with it as the stem is with the root. The achievements and fame of Christopher Columbus, Sir Walter Raleigh, Captain John Smith, the Pilgrim Fathers, Roger Williams, William Penn, General Oglethorpe, Bishop Berkeley, John Wesley, George Whitefield, Count Zinzendorf, General Lafayette, Dr. Priestley, Louis Agassiz, James McCosh, and other distinguished men of modern times are divided between their native Europe and their temporary or permanent home in America.

In one respect America is only a new edition of Europe. Human nature and divine grace are the same in all ages and countries, and the great antagonist of God is as busy in the new world as in the old. There is nothing new under the sun. And yet there is nothing old under the sun. History never repeats itself. Every age and every nation has a peculiar mission to fulfil, and adds to the capital of wisdom and experience. America is not a feeble echo of Europe, but is honoring her ancestry by making a profitable investment of her rich inheritance and will transmit it doubled in value to posterity.

CENTENNIAL PROGRESS.

The progress of the United States within the first century of their independent existence is one of the marvels in modern history. It is due not to superior merit, but chiefly to the immense extent of country and a foreign immigration which has assumed the proportions of a peaceful migration of nations. We would not forget that God sometimes selects the smallest countries—as Palestine, Greece, Switzerland, the British Isles—for the greatest service. But vast empires are also included in his plan, and the unprecedented growth of the youngest of nations foreshadows a great future, as it involves corresponding danger and responsibility.

The United States of America is the daughter of Great Britain. It passed from the colonial into the national state by the Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1776; was recognized after a seven years' war by Great Britain, February 10, 1783, and adopted a constitution, September 17, 1787, which was enlarged from time to time by fifteen amendments, the last amendment being passed, February 26th, 1869. It has had nineteen Presidents, some having served two terms of four years. In 1876 the nation celebrated its first Centennial by an international exhibition in Philadelphia, the city of its birth, and by innumerable local commemorations. No nation on earth has celebrated such a centenary; none had such cause of gratitude for the past and hope for the future; none received such a rich legacy; none such a vast responsibility.

During that century the United States has had four wars; two with Great Britain, one with Mexico, and, worst of all, a fierce civil war which brought it to the brink of dismemberment. The first was the war for independence, the last for the preservation of the Union, the sovereignty of the national government over State rights, and the emancipation of four millions of negro slaves. The civil war cost probably more blood and treasure and stimulated more speculation and corruption than any war of the same duration; but the destruction of slavery—that relic of barbarism and heathenism which turned the Declaration of Independence into a lie and attracted the finger of scorn from the civilized world upon this land of boasted freedom and equality—was worth the cost. And, what is not less remarkable, immediately upon the defeat of the rebellion the immense army melted away like snow before the vernal sun, and the soldiers returned to the occupations of peace. Fortunately this country needs no standing army except for the protection of the frontier against Mexicans and wild Indians.

The progress within a century may be summed up in the following facts: The population—in round figures—has grown from less than three millions to more than forty millions, the number of States from thirteen to thirty-eight (besides ten Territories which in the course of time will take their rank among the States), the extent of territory by purchase and war from 420,892 to 3,026,494 square miles, with every variety of

soil and climate, and inexhaustible agricultural and mineral wealth.

The growth of churches, schools, colleges, libraries, newspapers, benevolent institutions, agriculture, manufactures, commerce, public roads, railroads, steamboats, and every branch of industry and art has been in proportion to the increase of population.

The American idea of a republic, as "a government of the people, by the people, and for the people," has been consistently developed and ceased to be a mere experiment.

At the same time we have learned that republican institutions are just as liable to be corrupted and perverted as monarchical and imperial institutions, and that liberty without moral self-government and respect for law is a delusion and a snare. Universal suffrage, which after the civil war was extended to the negroes without any qualification, has worked well in the country as a whole and in national elections, but in the large cities it has thrown the ruling power into the hands of an ignorant multitude of voters under the control of selfish demagogues; and even our national elections are not free from disgraceful frauds. But universal suffrage once given to the people can never be recalled, except by a revolution, and its evils can only be counteracted by universal education. The evils of older countries are fast accumulating among us. Wealth is breeding extravagance and luxury, and is sweeping away the noble simplicity of republican habits. Materialism and Mammonism are undermining the foundations of virtue and spreading a degrading form of idolatry. Vice, crime, and pauperism are on the increase. Capital and labor are coming into conflict. We had street riots, in Philadelphia (1844), New York (1863), and elsewhere, and even a fearful outbreak of communistic violence (in 1877), which stopped railroads, destroyed millions of property, and threatened whole cities with destruction. Bribery and corruption have disgraced many a legislature, and even the judiciary is not always administering impartial justice. We are forced to witness the humiliating and shameful spectacle of whole States repudiating their honest debts, after Mississippi long ago had set the bad example, and there is no power in the general government to vindicate the national honor. If with a

comparatively small population in an immense country waiting for occupants we have already so much trouble, how much greater will our dangers and troubles be when the land shall be as thickly settled as Europe?

Some look upon universal education as the remedy for all evils, forgetting the inborn depravity of human nature. But intellectual education is worth little without virtue, and virtue must be supported and fed by piety, which binds men to God, inspires them with love to their fellow-men, and urges them on to noble thoughts and noble deeds. Our safety and ultimate success depends upon the maintenance and spread of the Christian religion. This was the conviction of our greatest statesmen from Washington to Daniel Webster and Abraham Lincoln. The religious tie of authority and loyalty must be strengthened in proportion as the political tie is relaxed. A self-governing democracy which does not obey the voice of conscience, and own God as its Ruler, must degenerate into mobocracy and anarchy. "Despotism," says De Tocqueville, that profound student of American institutions, "may govern without faith, but liberty cannot." God's Church, God's Book, and God's Day are the three pillars of American society. Without them it must go the way of all flesh, and God will raise up some other nation or continent to carry on his designs; but with them it will continue to prosper notwithstanding all hindrances from without and within.

A distinguished English divine, when visiting Niagara Falls, as he looked at midnight from the bridge which spans the river and unites the British and American dominions, into the seething chaos below and listened to the ceaseless roar of that avalanche of water, thought it a fit emblem of the restless and bewildering whirlpool of American life; but when he raised his eyes to the moonlight sky, "there arose a cloud of spray twice as high as the Falls themselves, silent, majestic, immovable: that silver column glittering in the moonbeams seemed an image of American history—of the upward heaven-aspiring destiny which should emerge from the distractions of the present."

It is the motto of an American citizen never to despair of the commonwealth, and it is the motto of every believing

Christian never to despair of the progress and ultimate triumph of Christianity.

ECCLESIASTICAL STATISTICS.

Figures are facts. The following statistics will give you the best idea of the outward growth and the present numerical status of Christianity in the United States.

I. STATISTICS OF 1870.

We present first the results of the last decennial census of the United States, which was taken in 1870. They were published in three large quarto volumes, and condensed in "A Compendium" of 942 closely printed pages of figures, edited by Francis A. Walker (Superintendent of Census), Washington, 1872. From this document we make the following extracts :

Total population in the United States and Territories in 1870....	38,558,371
White do.....	33,589,377
Colored.....	4,880,009
Foreign-born white population (included in total).....	5,567,229
Born in Great Britain and Ireland.....	2,626,241
Born in Germany.....	1,690,533

The ecclesiastical statistics of the census report (which are not given as a separate head, but strangely ranked under "Schools, Libraries, Newspapers, and Churches," and which do not agree in all cases with the statistics of denominational year-books and almanacs) are given on p. 514, in alphabetical order as follows :

DENOMINATIONS.	ECCLESIASTICAL STATISTICS OF 1870.			
	Organi- zations. (Congre- gations.)	Edi- fices.	Sittings.	Property.
All denominations.....	72,459	63,082	21,665,062	\$354,483,581
1 Baptist (regular or Calvinistic).....	14,474	12,857	3,997,116	\$39,229,221
2 Baptist (other, Free-Will, Mennon- ites, Tunkers, etc.).....	1,355	1,105	363,019	2,378,977
3 Christian (and "Disciples of Christ")	3,578	2,822	865,602	6,425,137
4 Congregational.....	2,887	2,715	1,117,212	25,069,698
5 Episcopal (Protestant)....	2,835	2,601	991,051	36,514,549
6 Evangelical Association.....	815	641	193,796	2,301,650
7 Friends (Quakers)....	692	662	224,664	3,939,560
8 Jews.....	189	152	73,265	5,155,234
9 Lutheran.....	3,032	2,776	977,332	14,917,747
10 Methodist.....	25,278	21,337	6,528,209	69,854,121
11 Miscellaneous.....	27	17	6,935	135,650
12 Moravian (Unitas Fratrum).....	72	67	25,700	709,100
13 Mormon.....	189	171	87,838	656,750
14 New Jerusalem (Swedenborgian)....	90	61	18,755	869,700
15 Presbyterian (regular)....	6,262	5,683	2,193,900	47,828,732
16 Presbyterian (other).....	1,562	1,388	499,344	5,436,524
17 Reformed Church in America (late Dutch Reformed).....	471	468	227,228	10,359,255
18 Reformed Church in the United States (late German Reformed)....	1,256	1,145	431,700	5,775,215
19 Roman Catholic.....	4,127	3,806	1,990,514	60,985,566
20 Second Adventist.....	225	140	34,555	306,240
21 Shaker.....	18	18	8,850	86,900
22 Spiritualist.....	95	22	6,970	100,150
23 Unitarian.....	331	310	155,471	6,282,675
24 United Brethren in Christ.....	1,445	937	265,025	1,819,810
25 Universalist.....	719	602	210,884	5,692,325
26 Unknown (Local Missions).....	26	27	11,925	687,800
27 Unknown (Union).....	409	552	153,202	965,295

The decennial growth of all the churches since 1850 may be inferred from the following table:

	Church Edifices.	Accommodation.	Property.
A.D. 1850.....	38,061	14,234,825	\$87,328,801
A.D. 1860.....	54,009	19,128,751	171,397,932
A.D. 1870.....	63,082	21,665,062	354,483,581

2. COMPARATIVE STATISTICS OF THE CENTENNIAL GROWTH OF CHURCHES FROM 1776 TO 1876.

The growth of churches during the first century of the United States can only be made out approximately. The Revolutionary war produced great confusion, and there are few reliable lists of ministers and congregations before 1790. The statistics of 1776, therefore, are mostly conjectural, but those of 1876 (as also those of 1878 in the next table) are from official records and private communications of leading men of different churches.

STATISTICS OF 1776 (OR 1780-90.)			STATISTICS OF 1876.		
DENOMINATIONS.	Ministers.	Churches.	DENOMINATIONS.	Ministers.	Churches.
Baptists of all descriptions.....	722	872 ¹	Baptists.....	13,779	22,924
Congregationalists.....	575	700	Congregationalists.....	3,333	3,509
Episcopalians.....	150 (No bishop.)	200 ²	Episcopalians.....	3,216 (61 bishops.)	4,000
Friends (Quakers).....	400	500	Friends (Quakers).....	865	885
Lutherans (1786).....	25	60	Lutherans.....	2,662	4,623
Methodists of all descriptions.....	24		Methodists.....	20,453	40,000
Moravians.....	12(?)	8(?)	Moravians.....	75	75
Presbyterians (Gen. Assembly, 1788).....	177	419	Presbyterians (Gen. Assembly).....	4,744	5,077
Reformed, Dutch.....	40	100	Reformed, Dutch.....	546	506
Reformed, German.....	12	60	Reformed, German.....	644	1,353
Roman Catholics.....	26(?)	52(?) ³	Roman Catholics.....	5,141	5,046
Universalists.....	1	1	Universalists.....	689	867

¹ The Regular or Calvinistic Baptists numbered in 1790 about 200 ministers and 300 congregations.

² Estimated. The Protestant Episcopal Church had no regular statistical tables before 1832.

³ The first R. C. bishop, Carroll of Maryland, was consecrated in 1790. In 1808 there were 80 Roman Catholic churches; in 1830, 230; in 1840, 454; in 1850, 1073; in 1860, 2385; in 1870, 3995.

3. ECCLESIASTICAL STATISTICS OF 1878.

DENOMINATIONS	Ministers.	Congregations.	Communicant Membership.	Nominal Membership.	Colleges.	Theological Seminaries.
Baptists :						
(a) Regular Baptists..	14,954	24,499	2,102,034		31	9.
(b) Other Baptists....	5,333	5,732	554,187			
(c) All Baptists	20,292 ¹	30,231	2,656,221			
Congregationalists.....	3,496 ²	3,620	375,654			7
Episcopalians.....	3,141 (63 b'ps.) ³	4,200	314,367	about 1,250,000	14	16
Friends (Quakers).....	860	900	70,000	100,000 about	4	none.
Lutherans.....	2,976	5,176	808,428	2,000,000	18	15
Methodists :						
(a) Epis. Meth. North.	11,676 (12 b'ps.)	20,000	1,709,958	6,900,000	27	7
(b) Other Methodists..	11,886	12,000	1,718,092	7,100,000	25	5
(c) All Methodists....	23,562 ⁴	32,000	3,428,050	14,000,000	52	12
Moravians.....	82 (4 b'ps.)	82	9,407	16,236	1	1
Presbyterians :						
(a) Gen. Assem. North	4,901	5,269	567,855			13
(b) Gen. Assem. South	1,117	1,878	114,578			2
(c) All Presbyterians.	8,301 ⁵	10,648	897,593			
Reformed Episcopalians.	6 (3 b'ps.)	69	7,000	16,500		1
Reformed, Dutch.....	550	510	79,000	251,000	2	1
Reformed, German.....	714	1,380	124,596	151,651	6	3
Roman Catholics.....	5,750 ⁶ (52 b'ps.)	5,589	6,375,630	6,375,630	78	23
Second Adventists.....	120	80	10,000			
Swedenborgians.....	100	115	5,000	15,000	1	2
Unitarians.....	401	358				2
Universalists.....	711	963	37,965	42,500	4	2

¹ Estimate of Rev. Prof. H. Osgood, D.D., Rochester, N. Y., compared with the American Baptist Year-Book. Philadelphia, 1879. (Bapt. Publication Society.)

² According to the careful statistics of the Congregational Year-Book. Boston, 1879.

³ The statistics furnished by Bishop Perry, of Iowa, the historiographer of the Protestant Episcopal Church of the United States, and the Rev. Dr. C. C. Tiffany, of New York.

⁴ According to the estimates furnished by Rev. D. Dorchester, of Springfield, Mass., endorsed by Rev. Dr. Warren, of Boston. The Methodist Almanac, New York (Nelson & Phillips), 1879, differs somewhat, and credits the Methodist Episcopal Church only with 11,308 ministers (including 12 bishops), 16,099 congregations, and 1,688,783 members. But there are counted besides 12,749 local preachers. All the Methodist organizations together number 30 bishops and 26,642 local preachers, in addition to the regular ordained clergymen.

⁵ The figures of the Northern and Southern General Assembly are from the last Minutes. The sum total of Presbyterians is estimated by Rev. Dr. E. F. Hatfield, of New York, Stated Clerk of the Northern General Assembly, and includes the United Presbyterians, the Welsh Calvinists, and the Cumberland Presbyterians, but not the Dutch and German Reformed churches.

⁶ Among the 52 Roman Catholic bishops there are 11 archbishops and 1 cardinal. See Roman Catholic Almanac for 1879, New York (Sadlier & Co.). In some dioceses chapels are counted with churches, in others with mission stations. In some cases colleges and theological seminaries are combined, as at Emmitsburg, Md. The membership includes the whole R. Catholic population.

4. STATISTICS OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN 1878.

We add the ecclesiastical statistics of the American metropolis, taken from the last report of the N. Y. City Mission Society, carefully prepared by its secretary, Mr. Lewis E. Jackson. It may furnish an idea of the strength of the churches in the larger cities.

Baptist churches and chapels.....	46
Congregational churches and chapels	9
Friends' churches and chapels.....	5
Greek churches and chapels.....	1
Jews' synagogues.....	23
Lutheran churches and chapels.....	23
Methodist Episcopal churches and chapels.....	58
African Methodist Episcopal churches and chapels.....	8
Free Methodist churches and chapels.....	2
Moravian churches and chapels.....	2
Presbyterian churches and chapels.....	65
United Presbyterian churches and chapels.....	10
Reformed Presbyterian churches and chapels.....	6
Protestant Episcopal churches and chapels	85
Reformed Episcopal churches and chapels.....	2
Reformed (Dutch and German) churches and chapels.	28
Roman Catholic churches and chapels.....	56
Union or Undenominational churches and chapels.....	18
Unitarian churches and chapels	4
Universalist churches and chapels.....	6
Miscellaneous churches and chapels.....	39
Total.....	496

Of these 496 church organizations (including chapels and mission stations), 387 have church edifices, and these, together with the ground they occupy, are estimated to be worth \$40,172,850. The total population of New York City in 1875 was 1,041,886.

The church organizations average a membership of 300, equal to a total of 80,000 communicants. The number of attendants, of course, is much larger. The Protestant churches and chapels afford accommodation probably for 275,000 persons, and the whole (nominally) Protestant population of the city is estimated at from 500,000 to 600,000.

The Roman Catholic churches are usually crowded on Sundays, and are not sufficient for the Roman Catholic population, which probably amounts to one third of the whole.

THE DIFFERENT ELEMENTS OF AMERICAN CHRISTIANITY.

The first distinctive feature of America is the commingling of nationalities. It is truly "*e pluribus unum*." The Anglo-Saxon nationality forms the solid foundation, the very best for a vigorous, enterprising, liberty-loving, independent race; but on this foundation are built stones from Scotland, Germany, Holland, Celtic Ireland, France, Switzerland, Scandinavia, Italy, Spain, Hungary, and Bohemia. Even African negroes, red Indians, and Asiatic Chinese are there in large numbers, but keeping apart.

With the exception of the last-mentioned races, the process of amalgamation is going on with wonderful rapidity, and out of the different nationalities of Europe there is fast rising a new and distinct nationality which more than any other seems destined to realize the unity and universality of the human family, with a continent for its home and two oceans for its outlet to the other continents. If the present English nation is superior to any of the three elements—the Celtic, the Anglo-Saxon, and the Norman-French—of which it is composed, may we not reasonably expect that the American nationality will ultimately be an advance upon any or most of the nationalities which contribute to its growth?

A similar phenomenon is presented to us in American Christianity taken as a whole. It has gathered its material from all the churches and sects of Europe. It strikes its roots in the most excited and interesting period of English history, in the first half of the seventeenth century, when all the leading English denominations—except the Methodist—assumed a separate organization. It embraces the Anglican Episcopal Church, the Congregational, the Presbyterian, the Baptist, the Methodist Churches, and the Society of Friends—all of English descent. Ireland furnishes the chief material for the Roman Catholic Church, Germany for the Lutheran, German Reformed, and Moravian, Holland for the Dutch Reformed Church. All the historical denominations are now represented in America except the old Greek Church, which numbers but one congregation in New York in connection with the Russian Embassy, and

another in Alaska Territory, which was bought from Russia under President Lincoln's administration. But these Churches are not, and probably never will be, melted into one national American Church. They exist as separate, independent organizations, on a basis of equality before the law, enjoying the protection of the government, but deriving no support from it. They are self-supporting and self-governing. *

CHURCH AND STATE.

America has solved the problem of a "Free Church in a Free State." Church and state co-exist in peaceful and respectful separation, each minding its own business without interference or hindrance from the other. The state takes care of the secular, the church of the moral and spiritual interests of the people. The church enjoys the protection of the government for its property and the free exercise of public worship, but asks and receives no pecuniary support from it.

Congress is forever prevented, by the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution, to make any law "respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." This indeed does not apply to the several States, and some of them continued to tax their citizens for the support of the church till 1830, but the voluntary principle has gradually triumphed in the whole country, except in the abnormal territory of the Mormons. The law of Congress, it should be distinctly remembered, is protective as well as prohibitive, and owes its origin not to contempt, but to respect for religion and its free exercise. Herein the American idea of religious freedom differs *toto cælo* from the red-republican idea, as faith differs from infidelity, and as constitutional liberty differs from anti-nomian license.

The experiment of unrestricted religious freedom has been tried for a hundred years, and has worked well. There is no desire anywhere to change it. Every church knows that the freedom and independence of all other churches is the best safeguard of its own freedom, and that the least attempt to aspire to political power and supremacy would arouse the jealousy and opposition of the others.

Religious freedom—which is very different from mere tole-

ration, and which necessarily includes freedom of public worship—is regarded in America as one of the fundamental and inalienable rights of man, more sacred than civil freedom or the freedom of thought and speech. It is the highest kind of freedom, and is at the same time the best protection of all other freedom. The dominion of conscience is inviolable. No power on earth has a right to interpose itself between man and his Maker. All attempts to compel religion from without are apt to beget hypocrisy or infidelity. Religion flourishes best in the atmosphere of freedom. The inevitable abuses of freedom are more than counterbalanced by its benefits. These are settled principles in America.

Experience has proved already in the first three centuries of persecution, that Christianity is abundantly able to support itself and to govern itself, and to do it much better than the secular power can do it. The voluntary principle has its inconveniences, and entails a great deal of suffering on pastors of young and poor congregations, and among immigrants who are not yet weaned of reliance on government support. The average salary of ministers is probably not more than \$700 (although a few receive from \$5000 to \$10,000), and ought to be \$1000 to enable them to live comfortably and to give their children a good education. But, on the other hand, the voluntary principle secures an able, energetic, devoted clergy, who command respect by their self-denying services. It makes the laity feel their responsibility, calls forth a vast amount of liberality, and attaches them to the church in proportion to the amount of labor and money they have invested in it. Liberality, like every other virtue, grows with its exercise, and so becomes a settled habit. The more we give the more we feel the blessedness of giving. “Make all ye can, save all ye can, give all ye can.”

Upon the whole we may venture to say that America, in proportion to her age and population, is better provided with churches, Sunday-schools, and religious institutions and agencies than any country in the world, with the exception, perhaps, of England and Scotland. Church extension keeps pace with the growth of the population; and this is saying much, if we remember the enormous influx of foreign elements.

THE CHRISTIAN CHARACTER OF THE AMERICAN NATION.

The separation of church and state is not and cannot be absolute. It does not mean a separation of the nation from religion. It means only the absence of an established or national church to which all are bound to belong and to contribute, whether they agree with its creed and polity or not ; it means that citizenship is independent of church-membership ; it means that every man is free to choose his own creed or no creed, and that his religious opinions and ecclesiastical connection have nothing to do with his civil and political rights.

But the American people are nevertheless in fact a Christian nation, and if religion may be judged from the number of churches and Sunday-schools, colleges and seminaries, from the extent of Bible-reading, Sabbath-keeping, church-going, liberal giving, and active charity, they need not fear a comparison with any nation in Christendom. The clergy are, upon the whole, the most respected and influential class of the community. They are invited to all public festivities, and called upon to open even political meetings with the invocation of the divine blessing. The government employs in the judicaries and in the introduction of officers the Christian oath. It appoints from time to time days of thanksgiving, fasting, and prayer. The memorable national ordinance of 1787, for the government of Territories west of the Ohio, declares that "Religion, morality, and knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and means of education shall ever be encouraged." Congress, the army and the navy, have their regular chaplains, paid by the government. Church property, like school property, is exempt from taxation. Christianity is an integral part of the common law of the land, and enjoys as much protection in courts of justice as in any country under the sun. It is deeply rooted in national habits, which are even stronger than laws, and has a mighty hold on the respect and affections of all classes of society.

I have consulted on this important subject, which is often misunderstood in Europe, one of the most learned jurists, Judge Theodore W. Dwight, President of the Columbia Law School,

New York, and he has kindly furnished me with the following confirmatory statement on the legal status of Christianity in the United States :

"It is well settled by decisions in the courts of the leading States of the Union—*e. g.*, New York, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts—that Christianity is a part of the common law of the State. Its recognition is shown in the administration of oaths in the courts of justice, in the rules which punish those who wilfully blaspheme, in the observance of Sunday, in the prohibition of profanity, in the legal establishment of permanent charitable trusts, and in the legal principles which control a parent in the education and training of his children. One of the American courts (that of Pennsylvania) states the law in this manner : ' Christianity is and always has been a part of the common law of this State—Christianity without the spiritual artillery of European countries—not Christianity founded on any particular religious tenets—not Christianity with an established church and titles and spiritual courts, but Christianity with liberty of conscience to all men.'

"The American States adopted these principles from the common law of England, rejecting such portions of the English law on this subject as were not suited to their customs and institutions. Our national development has in it the best and purest elements of historic Christianity as related to the government of States. Should we tear Christianity out of our law, we would rob our law of its fairest jewels, we would deprive it of its richest treasures, we would arrest its growth, and bereave it of its capacity to adapt itself to the progress in culture, refinement, and morality of those for whose benefit it properly exists."

There are especially three points on which church and state come in contact : marriage, Sunday, and education. They require a separate consideration.

I. MARRIAGE in America is a civil contract, and may be performed by a civil magistrate as well as by a clergyman. The Mayor of New York solemnizes more marriages—chiefly among immigrants—than any minister of the Gospel. But most Americans seek the blessing of the church for their union.

The only legitimate form of marriage is monogamy. Mormonism tried to undermine this Christian institution, and to introduce a worse than Mohammedan polygamy which destroys the dignity of woman and the happiness of home ; but Congress has expressly prohibited polygamy, and the Supreme Court has affirmed the constitutionality of this law. Utah Territory will not be admitted into the confederacy of independent

States until this poisonous plant is uprooted. It is a significant fact that the increase of that abnormal sect is almost exclusively from foreign immigration, stimulated by promises of temporal prosperity, which so far has attended the Mormon settlements in Utah.

2. SUNDAY is regarded as both a civil and religious institution, and hence a proper subject for protective (not coercive) legislation. The State cannot compel people to go to church or to observe Sunday religiously, but it may lawfully prohibit the *public desecration* of it, and ought to protect the religious people in the enjoyment of the Sunday rest and the privilege of public worship as well as in the enjoyment of any other right. Hence the Sabbath is guarded in nearly all the States, and such protection is of the utmost importance to the laboring community, who otherwise would become slaves to heartless capital.

A strict regard for the civil and religious Sabbath is a national American custom, and dates from the first settlements of the country, especially in Puritan New England. Law and custom go hand in hand. All legislative and judicial proceedings, including those of the Supreme Court of the United States, are suspended on Sunday. Civil contracts are to a large extent illegal if made on that day. No political elections are held on Sunday, as is customary in France. The inauguration of the President of the United States is postponed to Monday, if the fourth of March appointed for this act falls on the Lord's Day. The Constitution of the United States, which extends over all the States and Territories, exempts Sunday from the working-days of the President for signing a bill of Congress. The whole nation celebrates the Declaration of Independence on the fifth instead of the fourth of July, if it be Sunday; thus subordinating the birthday of the nation to the day of Christ's resurrection.

So general and deep-rooted is this sentiment in the American people, that President Abraham Lincoln, even in the midst of the civil war, when every thing seemed to give way to military necessity, issued a memorable order enjoining the proper observance of the Sabbath upon the officers and men in the army and navy. The order, dated Washington, November 15th, 1862, says: "The importance for man and beast of the

prescribed weekly rest, the sacred rights of Christian soldiers and sailors, a becoming deference to the best sentiment of a Christian people, and a due regard for the Divine will, demand that Sunday labor in the army and navy be reduced to the measure of strict necessity."

The sanctity of the American Sabbath is threatened by infidels and foreigners from the Continent, who would like to turn it into a day of secular amusement, and to substitute the theatre and beer saloon for the church and Sunday-school. But the better class of Europeans, after some observation and experience, come to see the inestimable blessing of one day of sacred rest for body and soul, and are co-operating with the Americans for the maintenance of their time-honored national custom. The Sabbath Committee of New York has done a good work in this direction and stimulated similar efforts in other large cities.

3. EDUCATION is untrammelled, and left to individuals, to the family, the church, and the several States. Religion may be freely taught in all private and parochial schools. The General Government provides only for the education of officers of the army and navy, and does so very liberally.

But almost every State and Territory maintains now a system of public schools which are supported by general taxation, and are open to all without distinction of race or creed. Some of the new Western States have made munificent provision by devoting a part of the public lands for the support of primary and even university education. President Grant, in his Centennial Message to Congress, December 7th, 1875, advised the passage of a constitutional amendment making it "the duty of the several States to establish and forever to maintain free public schools, adequate to the education of all the children in rudimentary branches, within their respective limits, irrespective of sex, color, birth-place, or religion; forbidding the teaching in said schools of religious [sectarian], atheistic, or pagan tenets," etc. But the suggestion was not acted on, and the strange phraseology in the last clause certainly would need some rectification.

In the public schools of New England and other States, the custom prevails—and has prevailed from the beginning—of opening the daily exercises with the reading of the Scriptures, singing, and prayer. This custom works very well where the

population is Protestant and homogeneous, and, although it is not at all sufficient, it keeps up before the rising generation the importance and necessity of religion as an essential element of education. This is a great deal. The effect, of course, depends greatly on the spirit and personal conviction of the teacher who conducts the religious exercises.

But just here comes in the irrepressible conflict between church and state. This time-honored custom is violently and persistently assailed by infidels, Jews, and especially by Roman Catholics—who have become very numerous in large cities. The Roman hierarchy, in accordance with the Papal Syllabus of 1864, claims the monopoly of religious education, cares more for the Roman Catechism than the Bible, regards King James' Version as a sectarian, incorrect, and incomplete translation, and is not without good reason afraid of the free Protestant atmosphere of the mixed public schools. These scruples are conscientious, and consistent from the Roman Catholic standpoint, and have inclined many Protestants to sacrifice the Bible, if necessary, rather than the common schools.

The controversy will come up again and again in different States, and can only be settled in the course of time. I will state the various plans which have been proposed.

(1) Give up the public schools, and leave education in the hands of the family and the church where it properly belongs. This was originally the Roman Catholic plan, but it was signally defeated in public elections. It would surrender a large portion of our population to the barbarism of ignorance. A self-governing republic needs for its preservation intelligent voters and useful citizens, and hence is bound to furnish the opportunity, at least for primary education. The American people will never abandon the common-school system; on the contrary, it is gaining strength from year to year and rising higher and higher, even beyond the reasonable limits of a thorough elementary training for intelligent and useful citizenship.

(2) Divide the public-school funds annually raised by taxation among the different denominations and sects for separate management. This is the more recent Roman Catholic proposition, but is likewise impracticable. It would break up the common-school system altogether. It would require Protes-

tants, who pay most taxes, to aid in supporting the Roman Catholic parochial schools, and would leave those who belong to no church or sect without any schools. Besides, it would intensify and perpetuate the sectarian animosities, while the present system has a tendency to check and moderate them, and to raise a homogeneous generation.

(3) United secular, and separate religious education. Confine the State schools to purely secular instruction, and leave all religious instruction to the churches and Sunday-schools. This is the spirit of General Grant's proposal mentioned above, which would exclude all religious, but also all irreligious (atheistic and pagan), teaching from the public schools. It seems to be most consistent with the separation of church and state, and many advocate it as the genuine American plan. But an immense interest like the education of a nation of cosmopolitan and pan-ecclesiastical composition cannot be regulated by a logical syllogism. Life is stronger and more elastic than logic. It is impossible to draw the precise line of separation between secular and moral, and between moral and religious education. Absolute indifference of the school to morals and religion is impossible; it must be either moral or immoral, religious or irreligious, Christian or anti-Christian. Religion enters into the teaching of history, mental and moral philosophy, and other branches of learning which are embraced in our common-school system, and which public sentiment deems necessary. What should we think of a text-book of general history which would ignore the creation, the fall, the revelation, Abraham, Moses, and even Jesus Christ, and the Christian Church? An education which ignores religion altogether would raise a heartless and infidel generation of intellectual animals, and prove a curse rather than a blessing.

(4) Let the leaders of ecclesiastical denominations unite in some general scheme of religious instruction which shall be confined to the essentials held in common by all, such as a selection of psalms and hymns, the Sermon on the Mount, the Ten Commandments, the Lord's Prayer, and the Apostles' Creed. But the Roman Catholics are not likely ever to agree with the Protestants on any religious formula. And the conscience of the Jews must likewise be respected.

(5) Let religious instruction be separately given in appointed hours by special teachers chosen for the purpose by the different churches; the parents to be free to send their children to the teacher they prefer, or to excuse them from attendance. This may be called the German plan, which has not yet received sufficient consideration.

(6) The local option plan leaves the whole question with the school boards to be decided according to the composition and wants of the children. This is the present plan, and is likely to prevail, with some modifications and adaptations to the wants of different communities. Absolute uniformity seems impracticable and undesirable in a country where the States are independent, the population heterogeneous, and the public sentiment divided.

Fortunately, religious education is not confined to public schools, which would be meagre indeed, but is supplemented by the family, the Sunday-school, and pastoral or catechetical instruction. Even if the Roman Catholics should succeed in driving the Bible out of our common schools, it would only stimulate the churches to greater zeal in training the young for usefulness in this world and happiness in the world to come.

DENOMINATIONALISM.

American Christianity, as already stated, is not an organic unit, nor a confederation of churches, but is divided into an indefinite number of independent ecclesiastical organizations called *Denominations*,¹ which, while differing in doctrine, or discipline, or cultus, are equal before the law, and have perfect liberty to work and to propagate themselves, by peaceful and moral means, to the extent of their ability.

Where there is no national or state church, there can be no dissenters or nonconformists as in England, and no sects in the sense in which this word is used on the Continent in opposition to the (national) church. The sects have become churches, and among these the Methodists and Baptists, who

¹ The term *Denominations* is the American equivalent for the European (Continental) term *Confessions*, and is more appropriate, since the number of sects is much larger than the number of confessions of faith.

are scarcely known in some countries of the Continent and barely tolerated in others, are numerically the largest in the United States.

This of itself would be enough to condemn the religious condition of the United States as an anomaly in the judgment of a churchman who is brought up in the traditions of an exclusive state-churchism. To a German looking from the outside, America is a wilderness of sects, as to an American, Germany is a wilderness of theological schools. The liberty of thought, which in Germany produces more opinions than thinkers, is checked in England and America by the wholesome restraint of public opinion and orthodox sentiment; but, on the other hand, we have much greater liberty of action and organization, which produces a superfluity of sects.

American denominationalism is certainly not the ideal and final condition of Christianity, but only a transition state for a far higher and better union than has ever existed before, a union which must be spiritual, free, and comprehend every variety of Christian life. The time must come, although it may not be before the second advent of Christ as the one Head of His Church, when party names will disappear, when there will be one flock under one Shepherd, and when believers will "be made perfect in one," even as Christ is with the Father.

But American denominationism is the necessary outcome of the church history of Europe, and is overruled by Providence for the more rapid spread of Christianity. We should consider the following facts, on which an intelligent judgment must be based :

1. There is a difference between denominationalism and sectarianism : the former is compatible with true catholicity of spirit ; the latter is nothing but an extended selfishness, which crops out of human nature everywhere and in all ages and conditions of the church. The Roman Church, with all its outward uniformity, has as much carnal animosity among its monastic orders as there ever existed between Protestant sects.

2. The American denominations have sprung directly or indirectly from the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century and the Puritan commotion of the seventeenth century ; they are found in Europe as well, though scattered and divided

by geographical and political boundaries, and hampered by many disabilities.

3. They represent historical phases and types of Christianity which must be fully developed and finish their mission before there can be a free reunion. At the same time I would not deny that there are a few petrified sects in America, which date their existence from some local or temporary quarrel in Europe, and which seem to have no right to exist except as antiquarian curiosity shops.

4. The denominations multiply the agencies for Christianizing the land, and stimulate a noble rivalry in all good works, which counterbalances the incidental evils of division. It is proper to add that proselytism is denounced by all honorable men. There is work enough for all denominations among their own members, and in the outlying semi-heathenish population, without interfering with each other.

5. They are really more united in spirit than the different theological schools and church parties of national churches under one governmental roof, and manifest this underlying unity by hearty co-operation in common enterprises, such as the distribution of the Bible, the preservation and promotion of Sunday observance, the Sunday-School Union, the Evangelical Alliance, city missions, and the management of various charitable institutions. The European delegates to the General Conference of the Alliance in New York were struck with the powerful manifestation of this unity in diversity, which they had never witnessed on such a grand scale anywhere before. And this spirit of catholic unity is steadily progressing, and all the more so because it is the spontaneous outgrowth of the spirit of Christianity, which is a spirit of love.

Among these various modes of co-operation should be mentioned the work of revising the English Bible in common use, which has been carried on since 1870 with great harmony by a large number of biblical scholars of all Protestant denominations in England and the United States. This revision, when completed and adopted for public use, will be a noble monument of the spiritual unity and exegetical consensus of English-speaking Christendom.

THEOLOGICAL EDUCATION.

We now proceed to describe some of the general activities of evangelical Christianity in America. We begin with the preparation for the ministry.

Theological learning is fast progressing, even among those denominations who formerly neglected it, but are beginning to see that the intelligence and culture of the age peremptorily require a well-educated ministry, especially in a country where public opinion rules supreme and where the church depends upon the voluntary support and affection of the people. A few obscure sects perpetuate their ignorance and stagnation, and as they are dead to the surrounding world, the world cares no more for them than for antediluvian fossils.

Ministerial education is carried on in special seminaries, of which there are now probably more than a hundred in the land. A few first-class institutions would be better than many poor ones which spread a superficial culture at the expense of depth and solidity. But the vast extent of the country and the rivalry of sects stimulate the multiplication. There are institutions where one or two professors must teach all branches of learning, and spend the vacation in the humiliating business of collecting their own scanty salary. But a few of the older seminaries are nearly as fully equipped with professors, students, and libraries as the best theological faculties in Germany and Switzerland, and admit no students who have not taken a full college course. Two of them have more students than some renowned universities of Europe.

Instruction is free in all these seminaries, and professors receive no fees. Indigent and worthy students are aided by scholarships or by beneficiary boards, to which all congregations are expected to contribute according to their means. Others prefer to support themselves by teaching or by mission work in connection with some church or Sunday-school.

Discipline is much more strict than in German universities. The wild excesses of student life are not unknown in some of our colleges, but unheard of in theological seminaries. Only such students are admitted as are in good standing in their

church, and give reasonable evidence of choosing the ministry not merely as an honorable profession, but from love to Christ and desire to save souls. Every lecture is opened with a short prayer. Much attention is paid to the cultivation of piety as well as learning. From a long experience as a public teacher in Europe and America, I may venture the assertion that the theological students of America, as regards ability, gentlemanly bearing, and Christian character are equal to any in the world.

The theology taught in these seminaries differs, of course, according to the denomination. Each has its own creed and theological traditions. New England Congregationalism has produced the first and so far the only distinct school of American dogmatic theology, headed by the great and good Jonathan Edwards. It is a subtle form of scholastic Calvinism based on the Westminster standards, but it has during the last fifty years undergone, in one of its branches, considerable modification, even to the verge of Pelagianism. The latest monumental work of orthodox Calvinism is the "Systematic Theology" of the venerable and amiable Dr. Charles Hodge, of Princeton, who after celebrating the semi-centennial of a spotless and unusually successful career of public teaching (1872), entered into his rest (1878), but will long live in his books and in the grateful memory of innumerable pupils. Dr. Tholuck, the friend of his youth, had preceded him a year before.

In biblical and historical learning we are largely indebted to Germany, which has been for the last fifty years the chief intellectual and critical workshop of Protestantism, both orthodox and heterodox. Professor Stuart of Andover, and Professor Robinson of Union Seminary, New York (the well-known Palestine explorer), were the pioneers of biblical and Anglo-German learning in America. Since that time almost every important German contribution to theological science has been imported or translated, and many German scholars—Neander, Gieseler, Tholuck, Olshausen, Lange, Meyer, Delitzsch, etc.—have more readers in America than in their fatherland (if we are to judge from the success of their translated works). A considerable number of our students are annually resorting to Berlin, Leipzig, Halle, and other universities to complete their studies; and not unfrequently they extend their visit to Bible lands, where

they can read "the fifth Gospel" and study the Book in the land of its birth. The students return with the latest ideas and advances of European scholarship, and prepare the way for America's golden age of theology, which cannot be far distant.

The American ministry, while it may be behind in classical culture, is more orthodox and better trained for practical church work than that of Protestant countries of the Continent. A minister may choose among the different creeds, but is expected to be loyal to the one he has chosen. A preacher who does not believe what he preaches is regarded as a moral monstrosity, and would soon be disciplined or starved out. There are indeed a few smart and witty sensationalists who turn the sacred pulpit into a platform for the amusement of the hearers, and preach politics, æsthetics, and anything rather than the Gospel of Christ. But these are exceptions. Dull and tedious sermons are not more frequent than in some parts of Europe. The great evangelical doctrines of sin and grace are faithfully, earnestly, and effectively proclaimed in nearly all denominations.

SUNDAY-SCHOOLS.

In close connection with the church is the Sunday-school. It is the church for the young and rising generation. There is hardly a congregation which has not a Sunday-school attached to it. The pupils are divided into groups, and the groups are gratuitously taught by members of the church, male and female, under the superintendence of the pastor or a competent layman. The school is held either before or after the morning service. It is made attractive to children by lively music, pictures, anecdotes, and innocent amusements adapted to their capacity and taste. The chief and often the only text-book is the Bible, with or without a catechism. The recent system of interdenominational and international Scripture lessons has immensely stimulated and extended Bible studies, and called forth a flood of popular commentaries in periodicals and separate volumes.

The American Sunday-school instruction is of incalculable importance for the future of the country. It may often be very superficial; but that is the fault of the teachers, and not of the system, which admits of endless improvement. The Sunday-

school system supplements the scanty religious training of the public schools ; it popularizes and commends religion by bringing it down to the capacity of childhood in the spirit of unselfish love ; it develops a vast amount of lay-agency, and gives to young men and women a fine field of pleasant usefulness on the Lord's Day ; it promotes the proper observance of the Lord's Day by feeding His lambs ; it keeps alive a child-like spirit in the adults ; it attaches the parents to the church by the interest shown in their offspring ; and it is a most effective missionary agency by scattering the seed of new churches throughout the land.

The literature for children stimulated by the Sunday-school system is beyond any thing known in former ages of the world. There are illustrated child's papers with a circulation not only of tens of thousands but of hundreds of thousands of copies. That a large amount of this literature is not child-like but childish, may be expected. But the chaff is soon blown away, the wheat remains. Alongside with ephemeral productions you will find in the majority of Sunday-school libraries the best popular and devotional books and periodicals for teachers and pupils.

The American Sunday-school system has for the last ten or fifteen years found much favor on the continent of Europe, and is likely to become there a regular institution. A society in Brooklyn, consisting mostly of ladies, keeps up a regular correspondence with foreign Sunday-school workers and aids them with funds.

MISSIONS.

The churches in the United States spend more men and money for the conversion of the heathen than any other nation except the English. The two great branches of the Anglo-Saxon race, having the control over the seas and commercial intercourse with all parts of the world, are chiefly intrusted by Providence with the propagation of Bible Christianity to the ends of the earth. They have the means, and on them rests the responsibility. It is, however, but proper to state that some of the most devoted missionaries in the employ of the English

"Church Missionary Society" (including Bishop Gobat of Jerusalem) are Germans or Swiss trained in the Mission Institute of Basle.

Missions are carried on in America by the churches themselves as a regular church work, instead of being left to voluntary societies, as in the national churches of Europe. Each pastor and each congregation are supposed to be interested in the spread of the Gospel at home and abroad, and to contribute towards it according to their ability. Boards are appointed as the agencies of the church, with officers who devote their whole time to this cause. The missionaries are selected from the most gifted and zealous graduates of the theological seminaries, instead of being trained in separate institutions of a lower grade.

Hence American missionaries in foreign lands are admitted by disinterested observers to be men of superior character and education. Lord Shaftesbury commended the American pioneers of the mission in the Turkish empire for "a marvellous combination of common-sense and piety," and more recently (in 1878) Lord Beaconsfield called them "men of the highest principles, of even a sublime character; men who devote their lives to the benefit of their fellow-creatures, and seek no reward but the approval of their own consciences." It would be easy to collect similar testimonies from the books of travellers who have observed the labors of these missionaries in Turkey, Syria, India, China, and Japan.

The missionary activity is divided between Foreign missions, Home missions, and City missions.

1. The FOREIGN or HEATHEN missions began in the colonial period with the labors of John Eliot (the translator of an Indian Bible—the first Bible printed in America, 1663), David Brainerd, and David Zeisberger, among the red Indians, and if their zeal had been kept up the Indian problem would have been peacefully solved long ago. The first general Foreign Missionary Society was formed in 1810 under the name of the "American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions." It grew out of a society of students in the Theological Seminary at Andover. It embraced for a considerable period the Congregational, Presbyterian, Dutch Reformed, and German

Reformed churches, but is now purely Congregationalist ; the other churches having peacefully withdrawn to form their own missionary societies, with a view to develop more fully the liberality of their people. The Baptists, Methodists, Episcopalians, Lutherans, and other denominations have likewise their own mission boards.

These various societies are now supporting schools, churches, and presses among the native Indians, in the Sandwich Islands, in Turkey, Syria, Egypt, Persia, East India, Siam, China, Japan, South and West Africa, Mexico, and South America, and the papal countries of Southern Europe. Some of the most zealous propagandists regard even the lands of the Reformation as an open mission field, and provoke the opposition of those who look upon them as sectarian intruders, while others welcome them as helpers in reclaiming the destitute masses, and rejoice with St. Paul if only Christ be preached and souls saved.

The American Missionary Societies combined sustain at present about 600 Protestant missionaries and many times that number of native helpers in foreign fields, at an annual cost of about \$1,704,000. Of this sum the General Assembly of the Northern Presbyterian Church contributed last year \$468,147.

2. HOME Missions. The vast immigration from Europe and the constant emigration of Americans from the Eastern to the Western and Pacific States necessitates the organization of special efforts for supplying this population and the new settlements with the means of grace, with ministers, churches, and institutions of learning. All the leading denominations take part in this great work of Christianizing the continent. It is generally felt that, unless we follow the westward tide of our population with the gospel, we are threatened with a new and worse heathenism and barbarism.

As a specimen of what is done in this direction I will present a sketch of the work of the Congregational Home Missionary Society, which has been kindly furnished to me by one of its secretaries (the Rev. Dr. D. B. Coe):

"The Home Missionary work of the Congregational churches was commenced in Massachusetts about the year 1695, and was sustained by annual grants from the treasury of the colony. 'The Society for Propagating the Gospel among

the Indians, and others in North America' was founded in Boston in 1787, and was the first incorporated missionary society in the United States. In 1798 the Missionary Society of Connecticut was organized, and similar societies were formed soon afterward in the other New England States.

"The American Home Missionary Society, though planned in New England, was organized, May 12th, 1826, by individuals representing four denominations of Christians. The Associate Reformed, Reformed Dutch, and Presbyterian churches successively withdrew from this alliance, and since 1860 the society has represented Congregationalists only in the work of home missions. But its resources and its operations have rapidly increased. In its first year it expended \$13,984, and sustained 169 missionaries who preached to 196 congregations in fifteen States and Territories. More than two thirds (120) of these missionaries were stationed in the State of New York, and only 33 of them in the Western States and Territories. During its last year (1878) the society expended \$284,540, and sustained 996 missionaries, who preached to 2237 congregations in 32 States and Territories; and 604 of these laborers were stationed in Western States and Territories.

"In 52 years the American Home Missionary Society has collected and disbursed \$8,200,000. Through its agency 33,000 years of ministerial labor have been performed at more than 7000 stations in 45 States and Territories of the United States. About 4000 churches have been planted or aided in the support of the ministry, 281,000 persons have been gathered into them, and nearly 2000 of them have been raised to the condition of self-support."

3. The CITY Mission is a part of Home mission, and aims to evangelize the destitute and ignorant masses which congregate in large cities, especially in New York, where, as in ancient Rome, to use the words of Tacitus, "*cuncta undique atrocia aut pudenda confluunt celebranturque.*" It is conducted by combined effort of several denominations, or by separate denominations, or by individual congregations which establish and support mission Sunday-schools and chapels as a regular part of their work. "The New York City Mission and Tract Society," which is carried on by several denominations, but mainly

by Presbyterians, sustains forty missionaries (men and women), three organized churches, five chapels, five Sunday-schools with 2000 children, and expends annually about \$40,000. Besides, almost every denomination in New York has its own missions, and there are also independent missions among the seamen, the Germans, the Irish, the Italians, the colored people.

THE RELIGIOUS PRESS.

America is the paradise of newspapers. The paradise is, of course, not free from snakes. "The satanic press," so called, is stronger in a republic than in a monarchy, and does an incalculable amount of mischief. There is no restraint whatever on the freedom of the press, which accordingly reflects all the bad as well as good passions of the people, and all the bitterness of party contests, especially in times of election. But the Americans have much more confidence in freedom than in the police, and are determined to fight out the battle on this line, being convinced that truth is mightier than error, and must prevail in the end. Newspapers are, of course, amenable to public opinion, and in the struggle for life and success they must satisfy all the reasonable demands, and respect the usages and tastes of their readers. No decent paper would dare to defy the general sentiment of morality and religion. Even the worst of them publish more religious news than any secular paper in Europe.

Every American reads newspapers. He would rather do without his breakfast than without his morning paper, which gives him a bird's-eye view of the world's life on the preceding day. The leading dailies number their subscribers by tens of thousands, some reaching a circulation of over a hundred thousand. They are brought into every household, sold on the street, in the hotels, on the steamboats, in the railroad cars, and transmitted by post to the remotest settlements. Owing to their immense circulation and advertising patronage they can afford to be very cheap. The enterprise of American newspapers shrinks from no expense. They get telegraphic news and correspondence from all parts of the world, wherever any thing of

interest is going on. The Monday issues contain even reports of popular sermons as items of news, so that millions may read what thousands have heard the day before. One editor in New York succeeded, where geographical societies and government expeditions failed, in finding Livingstone in the wilds of Africa, and revealing the mysteries of that continent from the sources of the Nile to the western coast.

This spirit of enterprise communicates itself in large measure to the religious press. Every respectable denomination has its stately quarterly review, its monthly magazine, and its weekly newspaper or newspapers. The quarterlies are intended for scholars, and for that vast and steadily-growing theological lay-public which wants to be posted in the progress of theology and general literature, and to possess itself of the results of the latest learned researches. The magazines furnish light reading for the educated classes. The weeklies are religious newspapers in the proper sense of the term. Of the last class 30 are published in New York City, 21 in Philadelphia, 15 in Chicago, 14 in Cincinnati, 11 in Boston, 9 in St. Louis, 9 in San Francisco, 4 in Richmond.

The weekly religious newspaper is a peculiar American institution, and reaches almost every family. Europe has, of course, its religious periodicals, but with the exception of a few English weeklies, they are confined to purely ecclesiastical or devotional reading, and rarely exceed a circulation of one thousand copies. An American religious weekly treats *de rebus omnibus et quibusdam aliis*, and requires at least five thousand subscribers to be self-sustaining. It furnishes a weekly panorama of the world as well as of the church, avoiding, of course, all that is demoralizing and objectionable, but omitting nothing that is thought instructive, interesting, and edifying to a Christian family. Miscellaneous advertisements, ecclesiastical, literary, and commercial, take up a good deal of space and pay the heavy expense.

The religious newspaper furnishes throughout the year a library of useful and entertaining reading for the small sum of two or three dollars. It is a welcome weekly family visitor, and easily becomes an indispensable institution, a powerful aid to the pulpit, and a promoter of every good cause.

THE TEMPERANCE REFORM.

Intemperance is one of the greatest evils in America, and the most fruitful source of crime, pauperism, and taxation. It prevails especially among the lower classes, both native and foreign. A great deal of intemperance is imported from abroad, and made worse under the stimulating effect of the American climate and by the poisonous adulteration of liquors. The Latin races are generally temperate (though less so than the Arabs and Turks under the prohibition of wine by the Koran); the immigrants from the British Isles and from Scandinavia take to the strongest drinks; the Germans, whom Dr. Luther in his day charged with being possessed by the "Saufteufel," worship lager-beer, which is consumed in amazing quantities, and, although far less injurious, yet, in the opinion of Prince Bismarck, the greatest of living Germans, "makes stupid and lazy, and breeds democracy." Its effect is much worse in America, where every thing is apt to be carried to excess.

It is estimated that between six and seven hundred millions of dollars are annually expended in the United States for intoxicating drinks. In New York City alone there are 8000 licensed and unlicensed liquor-shops and lager-beer saloons. Chief-Justice Noah Davis, of New York, states from his long judicial experience that "one half of all the crimes of America and Great Britain is caused by the intemperate use of intoxicating liquors; and that of the crimes involving personal violence certainly three fourths are chargeable to the same cause." The liquor interest is a fearful monster: it defies or evades legislation, it uses bribery and corruption for its work of destruction, it devours the hard earnings of the poor, it brings misery and ruin on families, and sends thousands of drunkards reeling with a rotten body and a cheerless soul to a hopeless grave.

To counteract this gigantic evil the best efforts of philanthropists and Christians have been called into action. The temperance movement, while it reveals one of the darkest aspects of American society, is also among the strongest evidences of

the earnest, aggressive, reforming character of American Christianity. The "National American Temperance Society" covers the land with tracts and books setting forth the baneful effects of intemperance, and acts upon legislatures in behalf of prohibitive measures. There are besides innumerable local and congregational temperance organizations of men and women. Temperance lecturers travel over the land and address crowded audiences in churches, public halls, and theatres, inducing thousands to take the pledge after the example set in a previous generation by Father Matthew in Ireland. Among these lecturers are reformed drunkards like John Gough and Francis Murphy, men of extraordinary dramatic eloquence, made doubly effective by their own sad experience. The evangelists Moody and Sankey make temperance a prominent practical topic of their revival preaching. The Methodist Church as a body is a vast temperance society.

There is a difference of views as to the best means of curing the evil, but there is abundant room for a variety of methods.

The moderate temperance reformers advocate strict license laws, the prohibition of all artificial alcoholic drinks and the poisonous adulteration of genuine wine. Regarding total prohibition as undesirable or at least as impracticable, especially in large cities, they aim at such a regulation and diminution of the liquor traffic as will make it comparatively harmless. Unfortunately, in a heterogeneous city like New York the best legislation is so often defeated or evaded by faithless magistrates, who are elected and re-elected by the very breakers of the laws, that the independent efforts of disinterested citizens are necessary to bring the police and the judges up to their duty. Two years ago a vigorous Society for the Prevention of Crime was formed under the leadership of the Chancellor of the University of New York (Dr. Howard Crosby), by the influence of which 1739 unlicensed tippling houses were shut up, which had been allowed to do their work of mischief in the very teeth of the license law now on the statute-book.

The radical temperance reformers advocate total abstinence and the entire prohibition of the liquor traffic. They put fer-

mented wines and malt liquors in the same category with distilled spirits as alike poisonous. The Maine law, so called, has been actually tried in the State of Maine and several other States, but while it may be carried out in certain country districts, it is a dead letter in large cities.

The advocates of total abstinence differ again as to the ground on which they base their practice. Not a few denounce the drinking even of pure wine and beer as a sin, and thus unintentionally cast reproach on the character and example of our blessed Lord, who changed water into wine, and instituted the holy communion in wine as the symbol of His blood shed for the remission of our sins. I say, unintentionally, and under the strange delusion that the Bible wine was not fermented and not intoxicating, *i.e.*, no wine at all. But the vast majority of teetotalers base abstinence on the tenable ground of Christian charity and expediency; they apply Paul's principle concerning meat (1 Cor. 7: 13) to drink, and deny themselves a right in order to set a good example and to avoid giving offence to a weak brother.

It is certainly a commanding phenomenon that since the beginning of the temperance reform in America about fifty years ago, the use of wine as a beverage which formerly prevailed, as it still prevails all over Europe, has been greatly diminished in respectable society. The majority of the Protestant clergy and church-members content themselves with water, coffee, and tea. You can sit down in any decent hotel or give a social party to the most distinguished guests without a drop of wine. What is the rule in good society in Europe is the exception in America. Thus much at all events has been effected by the temperance reform. But much more is needed if the lower classes are to be saved from the deadly effects of the scourge of intemperance. The temperance movement will not stop until the sale of distilled liquors, such as rum, brandy, gin, and whiskey, as a beverage, is prohibited, and banished from the land.

THE TREATMENT OF THE FOREIGN RACES.

Our picture of American Christianity would not be complete without a glance at the treatment of the non-Caucasian

rac^{es}—the Negroes, the Indians, and the Chinese, who are brought as wards under the care of our government and our churches. The negroes were imported against their will by the iniquity of the African slave-trade, but have become naturalized and feel at home among the whites ; the Indians are the natives of the soil, but are still refused the privileges of citizens, and crowded out by the white men, or flee from them like the buffaloes of the prairies ; the Chinese emigrate voluntarily and form a distinct community of their own, but generally return again to their native China with the gains of their industry.

The conduct of the Americans towards these races is unfortunately characterized by the overbearing pride and oppression of a superior race, but redeemed by many examples of noble Christian devotion and a growing sense of our national guilt for the past and our duty for the present and future. The negro problem is at last happily solved, and it is to be hoped that the justice done to the Africans will ultimately be granted to the Indians and Chinese.

THE NEGROES.

The history of the African race in the United States is one of the most striking instances of God's wisdom and mercy overruling the wrath of man for His own glory. The civil war which brought the government to the brink of ruin was a just retribution for the national sin of slavery, but ended, by an immense sacrifice of blood and treasure, in the salvation of the Union against the suicidal rebellion of the slaveholders, and in the destruction of slavery. It would have been far more honorable if emancipation had been peacefully and gradually accomplished by voluntary action of Congress as a measure of justice and humanity, instead of being resorted to as a necessary war-measure in self-defence, with its inevitable consequence of chaotic confusion and bitter alienation of the Southern and Northern States, which it will take a whole generation to heal. Nevertheless the great cure has been accomplished, and four millions of negroes now enjoy the rights of free citizens. American slavery

lives only in "Uncle Tom's Cabin," and in those plaintive songs with which the jubilee and Hampton singers have moved the hearts of Europe as well as America.

With emancipation came a new zeal for the moral and religious training of the freedmen. Considering all the difficulties of the case, the progress made is quite encouraging. The negro problem is unfortunately still complicated with party politics. The sooner the negro's rights and wrongs are taken out of politics the better.

The Southern churches have the negroes more immediately under their care and could do most for them, but they are fearfully impoverished by the war, and need Northern aid. The Baptists, Methodists, and Presbyterians have special societies and agencies for this branch of Christian philanthropy. The Roman Catholics also have made quiet and earnest efforts in that direction, but without much success. Schools, academies, colleges, and theological seminaries have been founded for the special benefit of the negroes; prominent among them are Howard University at Washington, Lincoln University, Fisk University, and the College at Hampton, near Fortress Monroe, in Virginia. It is supposed that one third or nearly one half of the colored people are now under direct Christian instruction. The negroes are very religious by nature, and infidelity is scarcely known among them; but their moral sense of honesty and chastity is weak. They have a marked preference for the Baptist and Methodist types of Christianity, which seem to be best suited to their emotional and demonstrative nature. They present a very important home-mission field to American Christians and philanthropists. Many of them no doubt will in course of time carry the Gospel to Africa, and form Christian colonies after the example of Liberia.

THE INDIAN PROBLEM.

The Indian problem is as dark as midnight. It has been called the devil's labyrinth, out of which there seems to be no escape. The romance of the earlier encounters between the

white and the red men, with which we are familiar from Cooper's novels, has long passed away. The story of the aborigines, the original lords of the soil, now reduced to beggary and apparently doomed to extinction, is a sad tragedy that must fill every American Christian with mingled indignation, humiliation, and shame. In the Ordinance of 1787 for the government of the national domain north-west of the Ohio River, the government solemnly declared that "the utmost good faith shall always be preserved towards the Indians, that their lands and property shall never be taken from them without their consent." And yet since the forcible removal of the Cherokees from the State of Georgia in 1830, the policy pursued towards the Indians has been one of most expensive mismanagement and injustice. There is no valid excuse, for the English Government, by strict adherence to treaty obligation, gets along well enough with the Indians in British North America.

The blame lies first upon those border ruffians who poison the Indians with the worst vices of civilization, covet their lands, push them farther and farther west from their reservations, and look upon them, not as human beings to be civilized, but simply as red-skins and incurable savages, doomed to extermination, like the hopelessly corrupt Canaanites of old ; then upon unprincipled Indian agents, who cheat both the government and the Indians by selling them rotten blankets and rotten provisions ; and finally upon the government itself, which has pursued no fixed and consistent policy of its own, but yields to the pressure of squatter sovereigns and political rings, and under this pressure violates the most solemn treaty obligations.

Is it a wonder that the poor Indian savages rise again and again in rebellion against such iniquities ? The expense of the Indian wars is so enormous that every Indian killed in battle is said to cost the government twenty thousand dollars, besides valuable lives. It is only too true what President Bartlett recently wrote (in the *New York Independent* for February 13th, 1879) :

"For at least fifty years the history of our relations to the Indian tribes has been chiefly a record of broken faith, oppressions, and exasperations on our part, followed by slaughters to put down the resistance and retaliation thus

aroused. The present and the past Administrations have shown a desire to protect the rights and interests of the tribes. But the fundamental method has been faulty; and for the most part the hand of the Government has been hard and heavy upon a race that have shown themselves, where properly approached, singularly accessible to religion and civilization. Add to this the frauds of civil agents, the violence of soldiers, the barbarity of officers, the corrupting influence of white renegades and swindlers, the devices and plottings of railway and timber speculators, the inroads of eager squatters, and the cold-blooded heartlessness that glosses over all this with the maxim that 'the weaker race is destined to fade away before the stronger,' and one is constrained to ask, Shall this go on forever? How long, O Lord! how long?"

The American Congress and people are now seriously roused on the subject, and are discussing the various modes of settling the difficult problem. Some advocate 'the transfer of the Indian affairs from the Interior Department of the Government to the War Department which managed it before, while others deprecate such a change from religious motives. General Sherman, however, recently assured the public that as long as he remains commander-in-chief, "every religious denomination should have a fair chance to establish schools, churches, and charitable societies among each and all the tribes," and that he will "personally and officially encourage every effort to convert the wild warrior to the obedient citizen with some Christian virtues superadded—be those Methodist, Episcopalian, Quaker, or Catholic."

It can scarcely be expected that the Indian can at once be changed from a wild hunter into a quiet farmer without passing first through the transition of nomad life. Above all things, treaties should be sacredly kept, or not made at all.

Whatever is to be done ought to be done quickly, for the race is gradually dying out. According to the last report of the Indian Commissioners, which contains some important facts, the whole number of Indians, exclusive of Alaska, is said to be only 250,864, against 251,000 in 1877 and 266,000 in 1876.

One thing seems certain from past experience and is confirmed by this report, that schools and missionary work are the shortest and surest road to Indian civilization. The government spent last year \$352,125 for educational purposes, and the religious societies \$66,759, making a total of \$418,885—consider.

ably more than in the previous year. There are 366 schools with 12,222 children. There are 41,309 Indians who can read. The number of missionaries of different denominations at work, exclusive of teachers, is 226, and there are 219 church buildings. It is very difficult to overcome the deep-rooted dissatisfaction and prejudices of the hostile Indians against the whites, and they must be kept under military control and at the same time be dealt with in an honorable manner that will convert them to better views. But other agents make favorable reports. The Rev. H. Swift, an Episcopal missionary at Cheyenne River (Dakota) Agency, reports that during six years spent among the Sioux he has witnessed a great change. "They were a wild, painted, armed, unfriendly, filthy, idle, dissolute, and heathen people. Now they dress properly, are cleanly, industrious, and have a desire to learn. Heathenism is no longer in the ascendant; but large congregations attend church services, and the number of professed Christians is increasing."

THE CHINESE.

The emigration from China (mostly from the province of Canton) began after the annexation of California and the discovery of the gold mines in 1848. The total number of Chinese emigrants during the last thirty years is estimated at 270,000, of whom more than one half have died or returned to their native land; the rest are scattered through the United States, mostly on the coast, but keep entirely aloof from assimilation with the Caucasian race. About 109,000 are now living in California (which has a total population of 670,000), and from 20 to 25,000 in the neighboring States and Territories. At San Francisco they occupy a special quarter of the city, which presents all the occupations, amusements, and strange customs of Chinadom.

The Chinese are intelligent, industrious, frugal, and peaceful. They furnish few inmates of hospitals and prisons. They have done much to develop the foreign trade and the resources of the country, and it is doubtful whether the great Pacific Railroad could have been built without their aid. Although their highest

ambition is to return to China with the gains of their industry, they leave the result of their labor behind, which is far more valuable than their earnings. The Surveyor-General of California estimates that they have increased the value of property in that State \$290,000,000 within ten years, and this property is held by white men. They have reclaimed a million acres of marsh lands, and raised their value from \$3 to \$100 per acre. This is a better showing than can be claimed by any equal number of "sand-lot hoodlums," as the white rabble of the Kearney stripe in San Francisco are called.

But, on the other hand, the Chinese bring with them also the vices and filth of heathenism, and are destitute of the ennobling influences of family life. Most of their imported women (who number only 7000) are said to be prostitutes of the lowest grade. Moreover, by their ability to live on rice and to do as good work for lower wages they have aroused the envy and indignation of the laboring classes in the Pacific States. Politicians irrespective of party are always hungry for votes, and many of them care more for money and power than for principle and honor. The same spirit of exclusive native Americanism which twenty years ago, under the name of Knownothingism, was turned against the Irish and German emigrants, was roused against the Mongolians, but now found its chief supporters among the Irish laborers, who suffer most from this competition. The whole Pacific coast resounded with the cry, "The heathen Chinese must go."¹

The anti-Mongolian crusade came to a crisis in the last session of Congress, which passed by a large majority the Chinese-exclusion bill, forbidding under penalties any vessel from bringing hereafter to American shores, at one time, more than fifteen Chinamen, whether as visitors or immigrants. This bill is not only contrary to the traditional policy of the country, which hospitably opens the door to voluntary emigrants from all parts of

¹ The spirit and tendency of this new form of nativism was well expressed and reduced *ad absurdum* by the following fictitious counter-petitions, which we quote as specimens of American humor from the *N. Y. Tribune* of February 25th, 1879:

To the Honorable House of Representatives.

The undersigned, legal voters and citizens of the United States, respectfully ask

the world without distinction of race and color, but it is also an open violation of articles five and six of the "Burlingame Treaty" of 1869, wherein the United States of America and the Emperor of China, recognizing the inherent and inalienable right of voluntary expatriation, and the mutual advantage of free migration and emigration of their citizens from one country to the other, for purposes of curiosity, trade, or permanent residence, pledge to such emigrants the enjoyment of the same privileges, immunities, or exemptions in respect to travel and residence as are enjoyed by citizens or subjects of the most favored nation.

The President therefore very properly vetoed the bill, March 2d, 1879, and the House of Representatives wisely re-

that you prevent the immigration of any more Germans to this country, because they will drink lager, go on Sunday excursions, save their money, and are buying up all the land in the country.

ROBERT MACGREGOR,
HUGH MACDOUGAL,
SANDY MACPHERSON,
and 1000 others.

To Yer Honers the Mimbers of Congress:

We the unthersigned citizens of the United States of Amerikie respectfully petition you to tack into the "Haythen Chinees" bill the white naggers or Ratalians that are coming over here in dhroves and working ten or twelve hours a day for nothin' at all at all, and boarding thimselves at that. Now what can an honest man do to airn a dacent livin' if you don't put a stop to it?

PATRICK O'REILLY,
MICHAEL McDERMOTT,
WM. JAMES O'SULLIVAN,
and 1000 others.

CONGRISHMAN: Vot for you no schtop dem Irishman shust de same mit Schine-man? He drinks up all de viskey like nothings, votes every time all day long, and makes drubles mit us. And it is shust so easy mit de needle in de camels' eye ash to have de behind vordt mit the Irishman.

JACOB ROERHAUSEN,
HANS BUMGARTEN,
PETER VON STEINBURGER,
and many others.

To Ze Grand Congress.

SHENTLEMEN: If you vill keeps out of ze countarie, all ze Germans, all ze Irish, all ze Anglasie, wis all ze, ze—vat you calls him—Shine—mans and evra boda but ze Frenchmans, you vill have one magnifishant Republic.

LOUIS DU BOISE,
PAUL COGNAC.

fused to pass it over his veto. Thus the national honor was saved from disgrace, and the wisdom of the veto power confided in the Executive, which guards the right of individual conscience, has received a striking illustration by showing that the President with the veto may better represent the national sentiment than a Congress of politicians attempting to outbid each other for a party advantage.

A wholesale immigration of heathen Mongolians for permanent residence might indeed endanger the Christian civilization of America, and would justify a modification or abrogation of the treaty by mutual consent of the two governments. But the experience of 1877 and 1878 does not justify such an apprehension, but the probability that the emigration from Asia will decrease rather than increase.

It is gratifying that the Christian sentiment of all denominations, as far as it has been manifested during the recent agitation in petitions and religious newspapers, has been strongly against the bill of Congress and in favor of the President's veto. How could it be otherwise? The instincts of the Christian heart are always in favor of peace and good-will toward men. A law like the one proposed by Congress would have been a fatal blow to Christian missions among the Chinese now residing in America, and probably also in China itself, by provoking measures of retaliation. The only way to Christianize them is kind treatment.

The missionary efforts which have been made by various churches among the Chinese in the Pacific States are by no means discouraging, if we consider the wide-spread prejudice against them. There are flourishing Chinese mission schools in San Francisco and Oakland, numbering, it is said, over three thousand attendants. I had never more attentive listeners than when I addressed one of them a year ago. A Presbyterian pastor at Oakland told me that he had in his large church for several years fifteen Chinese converts, who during all that time had led as consistent a Christian life as any equal number of American members. It is supposed that about one thousand Chinamen have been converted. Besides, two hundred Chinese youths are educated at the expense of their government in

various American institutions, and show remarkable aptitude for learning.

The providential design in the Chinese immigration seems to be the same as in the involuntary importation of the African slaves : it looks towards the extension of Christ's kingdom and the salvation of men. The conversion of Chinese immigrants, most of whom will return, is the entering wedge for the conversion of that immense empire, which numerically represents more than one fourth of the population of the globe.

PHILIP SCHAFF.

THE LATEST PHASES OF THE PHILOSOPHIC MOVEMENT IN ITALY.

DURING the Renaissance (1400 to 1500 A.D.), Italy directed the philosophic movement in Europe. The schools of Padua, Bologna, and Florence were greatly renowned; Aristotelianism and Platonism, those two immortal forms of philosophy, had most illustrious representatives in these schools; but with the tortures of Campanella and the martyrdom of Giordano Bruno, the symmetrical development of thought came to an end, stifled by the Inquisition and by despotism. Italy, invaded by strangers, ceased to belong to herself, and philosophy could only soar again with the awakening of national sentiment and the efforts of patriotism to recover independence.

I.

Amid the precursors of those events which have resulted in the reconstruction of Italian nationality, there figure illustrious writers and philosophers. The names of Romagnosi, of Galluppi, of Rosmini, of Gioberti, of Mamiani, are bound up in the gratitude of Italians with those of Parini, of Foscolo, of Alfieri, of Manzoni, of Pellico, of Niccolini. The doctrines of which the former of these are the authors, form a body of thought which has been the theme of a work in two volumes ("Essay on the History of Philosophy in Italy during the Nineteenth Century," by Louis Ferri. Paris, 1869), and we must familiarize ourselves with their essential characteristics if we are to form a true idea of the actual condition of philosophy in the Italian peninsula. They not only contain the most original and influential thought of Italy in the sphere of philoso-

phy during the last century, but are at the same time the mark at which the attacks of dissentient criticism are aimed, and the point of new departures. But while I propose to set forth that which in the philosophic productions of the Italy of our age is spontaneous and characteristic, I do not propose to maintain that the spirit of the peninsula has developed itself without aid from abroad, or without reference to the past. On the contrary, foreign influence and historic traditions have stamped a deep impress upon its labors, so much so that without the philosophies of Scotland, of Germany, and of France, on the one hand, and the ideas of Christianity and scholasticism on the other, the most important works of contemporary Italian philosophers would be incomprehensible.

II.

Italy may be said to have had no other philosophy than that of Condillac and the encyclopædists before the year 1819. The *Traité des Sensations*, variously commentated for the use of schools by the Abbé Soave and the economist Gioja, feebly modified by the celebrated jurisconsult Romagnosi, and applied by them to the various branches of human knowledge, ruled, with rare exceptions, in the teachings and writings of philosophers from the north of Italy to the south.

The appearance of a work by the Calabrian, Pasquale Galluppi (*Saggio filosofico sulla critica della conoscenza*), was the signal for a revolution. Devoted to the study of philosophy, and particularly to the investigation of the fundamental problem of cognition, discontented with the sensualistic solution of this problem, the author of this work demands of history, of the discussion of systematic philosophy and of psychological analysis, a solution more in conformity with common-sense and the instincts of humanity.

The Cartesian and Scotch schools and the philosophy of Kant are the principal historic sources from which he draws, and his *Lettere filosofiche su le vicende della filosofia relativamente a' principii delle conoscenze umane da Cartesio insino a Kant*, published in 1827, and translated later into French, prove, by the clearness and exactitude which distinguishes them, how thoroughly he had comprehended their theories.

It is true that Galluppi is indebted for these results in no small degree to Cousin and his school, since their expositions and translations facilitated his access to theories which he could not comprehend in their original tongue. None the less, however, Galluppi is a truly distinguished psychologist, and the acumen of his analysis exercised a propitious influence on the philosophical studies of Italy. As a defender of spiritualism, and consequently of the distinction between mind and matter, between God and the world, he put forth all his efforts to demonstrate their existence by what he calls the reality of cognition. With what success did he meet in this enterprise? Criticism reproaches him with having pretended to base the legitimacy of our belief in the existence of the external world on the objectivity of sensation, and with having misunderstood the special function attributed by Reid to perception; in other words, with having confounded in this question the distinct offices of sensibility and intelligence. The manner in which he accounts for the existence of the soul has incurred the same reproach; for he bases it upon a sense which he confounds with consciousness, properly so called.

It is very true that Galluppi never takes into consideration the difference which exists between the different phases of experience, and especially between those which in his system are fundamental, one of which he designates as immediate or primitive experience, and the other as secondary, derived or compared experience. According to his theory, these two phases are to be distinguished in that the former contains nothing but sensible elements, while the latter is the resultant of sensible elements and of intellectual elements or ideas. It is true that between these two forms of knowledge there is exerted an activity of the soul and an intellectual operation which commences with attention and produces by analysis and synthesis those ideas which are necessary to carry over experience of the first kind to that of the second. Unfortunately, Galluppi's exposition of these ideas remained incomplete in this essential point, his very language is equivocal; and although he compelled himself to shun the shoals of idealism and of sensualism, although he sought a realism conformable to common-sense, he did not in the least succeed in dispelling the mists which surround his "Objectivity of Sensation."

The feeling (*sentiment*) of self is in Galluppi's system an integral element of every phenomenon of perception ; but he distinguishes this feeling from the reality of the soul considered in its substantial unity. This unity, which he calls metaphysical, is for him the resultant of a course of reasoning based upon synthesis and the products of that function. In his mind every idea, every mental representation is a synthetic unity, which supposes the metaphysical unity of the Ego. In the same way, as he thinks, the reality of divine existence is neither given in an *a priori* intuition, as the ontologists suppose, nor left in that uncertainty to which Kant's Critique of Pure Reason condemns it. The idea of the absolute is, he believes, suggested by that of the relative, the idea of the infinite and necessary by those of the finite and contingent, and the existence of the Being to whom the attributes of infinity and necessity belong is demonstrated by a process of reasoning whose premises are furnished by the perception of finite realities and by the principle of causality.

The theory of Galluppi with reference to this all-important point is altogether too imperfect ; his explication of the origin of the idea of the absolute, which he seeks in the analysis of the relative and in an operation of the intelligence, is wrecked upon insurmountable difficulties, the most manifest of which is the impossibility of positing the absolute as an element of another object, and, above all, of its exact contrary.

We will now proceed from these unsatisfactory particulars to those in which Galluppi's system stands firm. The first is the distinction between external phenomena and the energy of the soul which appears as it really is, especially in thought and intelligence, whilst the qualities of sensible things are the distinct appearances of the things which they reveal to us. Another point of doctrine which has a clearly discernible affinity with the preceding is the veracity of consciousness, *criterion* of truth, with which, according to Galluppi, all others are connected, because the very axioms which rule our demonstrations are the products of consciousness before they become universal laws, and because the particular rules of external perception and the products of sensible cognition cannot exist for us without forming, in the first place, a part of a natural whole and a concrete

synthesis, of which the consciousness of the Ego and its modes is a necessary condition.

The *rôle* which Galluppi assigns to consciousness and the keen analysis which he gives us of its attributes bring him, on the one hand, into close relationship with Reid, and separate him, on the other, by a wide gulf from Kant. With the former he attributes to consciousness an immediate certainty, which, based upon the consciousness of the Ego and aided by reason, reaches the metaphysical unity of the soul, whilst he refuses to see, with the second, in the functions of the conscious mind any thing else than the means of internal representation, without any necessary connection with reality in itself. In other words, consciousness furnishes him in the modes of the subject a part of the internal noumenon which it belongs to reason to complete.

However, in his sincere endeavor in the search for truth, united with a circumspection which separates him from the spirit of system, Galluppi does not hesitate to borrow from Kant the means of grounding his ethical systems, the notion of which he regards as an *a priori* element of practical reason (*connaissance*). Nevertheless, in spite of this transcendental side of his system, Galluppi believed himself to have founded a philosophy of experience, and defended it as such in the chair which he occupied in the University of Naples from 1831 till his death in 1846. But what we have just said will suffice to show that every thing in his system did not have an experimental origin. Italian metaphysics, also, weighed down by the difficulties raised against sensualism and empiricism, had to enter resolutely upon the course which the Calabrian philosopher had just marked out for morals. Ontologism rules in the phase whither we are about to follow it.

III.

The author of this revolution was a member of the clergy, a cadet of a noble family of the Venetian provinces. Antonio Rosmini, born at Roveredo in 1799, was never a teacher of philosophy, but he had at his disposal resources more efficacious perhaps than those of a professorial chair. He was rich, and his inclination having turned him toward the Church he con-

ceived and carried out the project of forming a religious order (Istituto della Carità) whose members should naturally become the disciples and expounders of his doctrine. In the month of May, 1829, appeared the celebrated work in which his doctrine is set forth. The "New Essay on the Origin of Ideas" (Nuovo Saggio sull'origine delle Idee) is composed of three distinct parts. In the first part all systems of importance are reviewed and divided into two classes, as they sin on the side of defect or of excess—that is to say, as they admit conditions too many or too few for the purpose of explaining the origin of ideas. In the second and third parts the Italian philosopher develops his own theory, the aim of which is to avoid whatever does not suffice or goes too far in the others. Some of the essential features of this theory are as follows: on the one hand, it grants to the school of experience that reality is based on and is an endowment of feeling (*sentiment*). On the other hand, it admits with the critical school that knowledge without an *a priori* element is impossible; of the two elements in knowledge, matter and form, one is furnished by sensibility, the other by the intellect, and more particularly by the intellectual intuition of Being. Whilst the empirical school admits too little to explain ideas, the ontological schools in general, and the critical philosophy in particular, admit far too much, because in place of a single *a priori* idea which can suffice to account for the genesis of others they unnecessarily enlarge the formal element, whether it be by the doctrine of innate ideas or by that of the forms of the sensibility and the understanding. According to Rosmini, it suffices for the explanation of cognition to remark that at the basis of each act of cognition lies with the elements of sensible origin the intuition of Being, the idea of which serves to unite them and render them intelligible and objective, or to cause them to be thought as they are in themselves. In other words, all ideas except one are formed by perception and formulate themselves by judgments, in which they present themselves to analysis as determinations of Being; and as the first judgment as well as the last are in the same condition, and as, besides, the Being of which we are speaking is indeterminate and universal and opposed to the concrete and particular given in experience, it follows, in Rosmini's system, that it constitutes the sole and neces-

sary *a priori* form of all knowledge ; so that the law of our faculty of cognition is a primary synthesis between the ideal or possible Being manifested to the understanding and the real Being revealed by the senses, a synthesis whose condition is the unity of the soul, and which corresponds up to a certain point with that which Kant admitted in every mental representation and in every concept, with this important difference, however, that the *a priori* formal element admitted by Rosmini in his syntheses is a unity, while that of Kant is a multiplicity, and that the same element is in the one objective, in the other subjective.

IV.

Such is the basis of the most important system of philosophy which has appeared in Italy during the nineteenth century. We would not, however, have any exact comprehension of its origin if we were to limit ourselves to the consideration of its points of agreement with Kant's Critique or with the philosophy of experience. Its founder yields, to be sure, to a desire of combating scepticism and of establishing the objectivity of reason, but he also proposes to himself the reconciliation of science and revelation. This design, which he expressly avows, is followed out in the fundamental ideas of his ontology. The ideal Being, the presence of which he exerts himself to prove in the intellectual intuition of man, and which virtually contains the types and intelligible reasons of all finite realities, constitutes with the substantial principle of these realities—that is, with the infinite reality—two aspects of the absolute Being, the relation of which gives birth to the third fundamental form of Being—namely, moral Being.

It is on these three forms of Being that Rosmini bases his philosophical interpretation of the dogma of the Trinity. The Real corresponds to the Father, the Ideal to the Son, or Word, the Moral to the divine Love or Spirit.

This is a theory far enough removed, as the reader will observe, from the circumspect efforts of Galluppi's psychology. Rosmini is a theologian as well as a philosopher. To this far-reaching and mighty soul, to this persevering investigator, it was granted within a lifetime comparatively short to bring to-

gether a complete encyclopædia of philosophic science, scattered amidst a large number of works, among which those devoted to Anthropology and Psychology excite a deep interest to this day.¹ Rosmini founded a school. Although his numerous adherents belong for the most part to the clergy, yet we find among them many of the laity, eminent men, like Pellico, Manzoni, and Tommaseo.² An innovator in philosophy, Rosmini aspired as well to the reform of the Church, and through the Church to that of the State. His writings on the Five Plagues of the Church (1848) and on the Constitution according to Social Justice (1848), show the tendency of his reform to be partly a liberal one, partly in opposition to public sentiment.

V.

Italian philosophy, thus started upon a course in which science and religion were allied in one cause and aimed at the same practical end, could not pause half-way. Its union with theology was about to become the most intimate possible, and both were destined to be employed for some time to come as direct instruments of political revolution in the hands of another reformer. This, in point of fact, was the end which the Abbé Vincenzo Gioberti proposed to himself. The writings of this illustrious patriot and author, composed in exile and secretly introduced into the peninsula when roused by the need for liberty and independence, exercised a paramount influence upon the events of 1848 and the temporary alliance between the Pontificate and the Italian people.

The most remarkable features in his ontologism are these: In place of the *a priori* intuition of ideal existence which Rosmini had made the keystone of his ideological system, Gioberti set up another intuition which embraces both absolute and relative Being, and a relation of creation between the two. While Rosmini had reduced the transcendent object of the pure understanding to a minimum, Gioberti raised it to a

¹ Rosmini's principal works are: *Nuovo Saggio sull' origine delle Idee*, *Psicologia*, *Antropologia*, *Logico*, *Teodicea*, *Principii di Scienza Morale*, *Filosofia del Diritto*, *Del Principio Supremo della Metodica*.

² The famous Tommaseo was a colleague of Daniel Manin in the provisional government of Venice in 1848.

maximum. *L'Ente crea l'Esistente* was, according to Gioberti, the magic formula, the application of which ought to regenerate science and society; and certainly as it was interpreted and developed in his works, and especially in the *Primato morale e civile degl' Italiani* and in the *Introduzione allo studio della Filosofia*,¹ it seemed plausible and fertile; but in reality its worth depended less on its own power than on the might of the spirit which made it the instrument of its designs and filled it with his ideas. We will only say that in making of the mystery of creation not only a philosophic dogma, but the incomprehensible object of the understanding, Gioberti could not without reason be accused of reducing philosophy again to the servile position which it had occupied in the middle ages. This is in substance the reproach which others uttered and which he himself felt in the latter part of his life, when the hopes with which the pontificate of Pius IX. had inspired him in its first years were shattered and he had changed his philosophy as well as his politics. The scattered outlines of this change, in which, without misunderstanding the points of agreement between reason and faith, he at the same time traced their distinct spheres in a system more rational than the former, have been preserved for us in the collection of fragments published as his posthumous works. Belied by political events, resisted by the spirit of the laity and by the progress of the historical and natural sciences, the close alliance between philosophy and theology of which Gioberti had dreamed was destroyed; but its fall did not embrace that of ontologism. Among the contemporaries of Rosmini and Gioberti, Count Mamiani had already embraced its doctrines, after having been for some time an adherent of the philosophy of experience to which he had devoted his work *Del Rinnovamento dell' antica filosofia Italiana* (1834). The cause of this change was a controversy between him and the Abbé Rosmini on the origin of ideas; but he did not pass without some reservations into the enemy's camp.

¹ The first philosophical work of Gioberti is entitled *Teorica del Sovranaturale*, Bruxelles, 1838. The *Introduzione allo studio della Filosofia* was published in 1839-40; the *Primato morale e civile degl' Italiani* in 1842-43. Besides these he wrote the *Treatise del Bello* (1841), the *Errori filosofici di Antonio Rosmini* (1842), and *Il Gesuita Moderno* (1847).

His writings bear the impress of an independent mind, and have modified in more than one vital point the ontologism prevalent in Italy. Like Rosmini and Gioberti, M. Mamiani admits an intellectual intuition, but he limits its object infinitely more than Gioberti, and extends its range far beyond the bounds fixed by Rosmini. According to him we have an ideal vision of the absolute Being, but while we attain through this higher function of the understanding directly to its existence, we can not do so but by the aid of ideas, intellectual forms, intermediate between the soul and the principle of truth, and of Being. Thus while the object of intuition is for Rosmini ideal, not real, a something which is divine without being God ; while it comprehends for Gioberti the universe in abridgment, it is limited for Mamiani to the divine reality without embracing the attributes of God. Ideas are also in Mamiani's system very different from what they are in those of Rosmini and Gioberti. While Rosmini thinks them the determinations of a universal form or sole idea playing the rôle of mediator between God and man, while Gioberti thinks them the determinations of infinite Being, of finite existence and the relation of these two objects, the first intuition of which particularizes and develops itself under the auspices of an *ontological reflection*, Mamiani regards them as objective forms by which the absolute reveals and represents itself to our intelligence. These three philosophers differ also in their extension of the part which experience plays in the generation of our cognition. Rosmini holds the share of the ideal in our perceptions and conceptions to be that of a sole and constant form to which the senses add an element manifold and variable. Ideas are in his system the innumerable daughters of a marriage ceaselessly renewed between the ideal and real in the womb of the human soul, if we may be allowed to express ourselves thus. Gioberti holds, if we examine only the works published during his lifetime, that our sensations and perceptions furnish only the necessary occasion for the development of the intuition and the manifestation of ideas. Finally, Mamiani, while he maintains for the ideas considered in themselves an existence objective and independent of sensible things and the sentient subject, unites them to experience in two ways. First, he lays down that no one of them is innate, that no one of

them presents itself in consciousness without a previous exercise of perception ; this, then, allows him to say that *universals* are *ante rem* and *cognitions post rem* ; lastly, distinguishing in them matter and form, he agrees that it is only in form that they differ from the corresponding subjective and objective phenomena, and that consequently they represent externally (*ad extra*) finite things in the province of experience, and internally (*ad intra*) the divine activity by which all things are created or are possible. We observe, therefore, that what is especially Mamiani's in this development of the theory of ideas is his method of representing their nature ; in his system they are neither modes of the divine thought as in those of Malebranche and St. Augustine, nor are they substantial determinations of divine existence as Plato declared, nor yet a kind of abstract and detached attribute of God like the ideal existence of Rosmini, but they are a kind of superior and transcendent phenomenality of the divine activity in relation on one side to God as their immediate cause, and on the other to the human intelligence which observes them and to the things of which they are copies. Here we have, as is easy to be seen, the form of Platonism modified by a mind justly preoccupied by the difficulties in which the systems of his predecessors had remained befogged. It is the work of an intelligence which understands the needs of an age ruled by the sentiment of the real, by the experimental method, and which, nevertheless, aspires to preserve the ontological foundations of rational theology and the objectivity of the necessary truths, an objectivity shaken by the Critique of Kant and denied by scepticism and empiricism.

VI.

Another point which we must mention, in this too rapid review of Mamiani's system, refers to external perception. The Italian philosopher wished, like Reid, to free it from the compromising mixture of representative ideas and abstract conceptions, and he believes himself to have attained this by the application of his general views regarding the conjunction of existences to the harmony between the subject perceiving and the

object perceived, and by the direct observation of internal facts as they fit into our sensible and intellectual intercourse with the external world.

The passivity which shows itself in our existence at the moment of the action of the external forces upon us and the intuitive act which perceives both the one and the other, are the facts on which he most insists and from which he draws this conclusion: that, considered in its essence, the perception of realities is altogether distinct from the intellectual intuition of ideas, and that it essentially consists in a perception of the meeting of two acts, one of which appertains to the subject, the other to the object.

Our space does not permit us to enter into further details. To form an idea of the different spheres in which the philosophic activity of Mamiani exerted itself, we must peruse the numerous books in which are set forth his views on the fundamental principles of law and on the international law of Europe (*D'un nuovo diritto Europeo*), on the connection of Religion and the State (*Teorica della Religione e dello Stato*), and especially on cosmology and the causes of progress, *Principii di Cosmologia* (in the second volume of the *Confessioni d'un Metafisico*). In all these works, whose elegant and pure style recalls that of the best Italian writers of the sixteenth century, Mamiani sometimes defends, sometimes modifies and completes the doctrines of the school whose leader he is. The distinction between theology and philosophy purposely mingled and confounded by Gioberti is re-established in his works. A love of free thought, a sincere desire for discussion, an unalterable faith in the triumph of truth, guide and animate his controversial writings, and have no other counterpoise than the love of the beautiful and patriotism. Mamiani was a poet before he was a philosopher, but for more than forty years his muse has been that of science and of eloquence.¹

¹Besides the *Rinnovamento dell'antica filosofia Italiana*, the *Confessioni d'un Metafisico*, the *Fondamenti della filosofia dell'Diritto*, *D'un nuovo diritto Europeo*, the *Teorica della Religione e dello Stato*, let us note, among other works of Mamiani, the *Dialoghi di scienza prima*, the *Meditazioni Cartesiane rinnovate*, *Dell'ontologia e del metodo*, and his *Lettere all'abbate Rosmini*.

VII.

About Mamiani there have grouped themselves in these days the partisans of a rational and independent spiritualism, who, while they agree with the last representative of Italian Platonism in a certain number of vital points, such as the objective reality of cognition, the spiritual nature of the human soul, its freedom and moral destiny, and the divine government of the world, yet belong to different schools or follow different methods. The principal of these are the lamented Bertini, professor of the history of philosophy in the University of Turin, where he has left memories of a career of instruction remarkable for erudition and critical force ; Bonatelli, professor of philosophy in the University of Padua, a Herbartian in theory ; Burzalotti, and the other co-editors of the *Filosofia delle Scuole Italiane*, a Review whose direction the author of this article shares with Count Mamiani. Sincerely attached to philosophic speculation and to the noble interests which are united in it, these writers are so animated by a love of truth and of independence that they often engage among themselves in controversies on the fundamental questions of philosophy. The problems of perception, of the idea, of the relation of the spirit to the absolute, the foundations of religion and of revelation, have all in turn been examined with great freedom of discussion and criticism.

VIII.

The principles of philosophic spiritualism of which this review is the organ in Italy are naturally opposed to those which inspire the *Civiltà Cattolica*, a theological organ under the direction of the Jesuits devoted to the Vatican and pontifical despotism. The *Civiltà Cattolica* represents in philosophy the school which gives its adhesion and lends its support to Thomism as well as to the dogma of the infallibility of the Pope and to the anathemas hurled by the syllabus of Pius IX. against the public liberties, the rights of the state, and the idea of progress. This invariable attachment of the Jesuits to the doctrine of the Catholic commentator of Aristotle is naturally associated with a bitter aversion to ontologism and to Platonism, and the reason for it is perhaps as much practical as speculative. For

Thomism as it is generally understood by the Jesuits restrains to the furthest extent the power of human reason, while Platonism raises it above the limited horizon of the real into the sphere of the ideal and its divine archetypes. One is far more favorable than the other to obedience, and is consequently appropriated to that immobility of the Church to which the Thomist school seems to consecrate all its endeavor; and up to this time it has been crowned by success, for not only do its doctrines generally prevail among all the Catholic clergy of Italy, but, aided by powerful influence, they have contrived to remove every other doctrine from the teaching of the ecclesiastical establishments. This overshadowing and powerful school tolerates no rival. In those colleges of Rome and the provinces whose supervision belongs to the Vatican, the only text-books permitted are those of Sanseverino and of Liberatore, rigorous Thomists and devout Jesuits. With the exception of these handbooks and those which reproduce their spirit and doctrine, all else is viewed with suspicion and disapprobation. The same is true as regards the timid innovations of the Abbé Bonelli and the daring works of Rosmini and Gioberti. We shall not pause to speak of the insertion in the Index of two works of the former and the posthumous works of the latter. Rosmini's *Five Plagues of the Holy Church* and *Constitution according to Social Justice* contain too much which touches nearly existing institutions and the interests of the Society of Jesus to cause any astonishment at their condemnation, and the last ideas of Gioberti were too heterodox to escape the same fate. But what was so dangerous in the works of the Abbé Bonelli, professor of philosophy in the College of the "*Pace*" at Rome, that it should be deemed necessary to fight them to the death, and to eliminate them from the course of instruction? This, beyond doubt, that Bonelli was not a Thomist; that, although a priest and orthodox, he recognized the need of following the movements of modern thought, and that, persuaded that the philosophy of experience in its widest sense would conduce to that end without danger to faith, he had adopted and introduced into his teachings and writings the philosophy of Bacon.¹

¹ See *Præcipuorum Philosophiæ Systematum, disquisitio historica Aloysii Bonelli, presbyteri Romani. Romæ, 1829.*

IX.

With regard to two questions in particular, the Jesuits have in these days repelled every kind of innovation contrary to the scholastic philosophy, with reference, namely, to the essence of the human understanding and the constitution of matter. On this latter point the learned members of the Society do not permit any divergence from the opinions of St. Thomas, even in one of their own number, without expressing the liveliest opposition. The case of Father Secchi, the illustrious physicist and astronomer, is an example. In 1864 he published a work entitled *Unité des forces physiques*. In this work, which met with great success, the learned ecclesiastic, proceeding from a purely physical standpoint, applied the principles of mechanics to the explanation and simplification of the phenomena of matter. At once there appeared a pamphlet from the pen of Father Cornold (*I sistemi meccanico e dinamico*), aiming at a refutation of his theories. Again, Father Tongiorgi, author of three volumes of *Institutiones Philosophicæ* (Rome, 1861), had in his Cosmology applied the chemical theory of atoms to the explanation of the nature of bodies. The defenders of philosophic orthodoxy at once rose against him in favor of the Aristotelian distinction of matter and form. Finally, the most violent opposition was called forth from Jesuit philosophers by a work of the Abbé Francisco Rignani, *Sulla essenza dei corpi* (Rome, 1876-77). This distinguished prelate, who is director of the College of the "Pace" at Rome, and who upholds the Baconian traditions of Bonelli in that place as far as the rigid instructions of the hierarchy make it possible, places the results and rules of the experimental method above the prejudices of the school. His metaphysical theory of matter is ingenious, and deserves to be mentioned. It is a dynamic conception based on physics and chemistry. Monsignor Rignani starts with the rational principle that the composite presupposes the simple; like modern science, he admits atoms or primitive bodies, but he distinguishes between the physical body and the chemical body. The true atom is not, as he thinks, the chemical, but is the physical body, although neither possesses absolute simplicity. On the contrary, simplicity and unity are to be found in each; a multi-

plicity of simple forces which taken by themselves and isolated could not produce any effect, and whose co-ordination produces the first elements of cosmical realities, primeval matter. These are the atoms; they are all equal in weight, and their diverse co-ordinations produce the specific weights of chemical elements, their properties and different aptitudes; so that a chemical body, a molecule of oxygen, for example, is a composite of physical atoms as regards matter or substance, and differs from them in the resulting effects of their multiplicity diversely co-ordinated, that is to say, in form. These ideas resemble without doubt those of Boscovich and the centres of force of Faraday, and possess the incontestable advantage over the doctrines of his adversaries of attempting a reconciliation between modern science and the Aristotelian traditions.

Such are the most salient features of the philosophical situation in the breasts of the Italian clergy and at Rome. Scholasticism supported by authority has up to this time been victorious. Thomism seems to be regarded in high places as one of the foundations of orthodoxy and to be considered as indispensable as the Bible.

X.

But the ontological idea is not the only one in the peninsula which fights for the freedom of thought and conscience, and puts forth all its effort to give an impulse to national intelligence. The Hegelian school of Naples has been laboring for the same object since 1860. We know the principles of Hegelianism, and do not need to develop them here. The idea, considered as the basis of things, developing itself throughout the spheres of logic, of nature, and of spirit, to take consciousness of itself in man and to produce social life and civilization, the dialectic idea finally ruling the whole circle of sciences, is with the Italian Hegelian as with the German the basis of a system which has justly been entitled the absolute idealism. This grand doctrine has not been modified by them, but it has not remained barren in their hands. It has been applied by Bertrando Spaventa and Francesco Fiorentino to the history of philosophic systems, and notably to the history of the systems of the Renaissance. It has given us in the writings of Francesco De Sanctis pro-

found critical studies of the leading productions of modern literature ; with Dr. De Meis it has penetrated into natural history, and finally has found in M. Vera the most faithful and learned interpreter of Hegel himself.¹

Cherished by distinguished minds, implanted in the south of Italy, and especially in Naples, where there appears to be a natural taste for that kind of speculation which is the distinguishing characteristic of Hegelianism, this system has penetrated into the colleges as well as into the universities, where it shares in the philosophical instruction.

XI.

In spite of the wide difference which separates the absolute Idealism from the theory of ontologism, these systems have concurred in emancipating the minds of men and in elevating them above the narrow limits of empiricism ; they have fought together the battle with materialism, and still agree in repelling the recent explanations of the nature of soul made by the English school. Unfortunately the impulse given by them no longer suffices for the wants of our time. The method of the absolute Idealism has grown old ; the progress of historical studies is united with that of experimental method in the discovery of defects. Common-sense, defied by a logic which begins by laying down at the head of its axioms the identity of contradictories, has taken up the glove, and, supported by history and observation, has thrown it down once more. On the other side, ontologism, with its transcendent vision of absolute existence and its external archetypes of things, finds no longer a favorable reception in an age devoted to the study of facts, and which sets up in psychological analysis and in the critique of cognition a rigor contrary to mystic rapture and enthusiasm. Great difficulties arise in the face of this vision ; and although an irresistible instinct which is really but the ex-

¹ The principal works of Spaventa are : *Principii di Filosofia*, *Introduzione allo studio della Filosofia*, *La Filosofia di Gioberti*, *Saggio di critica Filosofica*, politica e religiosa. Those of Fiorentino are : *Pietro Pomponazzi studii storici su la scuola Bolognese e Padovana del secola XVI.*, *Barnardino Telesio*, *Studii storici su la idea della Natura nel risorgimento italiano*. Those of M. De Meis are *I tipi animali* and *Vita a pensieri*.

pression of nature and common-sense declares that truth is external, that it must have an objective basis in Being, and that our soul was made for it, we cannot diminish the repugnance to admit that the path followed by ontologism is the most scientific and legitimate. Do the partisans of the English school of association and evolution succeed better in solving the enigmas of the human soul, in explaining cognition and its faculties? It is certainly permissible to doubt it. Under the name of the philosophy of experience, it is really a system which they teach, and this system, which owes its importance to the progress of physiology and natural history, and obtains from these sciences a certain number of objective facts which transcend the limit of the subjective observations of the old psychology, swings on one side to pantheism and on the other to materialism. For on the one side it undertakes to show that all existences arise through evolution from an eternal and infinite matter kept in perpetual ferment by a continual movement of composition and decomposition, and on the other side it either effaces entirely the distinction between physiological and psychical facts or declares a complete subordination of the latter to the former. But if they undertake to deny, with the transformist Hæckel and the boldest Darwinians, the distinction between soul and body, internal freedom, and the consequences in metaphysics and morals which proceed from it, Italian evolutionists still remain powerless to clear away from their theories the insolvable objections which meet them, of which the first is that which repels as contrary to observation, the confusion of psychical and physiological facts. The most remarkable representative of this school which voluntarily takes the name of positivist, is M. Ardigò, professor in the Lyceum of Mantua. In a book entitled *La psicologia come scienza positiva* (Mantua, 1871), he supports himself on the relativity of internal and external facts, to redivide them into two divisions of the same kind, and declares them to be all equally phenomenal. For him the distinction maintained by Tyndall, Du Bois-Reymond, Helmholtz, and the savants who avow the impossibility of passing from one of these orders to the other, does not exist. In harmony with Comte, with Spencer, and, in general, with the representatives of Positivism, on the necessity of abandoning to

the "dreams of metaphysic" the investigation of essences and causes, he admits at the same time an unique reality which he calls psycho-physical, which he believes himself to have established on the analysis of facts and by the inductive method. In opposition to materialism and spiritualism, which appear to him two equally exclusive systems, this writer affirms his views on cosmic unity in a more recent work, entitled *Natural Formation in the Solar System*, where, following the tracts of Herbert Spencer, he explains the genesis of worlds and the development of existences by a natural movement which causes all things to pass from an indistinct condition to a distinct condition, from homogeneity to heterogeneity.

This evolutionism applied to the psychological problems which affect morals could not fail to engender the negation of free will. M. Ardigo denies it in the name of the uninterrupted continuity of the train of facts and of the principle of causality. Falling for this end into what we conceive to be an error common to other positivists, he makes the internal freedom admitted by spiritualists a contradictory conception, representing it as a spontaneity without motives, and reduces for his purposes voluntary action to the result of a series of intellectual movements, which are in reality nothing but physiological ones. M. Ardigo was preceded in this theory by M. Herzen, demonstrator of anatomy in Florence, a disciple of M. Maurice Schiff, and author of a book published in Italian and French on the physiological analysis of the will, and has been followed by M. Enrico Ferri, who has developed his ideas in a large volume directed against the existence of free will and human responsibility.

XII.

We must acknowledge that the spiritualistic school, relying doubtless on the support of common-sense, has made no answer to these negations by extended and special treatises, but it has never ceased to demonstrate the insufficiency of the proof on which they rest. Above all, it has insisted on three points: I. We can grasp by consciousness a reality which is not phenomenal—that is to say, the appearance of another, but which is noumenal—that is, the direct manifestation of Being to itself.

II. This reality is not a collection of modes but a dynamic unity, an active subject, which in so far as it is conscious of itself is called Ego. III. Every thing in human knowledge is not relative ; there are absolute principles, whatever be their origin or the manner of explicating them. The same school has combated the notion, in its belief contradictory, of an absolute which ceaselessly changes, the ever-changing Proteus of Hegelian pantheism. It has combated Hartmann's notion of the Unconscious and Spencer's theory of the Unknowable as being incapable of affording a rational basis for either science or religion. It has finally sought to arrest the madness of the evolutionists by calling attention in the writings of savants opposed to them to the proofs on which their precipitate conclusions rest. Mamiani especially has devoted himself, in the *Filosofia delle scuole Italiane*, with the greatest constancy and ardor to this work. The psychology of transformism is at this moment undergoing criticism in the same review, and, finally, a memoir, published at Rome, in the transactions of the Academy of the Lincei, goes back to the historical origin of the doctrines, sets forth their insufficiency and lacunes without misconceiving their importance. Nevertheless, we cannot refrain from observing that the spiritualistic school of Italy does not occupy itself sufficiently with psychology. Taken up with the great questions of ontology, it has roused itself to debate the questions concerning the agreement of the soul with the absolute, while schools of experimental philosophy abroad were giving a tendency to human thought and gathering facts to which it was as yet indifferent. It has, however, no want of precedents even in its own midst. Thus the Psychology of Rosmini is not only a metaphysical study of the essence of the soul, but is also an examination into the laws of its development. His Anthropology, under the heading of "Functions of the Synthetic Force of the Soul," includes the most essential of all psychological facts, those of association. Why has not this second part of Rosmini's work been more carefully examined ? The leaders of spiritualism have neglected detail, fixed their gaze on the summit of the Understanding and not on the facts which form their base. There has been too much place given in their works to polemic as to the dominant formulas of the system, and they

have been wrong in occupying themselves too little with the more modest and certain disciplines of their science. Not only psychology but logic also could complain of their indifference. If we except a single important work of Rosmini's, we would search in vain for any thing remarkable accomplished in Italy for this science during the second half of the century.

While the English have studied the theories of the proposition and syllogism, and made changes in both, while they have perfected that of induction and written the history of the processes of the human mind in the sciences, while the Germans in the same department of philosophy have produced the important works of Lotze, Drobisch, Dühring, and Sigwart, not to speak of some of the principal representatives of Herbart's school, the Italians have no recent work on logic which can be cited. *Æsthetics*, which would seem particularly suited to their tastes, has not proved any more attractive. Happily, the philosophy of history forms an exception. In this particular department of philosophic study the thread of our traditions remains unbroken. Since the time of Vico this important science has never ceased to be cultivated, and in modern times a disciple of Romagnosi, Joseph Ferrari, has endeavored to submit it to an universal arithmetic capable of controlling the periodic course of political events and their forms, types, in all nations. Such is the spirit and the aim of his work entitled, *Il Periodo politico*, the last which this writer, more brilliant than solid, wrote upon the favorite subject of his speculations, and whose publication preceded but a short time the end of his career.

By the side of Ferrari we shall place M. Ansonio Franchi, professor in Milan. Their tendencies and ideas may be regarded as intermediate between the Italian development of the French philosophy of the eighteenth century and the party in the present movement which belongs to the French positivism of Auguste Comte and the English transformist school. We would add also that having written at a time when the spiritualistic school flourished, these two philosophers took an attitude hostile to it. Since they were both partisans of the most radical political party, they embraced in their attacks the doctrines of the representatives of that school, as well as the por-

litical principle of the moderate party, which in spirit and reality were at one.¹

In spite of this identity of purpose, the philosophical methods of these two men were very different. Ferrari was at heart a sceptic and a knight-errant who seemed only to believe in the contradictions of history and nature for the purpose of using them to demolish existing theories and institutions. In his versatile mind there was an element of confusion and volatility. Franchi's intelligence is more solid and symmetrical. His writings on Sensation (*Del Sentimento*) and on the judgment (*Teorica del Gindizio*) belong almost as much to the critical school of Kant as to the empirical. The same characteristic is plain in his *Filosofia della scuole Italiane*, a polemic often fiery, but never without force, in which he has brought suit, if we may be allowed the expression, against ontological doctrines.² In this book, which was widely heralded, the author endeavored to put in evidence the contradictions of their principal representatives, but his destructive critique put nothing in place of the systems which he sought to overthrow. This inconvenience he proposed to remedy in his book on sentiment, in which he re-establishes the foundations of science, of natural religion, and of morals, by admitting primitive instincts, which reflection renders clear and develops. In short, the philosophy of Franchi is a critique of ontologism and a return to a theory of experience differing but little in its essential characteristics from that of Galluppi, but he fails to reproduce either Galluppi's analytic method or his historical erudition.

XIII.

The intuition of absolute existence was the principal object of Franchi's attack, and his polemic on this point still preserves

¹ See especially the philosophical and political review entitled *La Ragione*, edited and published by Franchi from 1850 to 1869, and the speech delivered by Ferrari before the Pilmontese chamber of deputies.

² *La Filosofia delle scuole Italiane* of Franchi is not to be confounded with the review of the same name published in Rome by Mamiani and Luigi Ferri. It was a collection of letters addressed to a professor in the University of Turin, the lamented Bertini, author of the *Filosofia della vita*, and an adherent of ontologism.

a certain interest. For the fundamental question which is now debated in philosophy, that whose solution must decide its fate, is without doubt that of determining whether there is an *a priori* element in human knowledge, or whether, on the contrary, every thing can be reduced to *a posteriori* elements, and, granted that the *a priori* element exists, what connection there is between it and its object. As we know, there are three principal schools at this time : the first, that of experience, admits nothing innate or superior to the product of the senses and of consciousness ; the critical school, for which the transcendental or *a priori* element is necessary to knowledge, without being a transcendent object of intuition ; and finally, the ontological school, which admits the intuition of one or several transcendent objects.

If we consider the condition of the problem in Italy at present, it seems to have reached this point : the controversies between ontologists have shown it to be necessary either to reject the intuition of a transcendent object or to admit that this object is real and determined, and that intuition or intellectual vision is true perception. The intuition or intellectual vision of an ideal absolute undetermined but objective is a contradiction. Has the intuition of an absolute existence, real and objective, been proven or can it be ? and besides, is it necessary to the establishment of science ? And is there no other means of demonstrating the objective value of the corresponding idea ? We believe that another path is possible, which can be found in the harmony of the idea of the absolute with experience. On this head we are at one with the English and American school, known as that of intuition, or at least with its most illustrious representatives, Hamilton, Mansel, and McCosh. In the PRINCETON REVIEW for November, 1878, the last of these, in criticising Kant, sustained the theory of a natural realism against the absolute distinction of phenomenon and noumenon, of the thing appearing and the thing in itself. He showed anew that our primitive perceptions certainly furnish the real and objective without the mediation of general ideas and of abstractions which are only possible in science. He has proved that if knowledge does not begin with reality it cannot end with it, and in effect we know that science operates upon the real

because scientific knowledge is preceded by the natural realism of intuitive knowledge. This solution of the problem of perception, which in its general features is that of the Scotch school, furnishes, in our belief, the position which we must assume, in order to answer the question of the existence of the absolute. This existence is not the direct object of a supersensuous intuition. It cannot be drawn from the idea of infinite existence without parallogism, as Kant has shown. The notion of its object rises in us by a law of our intelligence, which reflection compels us to conceive as the final condition of all finite reality and the lowest foundation of all thought. We do not embrace the infinite in our sensory, we do not perceive it, we do not contemplate it, in the proper sense of the word; we conceive it by a law of our reason (cf. McCosh, *Intuitions of the Mind, The Infinite*). Now, if this law necessarily intervenes in the organization of our ideas of the world at the same time when the perception of the existences which compose them reaches their reality, we have a means of assuring ourselves of its objectivity and of the truth of the idea which is its result—that is, of the idea of the Infinite. It suffices to ask ourselves if the scientific operation which develops our perceptions and arranges their sum is suited to this idea, if it conditions from far or near the results which experience verifies. The answer is not doubtful; the idea of the infinite necessarily conditions the operations of science in nature, and experience, gathering the objective results of these operations, bears witness to the reality of the condition. Kant, having separated the thing in itself from the phenomenon at the base of knowledge, could not reunite them at its apex; but the true theory of perception, that whose primitive form the Scotch school has discerned, reunites at the beginning what Kant falsely separated, and permits by a final synthesis the re-establishment of the union of the ideal and the real, in the idea of the infinite considered as the immanent condition of finite realities, in spite of the impossibility of contemplating them directly in a region where perception abandons us.

LUIGI FERRI.

PAINTING IN ITS HISTORIC RELATIONS.

IN a former number of this Review (September, 1878,) I ventured upon the statement concerning art, in all its varieties, that it was an interpreter of history ; but in the restricted limits of a single paper I could do no more than to give a few illustrations of the position taken from the study of architecture and the plastic arts. I propose to resume the consideration of the subject in this article by a brief inquiry as to the historic teachings of the sister art of painting. Here we enter upon a more extended field, of which I can only present a partial outline to the reader, which the student of history and art must fill up for himself.

Fortunately, although there is an *embarras de richesses*, since the great works of pictorial art largely outnumber those of architecture and statuary, I can illustrate my subject by referring to national characteristics and representative artists and pictures. The period, too, is much more limited ; for while architecture and sculpture are pre-eminently classic arts, finding their best development in ancient times, painting, as we know and enjoy it, is a modern art, and is the more interesting as the interpreter of modern history.

It seems hardly necessary to say that in speaking of painting in its relation to national history, I do not refer to imported art, except indeed so far as it vindicates or accuses the popular taste. The establishment of great museums and galleries is indeed a sign of culture, and tends to attract and mould native talent ; but my postulate is this : when art is indigenous in a country, or comes into it, under historic circumstances, it is moulded by the light, the scenery, the characteristics of the people of that country, and very soon begins to tell the nation's

history. The artist, like the author, is the man of his time and people ; he depicts what he sees and feels, and unconsciously presents from age to age a chronicle of national life. In the words of Isaac d'Israeli, as applied to the literati, artists "are the creators or creatures of opinion ; the great form the epoch ; the many reflect the age."¹

The painter, in this great school of history, occupies a more prominent and magisterial station than the architect or sculptor ; the work of the two latter must be largely interpreted by the intellect and the imagination ; that of the former clearly narrates the circumstance, or depicts the person, so that it requires little effort of the fancy to aid the illusion. Perhaps no one has so delicately determined the place and relations of painting among the arts, and its historic power, as Cousin, in his eloquent eulogium of poetry. According to his view it stands between sculpture and music ; almost as precise as the one ; almost as touching as the other, expressing beauty under all its forms, and the human soul in the richness and variety of its sentiments.²

Notwithstanding the very few remains of ancient paintings which have come down to the modern period, we have so many and such enthusiastic references to the great painters of antiquity, in the writings of Plato, Aristotle, Pliny, Cicero, and Horace, that we may form no inadequate conception of their achievements and progress, and their influence upon the periods in which they lived.

A few sentences, however, will be sufficient for our purpose in reference to them. Passing by the subject of Egyptian painters, with the observation that they seemed to content themselves with adorning flat reliefs or flat surfaces with unshaded color, with no foreshortening or perspective, we approach with more respect the claims of Grecian art ; which, beginning with

¹ "Amenities of Literature.

² "Entre la sculpture et la musique, ces deux extrêmes opposés, est la peinture, presque aussi précise que l'une, presque aussi touchante que l'autre ; . . . plus pathétique que la sculpture, plus claire que la musique, la peinture s'élève au-dessus de tous les deux, parce qu'elle exprime davantage la beauté sous toutes les formes, l'âme humaine dans la richesse et la variété de ses sentiments." *Du vrai, du beau, et du bien.*

drawing, soon presented substance and color—from skiagram to monochromes, and from these to the illusion of natural coloring. The Greeks had varied and permanent pigments ; they understood chiaroscuro ; they studied like modern painters from nude models ; they painted on canvas (*lintheum-pictum*). Soon the art became so diffused that we find, as in later times, *schools* of painting. We are almost as familiar with the name of Apelles as with that of his patron Alexander. Painting in his period was called the Apellean art, and what we can learn of his soft, finished, and effective pictures has entitled him to the name bestowed upon him by modern scholars—"the antique Rafael."

There are no anecdotes of Sanzio and Michael Angelo better known than that of Apelles and the critical cobbler, who could set the artist right about a sandal tie, but who when he ventured beyond his trade was rebuked by the painter with the *ne sutor ultra crepidam*, which has silenced many a pretender since.

And there is a nice prout-bit of history in the story of the contest between Zeuxis and Parrhasius : the former painted a boy carrying a basket of grapes, which were so real that the birds pecked at them ; the latter a curtain which deceived his rival and won the prize. The depression of Zeuxis was not dispelled by the friendly criticism of the birds ; "for," said he, "if my picture was really good, the sight of the boy carrying the basket should have frightened the birds away."

The first great historic lesson to be found in Greek art is that art was worship. It attempted to depict the gods ; it was used as an instrument in their honor. It passed by logical degrees to heroes and the representations of a rich mythology which delighted to personify the powers of nature in human form and action. It taught theology ; and it honored valor, whether of an Apollo, a Hercules, or an Alexander. It descended to the representation of existing customs and surrounding nature. It seems to have possessed its votaries ; they threw their whole lives into their art. What a history there is of enthusiasm deaf to pity in the veritable story that Parrhasius bought an aged Olynthian slave, and tortured him on the rack that he might adequately present the agonies of Prometheus,

"The vulture at his vitals, and the links
Of the lame Lemnian festering in his flesh."

They could use stratagems of imagination in their representations of men. "Polygnotus," says Aristotle, "painted men more beautiful than they are; but Pauson less so, and Dionysius painted them as they are."¹

The passage from Greece to Rome is neither far nor difficult, for almost all the decorative art in ancient Rome, of which there are a few remains, is Greek.² Before the Tarquins the images and delineation of the gods were Etruscan handiwork; but when we come far down in the history, to the period so lately unveiled at Pompeii and Herculaneum, we find the wall paintings at least Greek in their origin. The celebrated Medea found on a wall in Pompeii is a fair copy of an earlier Grecian painting. The Cæsars had wealth and power, and they bought or captured their paintings.³ Thus it was that in the dearth of Roman talent, and the few inducements to native effort, Grecian painters were employed in Italy, and collections of their works were made. Thrice conquered Rome had little time and small inclination to cultivate the arts.

The burial-places and catacombs were the rude cradle of Christian art, and, when Christianity was adopted as the imperial religion, a vast field was opened to sacred art, and was divided into the territories of the natural, the supernatural, and the symbolic. Thus, alike in its great verities and its frivolous errors, Christianity is wonderfully displayed in all its periods by pictorial art. Martyrs, saints, the Virgin, angels, even the persons of the ever-blessed Trinity, were subjects for the pencil; and whether in the rude paintings of the catacombs, the flat figures before the Renaissance, or the immortal works of that new birth, we are taught what men believed, or fancied they believed, as fully as by the formularies of doctrine and the rituals of worship. Take the most prominent subject of all, the yearning of men to find out what were the human form and lineaments of Christ. If the famous letter of Lentulus, an officer of Pontius Pilate, to the Roman Senate, describing His person

¹ Poetic. ch. ii.

² See an article by Tyrwhitt on "Greek Art at Rome," *Cont. Rev.*, Sept. 1877.

³ Lübke, "History of Art," i., 200. I have used Bunnett's translation, London, 1868.

was a forgery, it is at least ancient and suggestive ; it is in accord with the visions of a meditative fancy.¹ "He is," says Farrar, who may be supposed to have combined and compared the representations—differing in detail but of the same general type—"a man of middle size . . . on whose face the purity and charm of youth are mingled with the thoughtfulness and dignity of manhood. His hair, which legend has compared to the color of wine, is parted in the middle of the forehead, and flows down over the neck. His features are paler and of a more Hellenic type than the weather-bronzed and olive-tinted faces of the hardy fishermen who are His apostles ; but though those features have been evidently marred by sorrow, yet no man whose soul has not been eaten away by sin and selfishness, can look unmoved and unawed on the divine expression of that calm and patient face."² But this pleasing summary is, after all, a judgment of fancies. The type even is a fancy. Irenæus, who lived in the second century, says indeed that pictures of Christ were common in his day, and he knew men who had seen the older apostles. The first portraits were marked by sadness ; later the representations assumed a lovelier and more cheerful aspect ; but in all there was a faint tradition of likeness, before, in the rapid progress of art, the thousand ideals of the Renaissance appeared, and presented the rapt fancy of many a meditative artist as he mused upon the Godhood in human form.

I must pass with the mere mention over the Romanesque period of painting—as of architecture—from the tenth to the thirteenth century, in which little of progress in art culture is found. Of the Gothic style which succeeded, it may be remarked, that while it reorganized architecture it injured and retarded the progress of painting. It took away wall-surfaces, and offered the poor equivalent of painting on glass for the decoration of the numerous tall windows.³ There were illuminations ; there were mosaics ; there were, during that long and unprogressive period, the flat figures of Hagiology, without foreshortening or chiaroscuro, labelled for divinities and saints with a golden circlet around the head, in comparison with

¹ See Radcliffe's "Schools and Masters of Painting," 14.

² "The Life of Christ," ch. xxii.

³ Lübke, "Hist. of Art," ii., 71.

which the Madonnas of Cimabue and Giotto, now so meagre, were the perfection of art.¹

The art of this earlier period was eminently decorative, enamelled on copper or silver, or gilded wood ; and the highest attainment was reached by Fra Angelico, who was sent for from his cloister by the Pope, and whose radiant angels, looking out from gilded panels, have been copied by tens of thousands, and sent all over the world. Thus before the Renaissance "declining ancient art became the garment in which the young and world-agitating ideas of Christianity were compelled to veil themselves. The new wine had to be put in the old bottles, till it burst asunder the decaying vessels, and issued forth in a new form of art as in a vessel appropriate to itself."² That new form was also a new birth—the Renaissance. The principal causes of the Renaissance have been already mentioned. After the violent intermixture of Roman civilization with German vigor, and during the dark ages, there seemed a hopeless and inextricable confusion ; the light of letters and of art, shut up in cloisters, no longer shone upon the masses of men ; but in reality the latent elements of European character and polity were in combination, ready, when the time should come, to burst upon the world in a new and beautiful order. For pictorial art that auspicious period was the sixteenth century. "What the age of Pericles was for sculpture the sixteenth century was for painting." Even the disasters of the Eastern empire, which culminated in the fall of Constantinople, sent a stream of Greek culture into the West, and gave a new impetus to art.

But the Renaissance, if it had depended on art alone, would have been greatly retarded. Patronage was needed, and that was not withheld. The family of the Medici, in Florence, whose munificence began with Cosmo, a merchant prince, patronized art and literature, and deserves most honorable mention in the history of the new culture. This is the chief glory

¹ "We cannot understand," says Radcliffe, "their popularity, till we contemplate a Byzantine Magdalene near them, standing like a hideous wooden doll, with vermilion-daubed cheeks, a gown of reddish brown, and explanatory scroll." "Schools and Masters of Painting." App. 489.

² Lübke, "Hist. of Art," i., 276.

of the grandson of Cosmo, Lorenzo, well called the Magnificent, whose second son, John, became Pope in 1513, with the title of Leo X. What a history of politics, religion, and art clusters around this name—the Reformation, the Renaissance, the splendid dome of St. Peter's at Rome! Popes, kings, and emperors caught the spirit, and immortal artists came flocking at their summons "like spirits from the vasty deep"—Leonardo, Raphael, Michael Angelo, Perugino, and Titian. We owe the origin of the Uffizi gallery in Florence to the Medici, and the busts of the family seem to make the claim and the announcement as they now stand to-day in the vestibule.¹

From that day to this, Italy has been the chosen home of pictorial art, the custodian of its greatest treasures, the *alma parens* of its greatest masters, the place to which art-pilgrims resort, not only to admire its collections, but to imbibe the spirit of its mysteries. Study in Italy is a solemn initiation. "It is the clime of art, the temple of the sacrament of the material transfigured into the spiritual. . . . An ethereal stream of ideal sentiment seems to float over the land, and refract all perceptions, feelings, and objects into beautiful outlines and lines. It is a land where all is ruin, but where ruin itself is more splendid, more permanent, and more vital than the freshest perfections of other countries."²

The gorgeous and diversified nature of Italy gave rise first to individual enthusiasm, and then to many distinct schools. The beauties of Florence, the picturesque banks of the Arno, and the natural grace of the *contadini* inspired the fancy of Cimabue, of Giotto, of Leonardo, and Michael Angelo. Thus nature suggests *form* as the distinctive feature of the Florentine school, while Venice was the chosen studio of color, as displayed in the gorgeous tints of Titian, Tintoretto,³ and Paul Veronese.⁴ It could not have been otherwise with the Venetian school. "With her street pavement of liquid chrysoprase,

¹ Radcliffe, "Schools and Masters," 491.

² H. B. Wallace, "Art, Scenery, and Philosophy in Europe."

³ Jacopo Robusti, called Tintoretto, from the trade of his father, Il Tintoret—the dyer.

⁴ Paolo Cagliari, of Verona, "mingled a silvery clearness with the amber, purple, and crimson of former Venetian colorists." Radcliffe, 215.

with her palaces of porphyry and marble, her frescoed façades, her quays and squares aglow with the brilliant costumes of the Levant, her lagoons afloat with the galleys of all nations, her churches floored with mosaics, her silvery domes, and ceilings glittering with sculptures bathed in molten gold," Venice was enveloped in a transparent atmosphere, with the sea or the flat plain for its only horizon. Tintoretto was called "The Thunderbolt of Painting," because of the vehemence and rapidity of his execution; but his distinctive merit was that he brought the poetry of chiaroscuro to perfection in expressing moods of passion and emotion, by the study of Venetian models of humanity, placed in dashes of light, and luminous half-shadows, merging into opaque darkness. Thus from the study of color came that power of chiaroscuro which characterizes the school of Venice, and in which even the great Raphael was wanting. It soon became evident that a school must arise which should combine form and color to the prejudice of neither.

But, again, Italy had a grand treasure-house for art in the old mythology, with its fanciful pictures, its thousand warm and striking subjects for the pencil—Jupiter, Venus and Minerva, Mars, Diana and Actæon, Olympian glories and Hesperian gardens. Here the historic teaching is manifest. In the words of Froude, "mythological history, mythological theology, mythological science"—and he might have added, mythological art—"belong to a time when men had not yet learned to analyze their convictions or distinguish between images vividly present to their own minds and an outward reality which might or might not correspond with these."¹ The painters of the early Renaissance were men still groping in that gorgeous cloud-land.

But from mythology it was an easy step and a happy one to the Christian story, and in art as well as religion Rome soon usurped the moral dominion of Europe. The studies of mythology had been purely fanciful; in Christian art the new and powerful element of reverence was introduced. It soon began to adorn the basilicas and churches, and to come to the support of the faith. Saints and martyrs without number reappeared upon earth; angels descended from heaven; Christ

¹"Scientific Methods applied to History." Short studies. 2d series.

walked once more among men, was born, performed miracles, was transfigured, was crucified, was entombed, rose from the dead, and was enthroned in glory. In that wonderful picture of Leonardo, "The Last Supper," it is fancied that the heads of the apostles are from the men of his own time, but the face of the Lord, by a perfect study of chiaroscuro, radiates the light upon the groups, and claims the principal admiration of the beholder.¹ There is a story that the artist, having finished the rest, could not paint this; he found it one morning miraculously finished.

We cannot estimate too highly the talents, genius, and industry of the great men who represent the Renaissance of Christian art in Italy. Their chief glory is that they were original and individual. Thus there were isolated names before there were schools; men who dared to paint as their hearts and fancies dictated; to lead and instruct the world; to lift men up to their standards. It has been said of Michael Angelo that, in his "Last Judgment," "he renounced all traditionary forms of Christian art,"² and of Raphael, that "he traversed and exhausted the whole mental range of his time, and revealed, in an almost countless number of splendid works, that highest idea of the beautiful, which, as he himself said, ever floated before him."³

¹ "The details we must take upon faith; painted over in oils, and badly, it has peeled off, so that the visitor is not only disappointed but shocked. His first impulse is to wonder if it ever could have been a famous work of art. If he will patiently study it in sections, it requires no great effort of the fancy to restore the form—and it never could have depended much on color. Take, for example, the group of John, Peter, and Judas, on the right hand of Christ: nothing can be more masterly." See Lübke, "Hist. of Art," ii., 216.

² It is a curious comment upon the theological or rather biblical scholarship of his time, that he should have been misled into giving his magnificent statue of Moses, when he came down from the mount, a pair of horns. The explanation is very simple: the Hebrew verb קָרַךְ means, 1, *to strike, to push*, and, 2, *to emit rays*. Hence we have קָרַךְ *a horn*, which in the dual means *rays of light*. Our

version is (Ex. 34 : 29), "the skin of his face shone," which accords with the Septuagint δεδόξαται τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ. In the Vulgate it is absurdly rendered *cornuta erat*, and hence Michael Angelo, and other painters and sculptors of his day, have represented the great law-giver with horns.

³ It was a beautiful thought to place the "Transfiguration" at the head of Raphael's catafalque when he died.

Such men compelled a world of admirers and imitators, for they spoke through their art to the quick, impulsive, and sensuous nature of their fellow-countrymen. There were impassioned pictures for their ardent fancy, and holy pictures for their religious moods ; and while the greater artists rose above the vulgar prejudices and common tastes, those of lower station were unconsciously affected by them. As a single example,—I have tried in vain, in the midst of my admiration, to pity a repentant sinner in the “*Magdalene*” of Correggio : I can only find a lovely woman, luxuriously reclining on the soft turf of a cave which the sunlight must visit, and reading an interesting story ; more covered, but not otherwise more refined than the “*Venus of Titian crowned by Cupid.*” This may be harsh judgment, but let the reader examine the picture once more.¹

The chronicler of art soon finds that with the great and independent masters there came hosts of disciples and imitators, and that these were segregated into schools, numerous, and distinguished by locality and characteristic. Thus, among many, the Florentine was the school of nature and form ; the Venetian that of color ; the Lombard, of expression ; those of Naples and Bologna, eclectic.²

The progress thus far in art cannot be better epitomized than in the formulary of Ruskin. The *fourteenth* century was the age of *thought*, and is represented by such men as Dante and Giotto ; the *fifteenth* was the age of *drawing*, and produced such men as Leonardo, Michael Angelo, Ghiberti, and Raphael, who worked in the succeeding age ; the *sixteenth* was emphatically the age of painting, illustrated by the former names, and also by those of Tintoretto, Paul Veronese, and Titian.

After that came the decline of painting in Italy, in the seventeenth century ; but when the school of nature, under Caravaggio and Salvator Rosa, was at its best, and about to cul-

¹ Mrs. Jameson speaks of the paramount idea of sensual beauty attributed to the *Magdalene* by the schools of Venice and Bologna ; and to the “*licentiousness of sentiment*” of the French painters, the “*air de galanterie*,” which suggests rather her former sinful condition than her penitence.—“*Sacred and Legendary Art*,” i., 345.

² It should be remembered that art made rapid material progress from the introduction of oil as a vehicle for color, by John Van Eyck, in 1410.

minate, Italian art was reaching out into other countries and planting vigorous shoots from the decaying trunk. Thus, while it was impressing itself with great power upon Western Europe, that beautiful art of Italy which had begun with nature, and pressed on with untiring footstep through the worlds of mythology and Christian story, "had returned to nature to die." It is astonishing to observe the rapidity of its decline, the suddenness of its extinction. There is no illustrious name since. The galleries are filled with clever copyists and imitators; there is an art-atmosphere in Rome which attracts students, connoisseurs, and idlers; but Rome is by no means a great repository of art. The Vatican has, it is said, eleven thousand rooms, and two hundred staircases, but besides the *stanze* of Rafael in the entrance chamber only four salons are given to painting. The causes of this must be found in detail in the religious and political history of Rome and of Italy. The Renaissance was, indeed, in a period of turmoil, but the turmoil was the tramp and hum of a marvellous *progress*; the decadence in a long period of modern turmoil was in accord with political *decline*.

Italy still remains the same in her beautiful and inspiring nature, and in the soul of her children. A new, united Italy, prosperous after all the storms of centuries, must present new incentives to talent and industry. Who shall say that another Raphael may not come from some obscure Urbino to astonish Europe with a new Renaissance—a regeneration of Italy in art, as well as in political government? The patriot who looks around and finds little to achieve in the cause of liberty, now so triumphant, may turn his thoughts upon the prostrate condition of Italian art, and find a new and interesting field for his energies and his hopes, and a vigor of emulation to equal if not to exceed the other nations of the continent, which, owing the origin of their art to his own beautiful Italy, have left her far behind in their swift career.

Among the first recipients of the great boon of Italian art was France; and, according to the principle we have laid down, we find whatever it received soon remoulded and colored by the peculiarities of the French nature and atmosphere, and thus made an exponent of French history. We need not go back to

the tinsel altar-pieces of King René, the accomplished but frivolous monarch of Anjou, who was a patron of art ; nor even to the parchment miniatures of Jean Fouquet, court painter of Louis XI. The first demands for veritable art were made by French monarchs upon Italian artists, because there were no painters in France worthy of the new culture. French wars and royal oppression, acting upon a very mercurial people, had thus far been adverse to art. It is to the credit of Francis I. that he sent an autograph letter to Michael Angelo, under date of February 6th, 1546, for paintings with which to adorn his cliâpels ; and that he appreciated the merits and honored the person of Leonardo da Vinci with an intimacy which ended only with the death of the artist.¹ We may accept the reign of Francis as the period in which Italian art came into France. Of original efforts there were few worth the mention, until, nearly a century later, we come to the works of Nicolas Poussin, and Claude Gelée, known as Claude Lorraine, who happily turned their attention to landscape, and thus won a fame which would have been impossible had they attempted high art.² Of the two, Claude had the higher merit for developing landscape, which had always thus far been the weak point in Italian art ; and he had a worthy successor in LeBrun, the Rosa of France.

The progress of art in France was extremely slow. The genius of the painters and the taste of the French people did not take that direction, and does not now. Active, mercurial, eager for happiness, they delight in personal adornments, gilded interiors, open-air demonstrations. They erect lofty piles, and surround them with mathematical parterres and artificial mazes, in which splendid fountains glisten with rainbow hues. And this taste is always a key to their art ; it is objective and realistic in the extreme. These things must be depicted with

¹ There is a story, which some have doubted, that Leonardo died in the king's arms. It was so excellent an art fancy that Angelica Kaufman, who painted at the close of the last century, adopted it as the subject of one of her masterpieces. Lübke, ii., 219.

² Poussin did attempt a few works of historical composition, which are but little esteemed ; while his "Arcadian Shepherds" is specially valued for its landscape. There can be no doubt that these landscapes mark an epoch in European art of which the French have a right to be proud.

an illusive correctness, which pleases the French but earns no permanent European reputation. The name of Claude Joseph Vernet (1714-89) would hardly be known through his own works or those of his son Charles, but he is retained in grateful memory as the grandfather of the greatest of the modern artists of France, Horace Vernet,—no less a historian than an artist.

The pompous, artificial portraiture of royalty under the Bourbons, and until the revolution, have little merit except as biographic exponents of the days of atrocious grandeur—the glorification of Louis XIV., the debaucheries of the regent, and the leprous horrors of Louis XV. and the *Parc aux cerfs*.¹ And when the great retribution came there was little time or taste for art. The greatest name during the French revolution was that of Jacques Louis David, the conventionist,² whose stilted and hyper-artificial style may be seen in that impossible equestrian feat of Napoleon crossing the Alps, on a rearing charger, surrounded with snow, and treading upon slippery ice on the verge of a precipice! It is the farcical exponent of French art as late as the beginning of the nineteenth century, and represents one phase at least of that French glory which inspired the excitable Frenchmen during the Napoleonic wars.³

I remember being struck, in the French salon of 1870, by a stratagem which was very successful, and which will serve as an illustration of the artificial character of French art in the latest day. The picture was one of a female figure, in rustic costume, sitting on a low wall of earth or stone; it was exquisitely painted, and deserved its label of "*hors concours*." The atmosphere behind the figure was of so brilliant a saffron yellow as almost to dazzle the eyes. It did more, and that the artist intended; it literally extinguished all the other paintings around

¹ The principal names during this period are Le Sueur, Le Brun, Mignard, Rigaud, Watteau, and Greuze: and although they are not without merit, the cursory reader will hardly recognize them as he goes over the list of world-renowned painters. If Le Sueur has indeed been called the French Raphael—it is certainly *longo intervallo*.

² He voted for the death of Louis XVI., who had been his kind patron.

³ Notwithstanding the ancient armor and the antique costumes in his *Beliarius* and his *Leonidas at Thermopylae*, "one must smile to perceive how far the French element outshines the Roman." Radcliffe, 532.

it to the distance of fifty feet on either side ; and it ought to have been not only *hors concours* but *hors du salon*.

Since the downfall of Napoleon I. art has progressed rapidly ; there have arisen several schools of correct draftsmen and brilliant colorists, whose works have hosts of critical admirers. I can only mention the most renowned. Horace Vernet, bold and fiery, as well as accurate, finds vent for his genius in battle pieces and wild Arab scenes¹—such as the “ Storming of Constantina,” “ The Lion Hunt in Algeria,” “ The Selling of Joseph by his Brethren,” and, later, “ Scenes from the Crimean War.” Splendid in conception, minute in detail, they are theatrical and spectacular, but eminently historical—and French.

Paul de la Roche, more thoughtful and ideal, has corrected the error of David, by presenting Napoleon crossing the Alps, his mule led by a peasant guide, in accordance with the truthful description given by Thiers.² And when he would seek another subject in that great and stormy life, he took the scene of the abdication at Fontainebleau, in the little cabinet, where, huddled helplessly in his *fautcuil*, with his head upon his breast, the great emperor acknowledged to himself that the world, which he had done such marvellous deeds to win, was lost.

I have no space to refer to the sad and dark delineations of Gerome—the “ Gladiators in the Arena,” the “ Consummatum est” of *Le Golgotha*, or to the exquisite *tableaux de genre* of Meissonier, or to the tender treatment of human flesh by Bougereau, or to the extreme finish in form and color of many modern artists.

In epitomizing the present condition of French art as it illustrates French nature, taste, and manners, I shall let a Frenchman be the judge and censor, by presenting the following extract from the *critique* of M. Houssaye upon the salon of 1877, in Paris :³

¹ In speaking of Vernet as an actual French historian, I refer to pictures which illustrate the scenes in the career of Louis Philippe and his sons,—in Algeria and Mexico, and his Crimean War pictures ; his “ Massacre of the Mamelukes” and his “ Defence of Clichy” illustrate actual history.

² “ Histoire du Consulat et de l’Empire.”

³ *Revue des Deux Mondes*. The salon is always a large exhibition of the finest and newest paintings, which excites the ambition and emulation of artists, and displays actual art at its best.

"It (the collection) is the same animal profusion of *tableaux de genre*, of landscapes and of portraits: it is the same procession, poor and meagre, of naked goddesses and unclothed women; the same theory of Bible and gospel types, which display less a cultivation of style for its own sake than of aspiration for the prizes of the salon, or for the first medal; the same grand scenes of history seen through the small end of the glass, conceived and treated in anecdotic fashion. Thus, as on former occasions, one is astonished at the skill of hand, at the power of execution of this ingenious spirit, but one deplores the absence of style, the poverty of conception, the ignoring of the grand and the beautiful. Superb promises which prepare us only for deceptions!"

He speaks also of the triple brass and heroic abnegations—qualities lacking in the French nature—requisite for a painter to spend two or three years on a historical painting, which may be praised and medalled, but will not sell, while in ten sittings he can make a portrait for which he can get twenty thousand francs. And yet French painting, artificial, unideal, but beautiful, in these latter days aptly illustrates the French character and the philosophy of French history.¹ Of Paul Gustave Doré, the illustrator of Dante, Cervantes, and Tennyson, it has been well said, that he is fantastic, imaginative, and sensational, and that it is "quite uncertain what place he will occupy in the estimation of posterity."

And now let us cross the channel, and look for a moment at the history of art in England. Its introduction was very late, and its development has been very slow. This condition of things has been due to many causes. The aristocracy looked down upon art as a profession; the people were ignorant and phlegmatic; the former would buy art with a quid-pro-quo, and the latter were indifferent to it. "A generation," says Tyrwhitt, "devoted entirely to money and politics cannot care at all for art." Something indeed must be allowed for the insular situation of Britain, which kept her from receiving the boon of Italian art as early and as fully as did the continental countries; but much of this indifference to art has certainly been due to the character and social conditions of the English

¹ It is but just to say that the Salon of 1878 was a great improvement upon that of the former year; many of the paintings were afterwards placed in the Exposition, where they had literally a world of admirers.

nation. So the earliest painters in Britain were foreigners. Henry VIII., it is said, invited Raphael and Titian to come to England, but was not successful in alluring them from the art-empire over which they ruled supreme in the South. Hans Holbein, who came to England in 1527, portrayed queens and court beauties, and, as we know, painted that flattered portrait of Anne of Cleves, which induced Henry to have her brought over, and then, much to his disgust, to marry her. It was a costly picture ; it changed the political situation ; it added one to the long list of Henry's crimes, and it cost Thomas Cromwell his head. Rubens was in England in 1629, and awakened some enthusiasm for painting. Vandyke, after two visits and two disappointments, was at last invited over by Charles I., who knighted him and gave him a pension ; and he painted so many portraits there that, though a foreigner, we always think of him as an English artist. Then came Peter Lely, from the Hague, who was knighted for his pictures, who was court painter to Charles I., Cromwell, and Charles II., and who has perpetuated in the galleries of Hampton Court the brazen charms of the frail beauties who formed the seraglio of the merry monarch. Of Godfrey Kneller, who was the son of an architect of Lübeck, it is recorded that he painted nine kings and queens during the reigns of Charles II., James II., William and Mary, and George I.

So far, nearly to the close of the seventeenth century, there were no English artists ; but after that an English school of art sprang rapidly into vigorous existence, as if from nothing. Beautiful art had conquered national phlegm and prejudice. The good work began with Sir James Thornhill, the immediate predecessor of Hogarth and Reynolds. Hogarth was a satirist and reformer rather than a great painter. No doubt through his means rakes were reclaimed, prostitution checked, idle apprentices rendered industrious, and marriages not made quite so much *à la mode*. He was, too, in the true sense a *historical* painter ; he shows us the curious social customs, the abuses, the bad manners, the enormous wrongs of the period, and in these his works have a permanent value to the student of history, but a great painter he certainly is not.

And of Sir Joshua Reynolds, so accurate in likenesses, so

admirable in coloring, it must be observed that he was in the main a painter of portraits, whose well-earned fame, as the greatest English artist of his day, shows how little had been achieved in England, when compared with the masterpieces of Italian art, which were already nearly two centuries old.¹

To my mind it is significant of the poverty of English art, until the beginning of the eighteenth century, that a humble lad, born in Chester County, Pennsylvania, in 1738, among Quakers, with little instruction, and not much genius, should have found his way to London, and risen, by great industry and judgment, to the presidency of the Royal Academy. The career of Benjamin West is a commentary on English painting. There was no high art before ; he undertook to inaugurate it, and although there is some merit in his "Death of Wolfe," the English world and his patrons were certainly willing "to take the will for the deed."²

Gainsborough, who died in 1789, may be considered the father of English landscape painting ; but still art in England was chiefly in portraits, and the taste of the beginning of the nineteenth century may be seen in the demand for the theatrical and ideal pictures of Sir Thomas Lawrence, whose subjects all seem to belong to one family, and that family proud of its blue blood and its waving hair.

But now a great progress was manifest, and the later history is one of activity, earnestness, and great success. The very qualities which retarded art in the beginning have aided it at last ; a pertinacity of opposition has slowly given place to a pertinacity of support ; and art critics like Ruskin and Eastlake, who make it the study of their lives, have proposed rigorous standards, and elevated their subject with its votaries. In no country is the future of art more promising than in Eng-

¹ His greatest work is "Mrs. Siddons as the Tragic Muse," and the historic lesson it will teach is the great revival of the drama. The president of the Royal Academy "could not resist the opportunity of sending his name down to posterity on the hem of her garment."

² When Sir Joshua Reynolds declared that "The Death of Wolfe" would occasion a revolution in art, he was misled by the simple fact that the artist had painted an epic picture, in the costume of the day and with the real circumstances, instead of in the clumsy armor and impossible grouping of the classic times, to which poor Haydon returned to his cost.

land, and easy communication with continental schools and collections gives to the English student all the advantages which the world can bestow.

Of the later English artists it is not the time to speak ; time must elapse before we can see what they have achieved towards the solution of the great problem ; they are still too much the subjects of controversy : the original fancies and gaudy colors of Turner ; the return to finished detail of the pre-Raphaelites — what Old South used to call in speaking of sermons, “ the painfulness ” of their painting ;¹ the rural and *genre* scenes of Wilkie ; and the figure-teeming canvas of William Frith, and many others.

Much has been said of *high art*, and this term has been confounded with *historical painting*. The mistake has led to evil consequences for art and artists. The two phrases are by no means synonymous ; it is only incidentally that they approach each other. We have seen how Haydon was ambitious to teach the English people high art, and how he committed suicide because they would not learn it. True historical art is not simply cognizant of classic subjects, or of great events in some antecedent period ; it is best represented by a faithful rendering of the men and manners of our own time, or that “ touch of nature ” in depicting the old, which in all periods “ makes the whole world kin.”² This is the only historical art which is of value to the student of history. “ It falls or rises,” says Ruskin, “ in changeful eminence from Dutch trivialities to a Velazquez portrait, just as historical writing varies in emi-

¹ Not simply in their finish with the pencil ; but in their careful study of detail. Holman Hunt went to Jerusalem to find models for his Hebrews, and was somewhat thwarted because the people, who thought his pictures were to be hung up and worshipped, were unwilling to sit to him. He encamped for a fortnight at the southern extremity of the Dead Sea, at an unhealthy season, to paint the color and atmosphere of the Moab mountains for his picture of the “ Scape Goat in the Wilderness.” His full moon in “ The Light of the World,” and his “ Shadow of the Cross,” are happy *stratagems*.

² It is this natural sympathy which is enkindled by the “ Virgin Martyr ” of Gabriel Max, whose upturned face, even when the wild beasts are gathering around her, seeks the friendly hand which has thrown a rose at her feet. This picture is in the possession of a lady in New York, who includes among her many unobtrusive charities the patronage of art, not only in the collection of paintings, but in a provision for art-instruction.

nence from an old woman's story-telling up to Herodotus." In accordance with this principle Hogarth was far more an historical painter than Haydon ; so was Wilkie ; Chantrey was an historical artist. The great Raphael, when he represents, in his cartoon of " Christ Appearing to his Disciples on the Lake of Galilee," the followers of the Lord with curly locks and long robes with fringes, is not a historical painter at all. The fishermen were really wet, sea-stained, unkempt, half-naked ; and not a college of splendid cardinals. It is not wonderful that the early reformers were inclined to reject all art as related to religion, because " high art" was in so many cases spurious and misleading ; not at all historical in the real meaning of the term.

From this digression in speaking of English art, I return to mention one painter who has lately passed away, and who seems to me to have an individuality of power and excellence. He has been compared to Rosa Bonheur ; but while hers are perfect representations of " dumb, driven cattle," his pictures are full of sentiment and moral teaching. If the days of Æsop should ever return, " Dignity" will confer with " Impudence ;" the animals will hold a council, with the lion in the chair, and decree a golden crown to Sir Edwin Landseer. A man of original genius and tender heart, his animals think and reason, and claim our sympathy as if they were human beings ; his pictures are heroic, and never mock-heroic ; and they range in variety through the forms of lambs and mastiffs, lions of the tropics and polar bears, gibbering apes and hunted stags, whose tears almost compel our own.

The limits of this paper forbid my consideration of the historic teachings of art in Germany and the Low Countries, subjects which deserve and repay a curious and careful study, but which cannot be disposed of in a current page or two. They must be left for future consideration.

I shall close with the mention of an art school neither so pretentious nor progressive as those of Flanders, France, or Italy, but yet very curious, rich, varied, and individual—I mean the Spanish school. In comparison with the never-ceasing crowds which visit the galleries of Italy, France, and Germany, few Americans find their way to the *Musco* at Madrid, or the

galleries of Seville, where Spanish art is to be seen in its glory.¹ The former is one of the most famous galleries in the world.

As to the origin of art in Spain, we may pass by the arabesques of Granada and Seville, the paintings on parchment in the courts of the Alhambra, which represent the chivalry of the Moors and Christians, and the decline of Moslem faith.² The materials and the original handling in art came to Spain from Italy at the Renaissance ; but the personality—in artist and subject—was not borrowed ; it was found in Spain. The earliest paintings were imitations of the Italian ; but art was soon bound by a threefold cord to the Peninsula—the church, royalty, and Spanish provincial life (*cosas de España*).

The power of the church is everywhere apparent in the sacred subjects—Virgin, saints, miracles—of Murillo, Ribera (Spagnoletto), Alonzo Cano, and a host of others. The same power that controlled art instructed the hearts of the people to call for and admire such subjects. The artist was himself devout ; he had or affected to have trances and visions.³ The Virgin appeared to one who was painting her similitude, and told him just how to arrange her dress ! This reverence engendered an extreme prudery in delineation. “No loosely-robed madonnas and unclad Magdalenes were allowed to profane the public eye.”⁴ To Spanish artists the Virgin had no feet ; they were always covered.⁵ To their exalted fancy she was not a woman, but a goddess ; they liked to depict her with the grand accessories of the mystical woman of the Revelation :⁶

¹ In the *Museo* there are sixty-five pictures by Velazquez ; forty-six by Murillo ; fifty-eight by Ribera, and eight by Alonzo Cano, while the Murillo gallery at Seville is a great treasure-house of that master's works.

² The Mohammedans were forbidden to represent the forms of men and animals by the Koran ; and for a long time their zeal for the faith led to exact obedience.

³ In some this reverence was Pharisaic : Alonzo Cano would not receive the Sacrament from a priest who habitually confessed Jews ; and when dying he would kiss only a very handsome crucifix.

⁴ Radcliffe, 337.

⁵ The reader will recall the story of a Queen of Spain, who in a royal progress passed through a town where there was a stocking factory ; the simple people sent her some stockings ; they were returned with the answer that the Queen of Spain had no legs.

⁶ Rev. xii. 1.

"Clothed with the sun, and in her train the moon,
And on her head a coronet of stars,
And, circling round her waist with heavenly grace,
The bow of mercy bright, and in her hand
Emmanuel's cross, her sceptre and her hope."

Strange to say, with this curious ideality many Spanish artists were very realistic. Those who have travelled in Spain will remember Alonzo Cano's picture of a dead bishop, robed and mitred, but rotting away in the charnel-house. The criticism is good, whether the story be true or not, that when Murillo went to see it, and was asked his opinion of it, he simply held his nose.¹

The greatest name in Spanish art, and that which is specially illustrative of the influence of the church, is the name of Murillo. He is a church painter, but he is always a Spaniard. His Virgins, modelled from the women around him, are dark-haired, essentially national, and representing the better class of Spanish muchachas. He is more easily studied than any other truly great artist in his three distinct styles—the *frio*, the *calido*, and the *vaporoso*. In the first, his beggars and peasants are for the most part painted; in the second, his *visions* are warmly depicted, and in the third he presents his aerial (vaporous) figures, rising, or poised in air, as if in their native element. Such are the "Immaculate Conception" of the Louvre, and the "St. John the Baptist." But in the latter his realistic tendency is displayed, in that his saint is but a sublimation of the peasant type, a glorified *muchacho* of provincial Spain.²

It may be said that all Spanish painters have acknowledged the influence of the church; but of those who have painted at the instance of *royalty*, and to perpetuate the kingly prerogative and prestige, Diego Velazquez is the most prominent representative. Murillo was a plebeian; Velazquez was a gentleman of blue blood; and, while more at home in the palace, he

¹ The painting is in the hospital of La Caridad, in Seville: the modern beholder instinctively imitates Murillo.

² We are reminded of the wise saws of honest Sancho as we look upon this picture: "Clothe me as you will," said Sancho to the Duke, "I shall still be Sancho Panza;" and again: "Clothe the boy so that he may look not like what he is, but what he may be."

had the rare merit of being extremely truthful ; he would not flatter his princely subjects, and the historian must thank him for delineating them just as they were, and as they lived. He painted a few sacred subjects ; but, says Ford, " he went to the earth and not to heaven for types and models ; hence his Virgin has neither the womanly tenderness of Murillo, the unspotted loveliness of Raphael, or the serenity unruffled by human passions of the antique ; he rather lowered heaven to earth, than raised earth to heaven." ¹

Thus we have his " Philip on Horseback ;" his equestrian portrait of " Isabella de Bourbon ;" his " Prince Carlos on a Chestnut Pony ;" his " Count Duke of Olivares," and his famous " Surrender of Breda" (1625). He was an accurate, if unconscious, chronicler of his own period, a historical painter in the best sense of the phrase ; and lest he should be wanting as a patriot, he has left us some remarkable landscapes, among which is his " Gardens of Aranjuez."

In speaking of the third potent influence over Spanish art, provincial life and customs, we must return to Murillo and the school which he originated. Here we have the peasants, the groups of ragged but contented boys seated on the ground eating fruit, and playing their simple games—persons and scenes which every traveller verifies as he wanders through the enchanted land of Southern Spain—a land which retains its primitive life while all the world is changing, a land

" In which it always seemed afternoon,
A land where all things always seemed the same ;" ²

the only land where the traveller really forgets his home.

In all its varieties Spanish art excites a peculiar enthusiasm, from its unlikeness to other schools, and from the great originality of its masters, " whose works bear the impress of the individual mind of those great Spaniards who borrowed nothing from the past or foreign art, nothing from Apelles or Raphael,

¹ Hand-book for Spain, ii., 690. He adds : " Look, however, at his ' Crucifixion '—a sublime representation of the death of the Son of Man ; the treatment is solemn and impressive. How fine the darkness over the face of the earth, and the partial concealment of the face by dishevelled and scattered hair."

² Tennyson, " The Lotos-eaters."

from Greece or Italy. . . . They drew, with a local color, subjects which were in correspondence with the national eye and mind ; while the *mens divini* of Murillo and the pith and savor of manhood of Velazquez imparted to the commonest subjects their own freshness and fire, as Pygmalion, in that beautiful myth, breathed life into a stone."¹ The women of Seville saw themselves while they worshipped the holy faith of SS. Justa and Rufina on the canvas of Murillo.²

If Spanish paintings have suffered from conquest, their purloining by the French gave them that public recognition which they could never have had in the cloistered peninsula. Napoleon Bonaparte had set the example of plundering captured capitals, and sending pictures and statues to enrich the Parisian galleries ; and his marshals were not slow to imitate him. Soult, the Duke of Dalmatia, is especially notorious for his rapacity in this respect. He carried off that famous "Immaculate Conception" which adorns the *salon carré* of the Louvre, and which was purchased by the French government at the sale of his effects, in 1852, for six hundred and fifteen thousand three hundred francs.³ The "Birth of the Virgin" and the "Repose in Egypt" were concealed from his search ; but a traitor gave him information, and he sent to *beg* them from the owners ; the petition meant command. Of another Murillo a story is told which credits him with a grim humor : "The worthy marshal one day, showing Colonel Gurwood his collection at Paris, stopped opposite a Murillo, and said, 'I very much value that specimen, as it saved the lives of two very estimable persons.' An aide-de-camp whispered, 'He threatened to have both shot on the spot unless they gave up the picture.'"⁴

The contest between the Hapsburgs and the Bourbons, and the later supremacy of the latter house, have been unfavorable to art in Spain, and since then no Spanish artist of great name has appeared except Francisco Goya, who has been called the Spanish Hogarth. Spain lies fallow in arts, in literature, and in arms ; when will her day of awakening come ?

¹ Ford, ii., 673.

² "Patron Saints of Seville." Murillo has painted them as *muchachas*, Spanish girls of the lower class. Mrs. Jameson, "Sacred and Legendary Art," ii., 677.

³ Galignani, Paris, 178.

⁴ Ford, i., 180.

Of American art it is not my purpose to speak. If art is indeed the chronicler and interpreter of history, what a rich field lies before the American painter, soliciting his labors and promising the richest rewards. In its very infancy our art is abundant and enthusiastic ; its inspiration is to be found not in grand galleries containing the treasures of former periods,—for our collections are still exceedingly meagre in comparison with those of older nations,—but in the great extent and variety of our country—in climate, natural scenery, and the types of mankind. The American artist should abandon madonnas and saints, Italian brigands and Alpine passes. Let him take home themes more varied, more picturesque, and more magnificent than all Europe can offer him. Of human personality he has the New Englander of the North, the Knickerbocker of New York, the cavalier of Virginia, the Quaker of Pennsylvania, the Huguenot of South Carolina, the creole of New Orleans, the Russian of Alaska, the Spanish Indian of New Mexico, the “dialectic” heroes of Bret Harte and Mark Twain and John Hay : the manumitted negro ; last and not least, the fast-vanishing aborigines, who wither in the noonday of our civilization like forest flowers before the sun. And each has his thrilling story, fresher and truer than the traditionary legends among which the early art of Europe found its subjects and its tone.

And for the landscape school what a world of beauty presents itself ! The snows of the North ; the grandiflora of the South ; the great cataract ; the Father of Rivers ; marine views on a double coast ranging almost from the frozen zone to the tropics ; the lofty precipices and the tall trees of California ; the marvellous jumble of the Yellowstone, and the gigantic spurs of the Rocky Mountains. With these let the painter portray the incidents and events in our unexampled progress, and then let a liberal government place the best of such works in *a great national gallery*, provided, filled, and maintained at the public expense ; and what a history of our country would be displayed upon the canvas, not only supplementary to the written records, but more truthful, more valuable, more intelligible than the written records themselves !

We have seen that the patronage of art at the Renaissance was necessary to its progress. It may be added that in the long

run patronage is an injury to national manliness. From that time to this, art has been an honorable, but frequently needy solicitor, and the artist is under the control of the rich and noble, who buy his talent, and appear as his benefactors ! Such should never be the case in America ; it is the artist who should play the part of benefactor, who should speak, as some are already doing, not of their *patrons*, but of their *clients*. Individual patronage, however necessary it may be, is not often beneficial, but the government patronage which I propose would open to talent an honorable emulation, to rank among the historiographers of America.

I cannot believe that this is a visionary project ; I look with a sincere hope to see it carried out ; we are still near enough to our origin to do this in the most effective manner.

In view of European art in its great museums, so easily accessible to-day to all our students of art, who can live among them quite as frugally as at home ; in view of the excellence attained in material and methods, the young American who is ambitious of fame in painting may place in his standard the words of Goldsmith's " Traveller" :

" For me your tributary stores combine :
Creation's heir, the world, the world is mine !

And as he looks at home, upon his inheritance of beauty and progress, he may exclaim, in the words of " The Pilgrim's Vision" of Holmes :

" I see the living tide roll on ;
It crowns with flaming towers
The icy capes of Labrador,
The Spaniard's ' land of flowers !'
It streams beyond the splintered ridge
That parts the northern showers ;
From eastern rock to sunset wave
The continent is ours !"

HENRY COPPÉE.

RELIGION AND MORALITY.

RELIGION and morality are not proper complementaries of each other. They do not lie side by side in the same plane, so as together to make up a larger, more comprehensive field of truth. They are not presented from the same point of view—are not determined by the same principle of logical division. Accordingly, in strictness of thought, religion cannot safely be viewed as supplementing morality, nor morality, on the other hand, as supplementing religion, either speculatively or practically.

Nor, again, are they correctly regarded either one as germs of the other, in the sense either that morality is but the outgrowth and fruit of religion, or religion the normal development of morality. However helpful the one to the other, however closely allied, this is not the exact relationship that subsists between them—that one is the natural source and ground and the other the proper outcome and result. A true and perfect religion cannot be based on a merely moral system, nor can a complete moral structure be built upon religion. Logically they do not stand in that relationship to each other.

Much less are religion and morality identical. As Wuttke well observes, under this treatment the one is reduced to the other, and morality is entirely merged into religion as in mysticism, or religion into morality as in the "illumism" of the last century. The general interpretations of experience ("Christian Ethics," § 55) as expressed in language have so differentiated religion from morality, that to represent the laws and

phases of the one in the terms of the other involves unavoidable contradiction and bewilderment.

These broad denials, without argument, of certain views more or less prevalent are presented as simply introductory to our endeavor to ascertain more precisely and exactly the essential character of religion on the one hand and of morality on the other, and the true relationship that subsists between them. Our method is indicated in the following propositions, which will be considered in order :

First. Religion and morality have much in common.

Secondly. They differ in important characteristics.

Thirdly. They cannot safely be divorced.

Fourthly. The conflicts that may arise between them admit of solution ; and,

Fifthly. In any comparison as to their relative authority and importance to man the precedence must be given to religion.

I. In the first place, religion and morality in several most important respects, are at one. They have thus, first, their seat and ground in a rational nature—a proper personality ; secondly, the essential characteristic of both alike is a constraining force acting out from and upon this rational nature ; thirdly, they both derive this constraining force alike solely from God ; and, fourthly, their spheres are coincident.

1. Religion and morals alike presuppose and also characterize a proper rational nature. This proposition, in this bald form of statement, would probably be questioned by none ; and yet a wide opinion and a corresponding practice contradict or ignore it. A religion and a morality of the highest type certainly cannot be supposed, except as in beings endowed with reason ; and in reason are necessarily embraced the several functions of sense, thought, and free choice, acting indeed in varying degrees of predominance in different rational acts, yet in fact never dissociated. In truth, we can have no adequate conception of an act of proper reason except as put forth in the common exertion of these three functions, and the concurrent exercise of the three satisfies our notions of reason. That is an arbitrary definition of reason which limits it to denote merely a specific, although the highest, form of the in-

telligence. Such a definition may satisfy a theory, but does not satisfy the demands of the great *norma loquendi*—general use. A rational act without sense or without freedom, however intelligent, is in the common apprehension of men as inconceivable as active lungs in human body without blood or muscle. Rationality—reason—can be conceived only of an active being that in its activity must have an object given to it, and therefore apprehended by it, in the sense and retained in the imagination, and must also intelligently and freely direct its action towards that object; that, in other words, must act aimingly, or with sympathetic, intelligent, and free design. All right notions of religion and equally of morality presuppose this unity of agent in the concurrent exercise of these several co-ordinate functions. To leave out of our notion of an act of reason or unduly to degrade or subordinate in that notion either of these constituents—receptive and retaining sense of object, intelligence of its essence and relations to the activity, and determination of activity towards it—is logically unsound and practically harmful.

Now there are notions widely prevalent in different circles which directly conflict with these representations of religion and morality as essentially rational—ever outworkings of a proper rational nature, that as one and single can act only as an entirety in the concurrent exercise of sense, thought, and freedom. There is a conception of religion, found elsewhere, but particularly put forth with a kind of authority by a certain class of thinkers, which makes it a mere matter of feeling, sentiment, emotion. Some of these men would satisfy the religious instinct, which they cannot but recognize as an endowment of the soul of man, with the conscience as its proper object—would deify nature and so make religion identical with “cosmic emotion;” while others exalt religious emotion—emotion towards God, or even a simple form of religious emotion, as for instance the sentiment of reverence, into the one essential characteristic of religion. So that to feel reverent, even although blindly or by spontaneous, unconsenting constraint, before the majesty of God, to worship before him or any specific manifestation of his greatness, is to meet all the requirements of religion. This conception, in either form, indeed, separates

religion from morals, as a sentiment is separated from action. With life and conduct such a merely emotional religion has little to do. If the whole of religion is contained in the simple feeling of reverence awakened in proper degree as objects great and high now and then address it, morality need not concern itself with it—*de minimis lex non curat*.

So, on the other hand, there is a conception of morality which excludes sympathy and wellnigh, too, a consenting will. To be moral is simply to move with cool mechanical accuracy and regularity along the track of an intelligently prescribed honesty and uprightness, swerving neither to the right hand nor to the left of an exact, evenhanded rectitude. The relief of obtrusive want, ministry to innocent distress, charity at home, focusing on self and then waning away in ever rapidly fading beams on receding kinship or neighborhood, bearing pain and letting others bear it with Stoic equanimity and indifference—this is morality, as some are prone to view it. Such morality is as far as possible removed from religion; it regards neither God nor man as beings between whom any sympathy is to be allowed or loving affection interchanged.

These conceptions of religion and morality, making religion predominantly and characteristically a matter of feeling and morality a matter of frigid rectitude, have led to the supposition that there is a true logical opposition between the two—an opposition that, resting on a common basis of mental activity, distinguishes the one as determined by feeling from the other as characterized by intelligence—that they are proper complementaries of each other, forming complementary types or species of character. We find exemplifications of the practical influence of these defective notions, perhaps held wellnigh unconsciously, everywhere around us: religion characterized as mere feeling—it may be gratitude, trust, or other sentiment as well as reverence or even mere sympathy on the one hand; and on the other morality that is purely judicial, repudiating alike passion and conscious freedom as necessarily perverting and defiling and comparing the direct and pure and authoritative decisions of conscience. The same man, indeed, thus opposing religion and morality to each other, assigning them separate co-ordinate spheres of manifestation, may be as a

religious man a very enthusiast in his reverential homage, his grateful thanksgivings, his confiding prayers, his proper sympathetic religious life, and be at the same time the most punctilious as well as the most discriminating and impartial observer of all the moralities of life, while yet keeping the two spheres entirely apart, excluding all morality from his religion and all religion from his morality. His life is necessarily a zigzag, driven at one time by one principle in this direction, and at another by a different motive in that ; and his character is correspondingly unsymmetrical and defective.

This illogical opposition shows itself in speculation in the so-called contest between reason and faith. To oppose religion as grounded in faith and as essentially characterized by this element to morality as founded in pure reason, is at bottom to oppose a specific function of a rational nature to the comprehensive nature itself, since a feeling is nothing other than a rational exercise, and can be conceived to be irrational only as it is imperfect in degree or in direction upon object ; and reason enjoins perfection in both regards. There can neither be faith without reason—that is, outside of a rational nature ; nor, on the other hand, can there be reason without faith : for faith, which is but a mental act denominated from its sense-side, implies an object given from without and impressing the sensibility, and thus engaging the intelligence and the free will ; and reason equally implies some object presented to it which it can receive only through the sensibility, and in this way exert upon it its functions of intelligence and free activity. The psychological error in separating the imagination or the faculty of form, by which the mind holds up the impressions made upon it, re-shaped and colored out of its own stored-up material, for its own contemplation and re-impression or for impression on other minds—in separating the active from the passive side of the same function—the proper sensibility, and the philosophical delusion of the ability of a finite reason to create out of itself, without experience determined from without, ideas and systems of thought and of conduct—to create even philosophy, a morality, a religion of pure reason—have conspired to prevent the discernment of the true relation between faith and reason, and to occasion the irrational supposi-

tion that there may be a real conflict between the two, between legitimate feeling and conviction, between morality and religion. In the light of the grand fundamental truth, as unquestionable as comprehensive, that for a finite being, as, on the one hand, there must be of necessity for every feeling an object which awakens and to its due relative degree determines it in form and intensity, and for all continued and intensified feeling a continued re-impression of the object upon the sensibility by the imagination as the one faculty of form, and as by the organic unity of the soul this feeling must be characterized more or less by intelligence and free will, and therefore can never be other than rational in nature, however imperfect in any respect of degree or direction; so, on the other hand, there is equal necessity in order to any intelligence or choice, that there be given an object on which reason is to act in thought or in purpose, and that object must be introduced to reason, to rational thought and choice, through the capacity or faculty of feeling—the proper sensibility or the imagination. Hence it follows with necessary conclusiveness that faith and reason cannot in legitimate exercise be in opposition or conflict, any more than one function in normal exercise be in conflict with another function or with the entire organic life. They are outgoings of the same rational nature, differing only in kind or degree of specific function. Faith directly regards the object presented to the sense and apprehended by it; reason indirectly implies this object thus presented and apprehended as a necessary precedent condition to its action. A rational religion without a God thus presented and apprehended, that constructs its God out of principles or ideas into which a real God has not been introduced in some way of actual experience, is a phantom, a nullity. Reason can never reach the divine except through faith—through the reception and acceptance of some manifestation of God.

It is accordingly in a very special sense only that we can represent on the one hand religion as grounded upon faith, and on the other morality as grounded upon reason, and by no means in that absolute sense which implies a radical diversity, and so a possible antagonism, between them. Were we even to suppose religion to be mere emotion or sentiment, they

could not be thus placed in fundamental antagonism, since emotion necessarily engages intelligence, while freedom and morality presuppose objects of moral action which first introduce themselves to the moral nature through the emotional. There may be variation in the degree of predominance in a given mental act of the several functions of the soul ; so far there may be contrast or opposition ; so far an act of feeling differs from one of thought or choice ; faith from reason ; religion from morality. But each alike supposes at bottom the same one organic nature—a soul that ever feels when it thinks and when it chooses, and thinks and chooses when it feels ; acts ever feelingly, intelligently, and freely in every act ; that believes whenever it reasons and reasons whenever it believes ; is religious when it is moral and moral when it is religious. The rational soul is essentially and pervasively emotional, intelligent, and free, believing and determining, religious and moral.

The grand truth thus to be carefully recognized in theory and conduct is, that religion and morality belong alike to the rational nature—to the proper personality, in the sense that every such nature must be both religious and moral, and can never in any expression of itself lay aside either attribute, any more than the animal nature can in its actual living expression forego its breathing or its pulse. To be rational for man is to be reverent and devout, loving and trusting, as it is to be upright and courteous and respectful towards all rational beings alike in their due degree and relation—towards God and equally towards man. A rational nature, we repeat, cannot but be, ever and always, both religious and moral.

2. Religion and morality agree in asserting each for itself an absolute sovereignty and rule over the whole personal life and conduct. There is alike in every human soul a true natural instinct of piety and equally so a true instinct of duty. These instincts are universally recognized—at least, are not questioned—by any authority worthy of consideration, while human history attests their existence on every page. They are of the nature of a constraining, obliging, as well as directive and guiding force, so as to impart a proper law over the soul—an actual imperative—impelling to acts of piety and

equally to acts of duty. They are, each in its respective way and manner, supreme and absolute, in the sense that, on the one hand, the dictates of true piety and, on the other, the dictates of duty are the highest law and exert a natural and underived authority—an authority as absolute and independent as it is possible to conceive in a finite created being. This ruling force, moreover, is seated in the rational nature, in the personality, and is inseparable from it. It cannot be conceived except as pertaining to such a nature ; nor can such a nature be conceived without this constraining force. We shall hereafter see that this sovereignty both of religion and of morality is not a divided, conflicting sovereignty in principle or spirit, in source or aim, and can be so, if at all, only through imperfect interpretation or application in specific acts of life and conduct.

3. Religion and morality, once more, agree in having their ground and sanction alike originally in God. The proof of this statement is demonstrative on the assumption of the fact of the religious and moral nature in man. And of this fact there certainly can be no question. It were as preposterous to question it as to question the fact that man thinks and also breathes. Experience, consciousness, observation, history, language, law, alike attest the fact that men are both religious and moral. Religion and rights are the two greatest factors of human history. It is equally incontestable that these religious and moral attributes appertain to the instinctive nature of man. They are not imbibed, they are not acquired from without ; they are developed from within out of native germs. They are the endowments with which the soul has been furnished, or rather the very constituents out of which the soul has been fashioned ; its essential elements, which its creator has determined to it. As the soul is his handiwork, its capabilities, its tendencies, its instincts, are the expression of his will as to what it should be and what it should effect ; they are his law to its action. The law of piety and the law of duty are alike thus his law, in the sense that they are the natural outcome and result of his fashioning and designing work. They are thus grounded in his creative will, as they are conditioned in their working by his disposing providence. They have accordingly

both alike his sanction. Their authority—underived from any creature, and so above all the forces of external nature, absolute, independent, as respects them—springs as creature from the creative act, from God who has made man alike a religious and a moral being. It is derived from him as this religious and moral nature is derived from his creative power, but is supreme and absolute in the sense that man can know no higher law. Even the new and positive law which the sovereign creator may be pleased to promulgate that is undiscoverable by the unaided reason of man, and that is not possibly derivable from his original and proper nature, must be not merely in harmony with this instinctive law, but in support and guidance and development of it; can never be subversive of it or contradictory to it. Such subversion and contradiction would prove at once that such new law was not from the same all-wise and all-perfect God. The supposition of any such revelation subverting his own law in creating man is preposterous; it arrays perfect wisdom against perfect wisdom, and is contradictory to clearest reason.

4. The spheres of religion and morality are exactly coincident, whether subjectively or objectively determined. The moral nature and the religious nature are, as already indicated, both conterminous with the rational nature; they must therefore be coincident. So far as man is susceptible to impression from external object; so far as he is intelligent so as to apprehend the object in its essence and relations and his own capabilities in reference to it; so far, moreover, as he is free to determine his own activity—he is certainly moral. And this capability of moral activity reaches to God as well as to other objects. No sound conception of morality can exclude from its sphere the highest, nearest, most engaging of all objects; since the moral nature must necessarily go out to him as fit object equally with other objects, if indeed God, as we may here lawfully assume, have himself a moral, that is a truly rational, nature—be susceptible, intelligent, free. If God be conceived to be something else than a moral person in this sense; be, for instance, an inconceivable thing, an incomprehensible and unthinkable absolute—a most preposterous and self-contradictory conception—or be a mere power that, while

“making for righteousness” or for blessedness or any other end, is yet destitute of all sympathy, all wisdom, all self-determination in sympathy and wisdom ; or, further, be a mere stock or stone or force of nature—then, indeed, morality has nothing to do with him ; the moral can interact only with the moral, and there can be no morality when there is not interaction between the moral subject and the moral object. This is a first truth in ethical science. But if there be evidence of any power or force in the sphere which men as moral beings occupy, there is equal evidence that that power or force is in communion with other objects in the same sphere so as to be impressible by them and reciprocally to impress them—is sympathetic ; is also intelligent, discerning ends and means, moving in orderly ways ; and moreover is autonomous, undetermined by external agency of any kind ; for that power or force in nature manifests itself in these rational ways everywhere, and only in these ways. Science may in logical abstraction separate for purposes of thought or knowledge the power or force in nature from these essential attributes, these attributes of reciprocal impressibility between its manifold parts, of orderly relationship between these parts, and of absolute sovereignty ; but it cannot conceive of it as a concrete reality, as an actual substance, except as thus characterized, for the simple reason that it can know the existence and working of this force only as it is manifested through and with these characteristics. Morality, therefore, if the term be meant to include the entire capability of the moral nature in relation to all great objects of its activity, must respect God as well as all created moral beings.

So, on the other hand, the religious nature must respect God in the fulness of his true character and relations. Inasmuch as a foremost attribute of the divine being is that of creator and ruler, the religion that truly and fully embraces God in its scope must embrace his works as they express his perfections and will, and must recognize him in every moral creation of his ; it cannot terminate in his pure being. Indeed, as his very being is activity, religion can find him only in his action, and must adore the manifestations he makes of himself in all that he has made as in all that he does. Religion, moreover, is in exercise nothing else than God-like action ; if God is

moral—loving, beneficent, upright—towards his moral creatures, every soul that is truly swayed by religion must, as it is God-like, be moral also.

Take what view we will, accordingly, we discover ever that the spheres of morality and religion, whether determined from the subject or from the object, must be exactly coincident. The religious nature must go out towards God wherever he is to be discovered, and must therefore recognize his moral creatures as the proper object of its activity—must, as true to itself, act morally throughout the entire sphere of moral beings; and the moral nature must equally go out towards God—must, as true to itself, act religiously throughout the entire sphere that God fills in common with itself. In an analogous way, looking from the object in religious and in moral activity, the divine in the creation of God commands the due regard of the religious sense—that is, enforces moral duty as truly religious; and the divine in the creator filling in common with his created work the moral universe, evokes all that is truly moral and requires that all true morality be religious. The identity of personal relation between God, the creator and moral ruler of all rational beings, and the God-fearing saint in the one case, and the conscientious moralist in the other, necessitates identity of law in all religion and all morals. Love to God as the first command and love to man as the second are prescribed by both as the complements of the one all-comprehensive law.

II. But while religion and morality have so much in common—are grounded in the same rational nature which they alike presuppose and at the same time characterize, exert a legitimate sovereignty alike in and over this nature, derive alike their sanction and authority from God, and fill the same spheres of rational activity—they yet, as common speech recognizes and abundant speculation and practice, however erroneous and imperfect, also prove, are widely to be differenced from each other in their proper logical import and application. They are not identical; and to treat them so is to mistake and to mislead. The fundamental difference is indicated at once by the fact that they are immediately given by different views of the same personal nature. Religion looks at

once at the object or end of life and conduct ; morality looks at the essential nature of the subject of rational activity or of that activity itself. The former is objectively determined ; the latter is subjectively determined. The term religion suggests as the first thing God, or at least the highest object of reverence, trust, service, love ; it denotes the personal or rational life in its immediate relations to that which is accepted as the God of the life. A religious system, whether of faith or of practice, is characterized first and chiefly by the view it takes of God—his character and relations, his personality, his attributes of power and love and wisdom and beneficence, his relations of sovereignty and of righteous and gracious providential rule. It determines from these attributes and relations as they regard men his claims as to nature and extent, and their duties, as well as their hopes and fears. It derives from them the whole authority of conscience, and finds in them the light to guide as well as the motives to prompt and press its control, formally and expressly making conscience the simple representative of God, and only as such the rightful regulator of life and conduct. In the religious view, conscience is the voice of God, and therefore sovereign. The common moralities of life are, in its view, of divine appointment, and are obligatory only as they are ordained of God. As from the very necessities of the case religion must see God in every thing—in every being, in every act—it must see God in every object possible to the moral activity, because it is God's work, and he is in every creation of his ; it places God accordingly in all specific acts of duty, and, as we have seen, makes morality essentially religious. It allows no duty which does not derive its obligation immediately or remotely from God as creator and sovereign ruler, and adjudges that man to be imperfect in the ordering of his moral nature who does not practically regard God as the source of all obligation and all morality. Religion has thus its peculiar nature and character determined from the object in the rational activity ; it is throughout characterized and shaped by what it accepts as the object that is to receive its highest adoration, its largest trust, its all-engaging service.

Morality, on the other hand, is given from a purely sub-

jective view. It determines all duty, all obligation, all rectitude, from the nature of duty, or, what amounts to the same thing, from the nature of the subject of duty. It necessarily supposes an object to whom duty is to be rendered ; it determines specific duties from the character and relations of this object of duty ; but it sees this object only through the medium of the moral nature. Whatever object may be imagined to exist without or beyond the scope of this moral nature it ignores and wholly rejects from its notice. All claims from whatsoever object are measured and determined in the light of the moral capabilities themselves. It accepts God as object to whom duty is owed ; it accepts him, if at least it be true and legitimate, as chiefest object, to whom first and highest obligations are to be discharged. A true ethical system must thus recognize God in his true character and relations to the moral subject, consequently as supreme and sovereign. It must accordingly, as we have seen, make all morality religious. But it determines and measures all duty to God immediately from the capabilities and instincts of the moral nature itself. Ethics may presuppose or imply, but does not attempt to prove, the divine origin of every moral agent, and therefore does not found itself directly in the divine authority. But it finds in the moral nature itself an instinct towards God as worthy object of duty, and so must enforce proper religious duty.

Thus while systems of morality and religion must give the same rules of practice and must fill out the same spheres of duty, these rules are ascertained and determined and correlated from entirely different points of view.

In the light of this fundamental difference between religion and morality it will be easy to see how, especially with imperfect men, widely diverse results, both in speculation and in practice, may be reached, according as the one or the other is made the principle of development. A perfect philosophy must from both attain the same specific rules of duty and from both prescribe the same specific steps of conduct ; but the methods and the motives will vary, and consequently, if aught of imperfection in the thought or in the life find admission, the results will not only be diverse in order of presentation and

arrangement and in gradation, but also in essential character ; the theology will be here and there in conflict with the ethics, and the piety will be at variance with the morality. In other words, a system of practical philosophy will easily, with imperfect men, limited in view and biassed in judgment, become a widely different thing when grounded and motived objectively in God from what it must be when developed and determined subjectively from the moral nature itself.

Speculatively, for illustration, theology begins with a positive revelation of God either oral and by the outward sense or in attributes and workings intentionally discerned. It inclines naturally and legitimately to the oral or sensible revelation. But there is a legitimate natural theology—a theology founded on the manifestations of God, either immediately in the soul itself—its own nature divinely constituted and its own experiences which it is necessitated in reason to ascribe to a supernatural, a divine working—or in the world without, being apprehended through the outward sense and so brought into its own experience, and in these affections of itself revealing to its intuitions just as in its own workings divine attributes. These revelations of God, whether oral or intuitional, are apprehended in proper faith, being accepted as accredited in themselves, just as the testimony of our own senses—what we see and hear—and of our own thoughts and feelings and purposes is believed and not reasoned out. Theology builds thus on faith—on the revelations of God accepted and trusted for their own sake. It erects its superstructure by proper work of reason, analyzing, selecting, correlating, adapting to a proposed end. Ethics, on the other hand, will naturally begin with the moral nature itself. It accepts this as given in proper faith, apprehending the phenomena of its own moral nature as true, credible manifestations of that nature. It founds thus necessarily on faith equally with religion, and builds up its superstructure by an analogous procedure a work of proper reason. But the relations of this moral nature to God are not, as in theology, the prominent and comprehensive relations in ethics ; they are either only remotely involved, as the moral nature must involve more or less the attributes of its author, or pre-

sented only as co-ordinate parts of the diversified object of moral activity.

While theology and ethics thus alike necessarily begin in rational faith and pursue their work in rational intelligence, and between the two no proper opposition of faith to reason is necessarily involved, yet unless absolute perfection be supposed in the cases the results in doctrine will more or less necessarily vary. Theology will exalt its views of the character and relations of God, and overbear all repugnances and remonstrances from alleged facts in human nature or experience. God will tend to become to it literally "all in all," absorbing all the human into the divine—absolutely identifying it as in pantheism, merging it in a living unity as in mysticism, or engaging it as exclusive object of action as in religious asceticism. It will tend not merely to exalt the first great commandment over the second as superior in rank and in importance, but by its exclusive regard to the first to crowd out or at least unduly depress the second. It will tend to run rational faith into credulity; to accept on slight pretext divine revelations, miraculous interventions, superstitious observances. Not that a perfectly exact religious philosophy must issue thus, but such is the liability in human weakness: the divine relationships will tend to overbear all other relationships, to engross to themselves the movements of thought, and so make the philosophy of human life one-sided and partial—make men religionists instead of religious, pietists instead of pious.

In an analogous way, ethical science, proceeding from the intuitions of reason as directed upon the manifestations of the moral nature, will tend not only to drop out of view the divine source and principle of all morality as well as of all thought, but to concern itself more exclusively with the immediate and palpable objects of moral activity, to identify itself more and more with mere philanthropy. The human, especially in the social relation, will determine the sphere of the moral life and indicate all the lines of duty. This is most fully exemplified in the famous system of Confucius, in which the human nature in its capabilities and its needs, to the utter exclusion of the divine, whether as creator and original or as existing object of the moral life, is made both the single basis of right living and the

single aim of humanity. The religious instincts become debased and perverted into love and worship of ancestry ; the state and the family become the all-comprehensive relations ; earth becomes the sole sphere of interest for man.

Practically, the life and conduct as ordered by commanding consideration of the divine—by habitual recognition of his being and all-perfect character, of his presence and power and goodness, of his righteous and gracious rule, and by a full subordination of every interest to his control and disposal—must be a very different matter from a life determined from a mere consideration of the moral nature, its capacities, its instincts, its ends. The motives of an exclusively religiously ordered life, its aims, its enthusiasms, will be higher and more commanding ; while at the same time it must be more liable to excesses, to unevennesses, to superhuman exaltations intermixed with unmanly depressions, because the invisible and spiritual cannot be held by human grasp so evenly and so steadily as the seen and tangible. The religious man will move, as a whole, in a higher plane than the mere moralist, while his course may not be so uniform or so constant.

In short, the life and conduct must be very differently shaped and colored according as it is motivated by the divine as freely accepted in the consciousness or by the mere phenomena of the human nature. Its look and aspiration in the one case will be outward and upward, its scope broader, and its inspirations deeper and stronger. In the other, the look will be inward, and along a level of its own existing attainments and developments ; its scope will be narrowed to its own demands and claims ; it will kindle with no enthusiasms but the common and ordinary ; it may be even, and ever keep along the just middle of possible endeavor ; it will hardly ever be ecstatic, hardly ever beam with the radiance proper to an immortal nature. Self-humiliation before God with the inspiring assurance of future glory will characterize the one ; self-complacency with satisfaction with the present will mark the other.

III. It is very apparent from this survey of the respective natures of religion and morality that they cannot in reason or with safety be divorced either in theory or in practice. Theology is, for its own sake, for its own integrity and com-

pleteness, necessitated to recognize every principle of sound ethics ; and piety, to be sound and perfect, must flow out into every department of the moral sphere. Just so a sound ethical system must found itself on a nature that is divine in origin ; that depends absolutely on God for sustenance and for growth and expression ; that goes out instinctively, by the constraints of its own being and of the conditions of its existence and working, towards God, and can never be satisfied till it reaches him ; that is in its normal condition God-like, and must be in sympathy and accord with him, as well as in loving trust and obedience towards him. It must, moreover, in laying out the spheres and directions of moral activity, devote one large field to God as its object, and recognize in worthy prominence and rank its relations to him. Ethics must embrace in its orderly enumeration of duties the duty owed to God—all religious duty. Piety, too, must be coupled with a sound moral life—or, more exactly, must be embodied in it. A religious life that renounces all claims but those that immediately respect God, becomes a lean, vigorless, Simon Stylites skeleton of faith, and approximates this type of character just in proportion as it separates itself from social relations and conditions. And a moral life, on the other hand, without God, is sadly incomplete, and as sadly weak and cold.

There is, as has been shown, no ground for separation to be discovered in their nature and essence. As embraced in the same personality, they must be in organic harmony. To regard them philosophically or practically as out of such vital relationship necessarily mars and mutilates them. A theology that holds back from exhibiting God except as he manifests himself in express sensible revelation by vision or by deed, or in ordinances and rites, ignoring his utterances in his works of creation and providence, and above all disregarding the declared image of his rational nature in man or fellow-beings, cannot but be sadly defective ; as also must be an ethical system that does not find in the moral nature of man a true and positive instinct towards the supernatural, the super-human, the super-angelic even—towards the truly Absolute and Infinite One, or that does not recognize obligations and duties which respect a real being who is other and higher than any fel-

low-creature or even than any imagined totality of finite existence. Theology magnifies God most when it discloses his presence and his sway in nature and in history, as well as in temple and in shrine. And ethics magnifies the moral man and perfects its own teachings as it distinctly finds its ideal in the God-like and terminates all duty in the person of God himself or those that bear his image.

In exact correspondence with this view of the organic relationship of theology and ethics as systems of doctrine, the religious life and practice reciprocates with true moral conduct a dependent helpfulness. A piety divorced from morals is a contradiction or an impossibility ; " If a man love not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen ? " " Inasmuch as ye did it not unto these, ye did it not unto me. " As there is no true piety that does not extend its love to man in due honor, courtesy, sympathy, and beneficence, so piety absolutely depends on moral behavior for its culture, and cannot thrive or be healthy without it. It learns duty to God in observing claims of fellow-man as bearing God's image ; all gracious affections—reverence, trust, obedience, gratitude, love—are soonest evoked in social relations, in " piety at home," requiting parental care, and through that household love and service and trust grow out and up towards the heavenly Father, and so thrive in the spiritual house of God on earth that not merely prefigures, but as a living temple actually germinates and develops into, the future glory. Upright walking towards God confirms and establishes itself in upright dealings with men ; reverence towards him is nurtured in respectful deference to superiority in station, in age, in worth among men ; faith in him grows in the exercise of confidence and trust in them, as obedience to him is learned and encouraged in dutiful submission to human authority. The religious life thus finds its rudiments, its nursery-bed, its occasions for exertion and expansion, the cheering evidence of its reality and purity, to a very large extent in the ordinary moralities. The heavenly virtues and graces are the same in essence with those that enter into our ideals of true earthly excellence, only vitalized by a positive divine ingredient, tempering, shaping, glorifying it—the good olive engrafted into an olive though

wild before. And, conversely, a moral life can be sustained and matured only as it grows up in God. It cannot thrive but in actual personal relationships ; in a personal trust in a personal friend and helper ; in a personal sympathy reaching down to its deepest cravings and out and up to its largest desires and aspirations ; in a personal authority enforced by worthiness of character, right of rule, and certainty of approval or of condemnation ; in a personal communion with an ever-present comforter and an infinite Saviour. Only as it can surely lean on an arm that is mightiest can it triumph over fear, perplexity, despondency, in the dangers and the difficulties that beset all earthly experience ; only as it is strong in God can it resist severe temptation. Reforms, whether in individual or in social life, move heavily, trippingly, failingly, if the higher springs of action found in religion are not invoked. The history of national as of personal reforms abundantly evinces this. The slave-trade, the institution of slavery itself, have yielded to the courage, the determination, the enthusiasm which religion has inspired. Intemperance has proved itself too mighty for merely moral assaults. Giving way, it may be for the moment, it reappears with new opportunity when vigilance is relaxed, or energy is wearied, or friendly help is removed. The tiger may be subdued by determined effort prompted by conscience, or wretchedness, or friendly persuasion ; but so long as the spirit inhabits a body with craving lusts and appetites inherited or acquired, the law in the members persists, and vicious habit, even in reform, is a tiger, chained may be, but with one eye still open watching its opportunities ; and only grace, with eyes that never sleep and arms that never yield nor tire, can assure permanence and completeness of reform. Social temperance may be the fashion of a day ; but the fashion of this world is a fickle and perishing thing after all. Temperance is stable only as it is based in divine obligation and support—only as it is rooted in a true religious life. So generally the morals of a people or of an age have found their life and maintenance in the religious men of the community or the times. The sentiment that may be supposed to be inculcated in the familiar effusion of Leigh Hunt—"Abou Ben Adhem"—that the divine favor exalts him highest who loves his fellow-man best although without love to

God, if the supposition were not itself as a possible realization utterly preposterous, is as contradictory to a sound ethics as a sound theology, and as fatal to practical morality as to practical piety. Love to a brother, so far as it ignores the common fatherhood, separates itself from the very spring and source of its life. Men are brethren only as God is their Father. Philanthropy has its roots in fraternity ; and fraternity among men, except as God is recognized as father, is contradictory in thought and visionary in life. Piety and morals cannot be divorced but with peril and loss on either side.

IV. It is altogether reasonable, moreover, to anticipate conflicts in doctrine and in duty arising from the two diverse interpretations by an imperfect intelligence, the one from the moral nature of man and the other from the revelations of the divine character and claims. That such conflicts appear, should occasion no perplexity or discouragement, either to the philanthropist or to the believer. They should in reason be expected, and be met in the assured confidence that they need imperil neither reason nor faith ; in the warranted conviction, indeed, that to the absolute reason they are perfectly at one, and that man's best interest is concerned in earnest and confident endeavor to reconcile them. Such hopeful endeavor, finding its occasion all along the pathway of human experience, is well fitted to maintain vigilance, to nourish piety and moral purity, to introduce into ever new visions of the essential harmony between right reason and true faith. As of very necessity grounded in the oneness of nature to which they belong, in the unity of universal being and of the creative source out of which all things spring, reason can have no fundamental antagonism with faith, while at the same time the specific deductions of the one may seem to be at variance with the several apprehensions of the other ; so the theologian and the ethical teacher may be brought into occasional strife over principles and methods and applications, and the believer and the moralist may encounter each other at the crossings here and there of their respective pathways, devious because human, and yet the encounter give no cause for either one repudiating or forbidding the other, or even for shrinking from the closest fellowship.

As the mysteries of faith must necessarily break in with a surprise on the lower visions of unaided human reason and sometimes even shock and stumble it—somewhat as the large experiences of mature life outspan the narrow range of a child's apprehension, yet cannot, when properly authenticated revelations, be reasonably rejected unless demonstrably contradictory and absurd in strictest logic; so the revelations of religion may seem beyond the comprehension of a moral philosophy that necessarily bounds itself within the comparatively small circumference of human capacity and experience, and yet claim allowance from it unless clearly in logical contradiction to demonstrated truth. The history of discovery, the history of human progress, is full of surprises that seem to the old experience incredible. The marvels of modern science and art are as beyond the comprehension of former ages as the deepest mysteries of religion can be imagined to be to the matured reason. Those great characteristics of Christian faith—the miracles of the incarnation, the crucifixion, the resurrection, the pentecostal baptism—are above the invention of human reason, above its comprehension, even as to their necessity, the manner of their coming to be, and of their working, their relationship generally to the system of God's righteous rule; but being accredited as facts on probable evidence, cannot be denied, inasmuch as they are neither self-contradictory nor absolutely incongruous with other attested facts. Just so human ethics may find no room in its conception of a righteous rule for forgiveness, for an atonement, for vicarious sacrifice; but the revealed truth on these points is in no necessary contradiction to any facts in man's moral nature. Alongside of the maturest and soundest ethics may lie the revelation that God may be "just, and the justifier of him that believeth in Jesus," breaking down no principle, no precept of morality, supplementing perhaps, but not subverting one particle of purely moral truth. Until such subversion, such contradiction, can be shown beyond the possibility of doubt, can a properly authenticated teaching of religion be reasonably denied. Doctrines may be true that human reason may not in its present light be able to harmonize, much less to comprehend in their ultimate ground and their relation to the divine

system of the universe. Morality can reasonably reject only a demonstrably false religion.

It may be that specific rules of duty, as derived from the moral nature of man on the one hand or the word of faith, may sometimes come into conflict. This is by no means strange. The several rules of morality itself often thus come into conflict, as do even dictates of religion as humanly interpreted. But it is certain that the actual religious instincts of man cannot be in natural disharmony with his moral instincts ; nor can there be in any conflict of humanly interpreted rules but one line of duty. What that line is to be in the case of any conflict of rules is to be determined on the principles of legitimate casuistry. The principles of the higher authority or the higher source of authority must give the religious so far the predominance over the merely moral rule ; while yet other principles of casuistry, as the greater nearness and directness or greater beneficence, may in a supposed case give the moral the precedence. For the trial of faith, for the strengthening and enlightenment of reason, for wise purposes of discipline, the prescriptions of faith and of reason, as man interprets them, may be in disharmony : but they are not at bottom antagonistic ; solution is probable ; man's privilege is to seek this solution and strive for it, in confidence of ever-growing success.

V. Once more, it is possible that one put himself more immediately and controllingly under the sway of religion and walk more by faith—by obedience to revealed law and trust in revealed guidance and help and promise ; or, on the other hand, put himself more under the control of conscience—of the practical reason dictating the right and the good. While the true course, prescribed both by right reason and by divine direction, is so far as possible to follow ever all light that comes assured from God, whether directly beaming from his Word or reflected from his works in man and nature, to strengthen and expand faith by reason and elevate and guide reason by faith, to maintain as may be a rational faith and a believing reason, according as faith or reason leads at the time, yet between the two there is room for choice. It certainly cannot be a matter of question whether in the light of immortality it is better to be an ignorant, even often stumbling, believer in God and so a

child of promise, or the sagest and most stoical of philosophical atheists, without hope as without God. But not to push the inquiry to this extreme, we may yet maintain that, all other things being equal, the life which is prompted and guided and nurtured and cheered more habitually by religious faith must be a higher, purer, better life than that which relies more upon proper moral truth. The proper religious instinct is deeper, stronger, more pervasive than the proper moral instinct, if this distinction be accepted in the only allowable sense—that which admits their essential harmony and devotes only a different outlook from the same rational spirit on the same rational nature and field. The ideal of character and attainment given by faith is the image of the divine perfection; that reasoned out of man's moral nature is but human at best. The aim to be God-like is loftier than the aim to be manly. An endless and tireless, rather a forever strengthening development into an infinite perfection, as it is worthier of a being of immortality, is a higher, every way better, hope and aspiration than the survey bounded by the moral nature of man, even although it take in God as the ground and the predominant object of duty, can bring to light. There are grand elements of character indeed standing out on the foreground of the truest and most perfect of all religions which ethics can hardly be supposed to be adequate of its own strength to conceive or of its own authority to prescribe, although it may unhesitatingly admit them when presented and then invest them with its own imperatives and sanctions; such are the divine elements of self-abnegation and filial trust. To lose the life in order to save it, to let go all to gain all, the more and better to give than to receive—this is of proper divine teaching and exemplification: it enters into the proper religious ideal of character; it is its crown and glory. On the other hand, the goal of practical morality is only to be just and equal, and so falls far below the Christian mark and aspiration. The significance of trust as an element of character is incomparably broader and richer from the properly religious point of view than from the merely moral. The sense of dependence as a native germ of the very being of man, out of which all true and stable trust must spring and grow, is immeasurably deeper and stronger as

it starts directly from the view of the Infinite and Absolute One than when it is directly prompted by the finite and dependent ; reliance immediately on the all-perfect Creator in strength and value must be confessed to be far above any trust in created being, however exalted.

The growth of character receives, too, from religion its strongest impulses. The highest morality is comparatively cold—chiefly, perhaps, because it necessarily leaves out to a great extent the power of personality. The morally perfect man is, alas ! for man, but an ideal ; no real has ever been found in mere humanity. Even if ever real, the perfect man could be model and sympathizing helper only to a small circle of acquaintance, and could unfold himself in the fulness of his aims and methods and excellences not to even one, not to the closest friend and follower. Morality, if complete, must bring in a personal God, indeed ; but he is not here logically placed at the front and foreground : he lies in the depths or is consigned to a corner. Religion places a personal God immediately and commandingly before the human soul. Thus comes from it the inspiration of a true rational sympathy, as between congenial spirits—between the infinite and perfect Creator and the finite and imperfect creature, indeed, yet the one created in the image of the other, whose very inferior and dependent and needy nature and condition is a ground of sympathy, real and as broad as the finite capacity, although it may not be paralleled in some other respects with the grounds of sympathy given by sameness of nature and condition. This inspiration from personal sympathy, personal communion, personal trust, breathing in upon the spirit always and everywhere, and strongest in time of greatest need, is matched by nothing supplied by morality. For the formation and growth of character the whole combined power to impel or attract, to drive or draw, from the instincts of the moral nature, from the authority of conscience, from the attractiveness of a human ideal of excellence, is feebleness itself in comparison with the single call of God's grace through his Son, "Come unto Me," breaking upon the ears and hearts of men weary and heavy laden with sin and sorrow. Redemption from guilt without a personal Redeemer, salvation from

sin and death without a personal Saviour, restoration to the favor and friendship of God without a personal Mediator and Intercessor, rise from the depths of a fallen nature to the holiness of heaven without a personal helper and guide and comforter, a true Holy Ghost—were hopeless indeed: but morality knows nothing of such divine personal agencies; revelation brings these grounds of help and hope to man.

There is still another view of the comparative rank and importance of religion and morality which is perhaps more decisive, because more fundamental and comprehensive. Religion is the one bond that binds indissolubly the truest philosophy, the highest art, and the purest morals. There is an elemental truth in the common phrases of "a divine philosophy," "a divine art," "a divine character:" they denote the grand root and centre of the true, the beautiful, and the good as being in God, in whom, as such root and centre, they have a vital union, and so stand in most sympathetic and helpful relationship to one another—even that of being members of one body.

Philosophy finds its last and lowest foundation in God as the former and disposer of the universe, and so the fountain of all truth, as the root of all being. Science, dealing professedly with this or that branch only of truth, ignores the root and trunk—"the physical philosopher, as such, must be a pure materialist," says a leader of scientific thought—and equally fails to discern the divine hue and form which really characterize every ramification of truth. Philosophy, which carries science into grounds and principles and ends, is constrained to acknowledge God as the only conceivable ultimate source of knowledge, and the one sphere that is comprehensive of all truth.

In the same way, high art which seizes the loftiest idea and embodies in the fittest body for the most perfect of form, has found in the past and will ever find both its ideal and its idea, as well as the kindlings of its enthusiasm, in the contemplation of God and the manifestations of the divine in nature and in grace.

So, too, the best types of human excellence are of a divine mould, designed and shaped after a divine pattern, drawing their

life and nourishment from God, and so exhibiting a true growth into the divine image. The best morals in human history we find exemplified in religious men taught and led by God. The power of mere morality to shape and elevate character has, indeed, been mainly confined to a meagre few of exceptional natures or surroundings; religion has shown its power on every class and condition. The best of ethical systems—the Stoic—blessed only a little circle whom a child can count; the only true religion—Christianity—is blessing a world.

But philosophy, art, and morals are mutually dependent on one another; they become perfect only as in organic relation; and the only ground and bond and life of this union is the divine—the religious—since in it is the one ultimate spring of all. They grow from one root, one trunk; they necessarily fail in vigor as they become dissevered members. Happy would it be for each and for the whole race of men if the man of thought, the man of letters and of art, and the man that seeks to lift his fellow, were practically to recognize their kinship, their brotherhood, as having a common fatherhood; if science, art, and philanthropy in all their respective branches were brought into a true fraternal sympathy and reciprocal helpfulness by becoming in the truest and highest sense and degree rational—by becoming impregnated with that living reason which is one with the divine reason.

HENRY N. DAY.

THE PROBLEM OF THE HUMAN WILL, AS RELATED TO SCIENTIFIC AND PHILOSOPHIC THEORIES.

IN a previous article¹ attention was directed upon the relation of the will-problem to scientific investigations concerning the nature of man. Having granted the reasonableness of the demand that human nature be brought within the sweep of scientific inquiry, it was indicated how far science had included brain and nerve within its circle, by ascertaining the laws which regulate the activity of the nerve system. Science has not, indeed, offered any thing approaching a complete explanation of the cerebrum and subordinate portions of the great nerve centre, or of their relation to the nerve system, or of its relation to the muscles and the periphery. But science has disclosed a unity of system in the physical organism illustrated by dependence of the nerve centre upon blood-supply ; dependence of the nerve system on nerve energy generated in the brain ; and dependence of the muscular system and the general sensibility of the body on the nerve energy carried along by the nerve fibres. A large amount of human activity is thus scientifically explained. Reflex and spontaneous action are accounted for under recognized laws of the nerve system. But it was shown that this is very far from being a science of human nature, if human activity be taken as the test. Restricting attention to physical action alone, it was pointed out that the will-problem remains unanswered by all that science has accomplished. Besides reflex muscular action, and besides spon-

¹ September, 1878, p. 329.

taneous action, originating in the vital forces of the organism, there is no explanation of a *voluntary* use of the muscles. This implies an application of the laws of muscular activity, and these of nerve activity, but it involves also an application of the laws of will activity, of which physiology has been able to tell us nothing. So far as physiology is concerned, the region of volition is a territory unknown. From personal experience we know that certain of our physical efforts are voluntary, but physiological inquiries take no account of this singular feature in human activity. Still, it is hard for science to rest contented with an avowal of ignorance. The scientific spirit—here provisionally set in contrast with the philosophic spirit—is a spirit of inquiry stimulated and directed by confidence in the instrument of external observation, and doubtful of every other. This scientific spirit, eager for the victory of the observational method, and guarding against any acknowledgment of a wider realm of being than the physical, cannot rest in the admission of ignorance. It cannot allow for such a division of labor as assigns a distinct field, with distinct instruments and efforts, for those who are known as mental philosophers. To this aggressive spirit there is a scientific answer. The facts of voluntary muscular activity are not scientifically explained. After all has been said that physiology has to tell about muscular fibre and muscular energy, after all it has to announce concerning nerve fibre and nerve energy, there remains the fact of personal determination—the will-problem—which science has not solved. Man knows his own deliberation and determination : human physiology cannot explain them. The scientific man is naturally reluctant to acknowledge this. He finds it difficult even to occupy a standpoint whence he may see the facts to which we refer. He works the ploughshare in his own field, believing that there is no true cultivation beyond his own furrow, and no need for the furrows being deeper than those familiar to him. The psychologist avers that the ploughing of the scientist is not deep enough. The dispute between them may be brought to this clear issue—distinguish and explain the voluntary element in human activity.

In the former article attention was restricted to muscular action in order to meet the physiologist on his own ground,

In this, the line of investigation must be advanced into the inner region of human activity—the sphere of consciousness—where thoughts are shaped, and purposes are formed. This is the real centre of human life, and not that animal activity seen by the outward observer, and which in reality constitutes only an outer circumference of action. What a man's life is cannot be decided by observing him as he hurries along the street; nor by closer observation, enabling one to say whether he is sickly or robust; nor by outward measurements, which may warrant inference as to mass of brain; nor even by surmises as to the brain's quality: but by such discovery as the man himself makes of his own thoughts and plans; best of all is it known to the man himself, as he is conscious of the conflict within, and the decision which he reaches in matters concerning the regulation of his conduct. Into this inner region we have now to attempt an entrance, with the view of ascertaining more exactly what is involved in voluntary determination, and afterward what is the relation of philosophy to the will-problem.

There is in our consciousness a knowledge of what we properly designate *personal agency*. A man knows himself as the cause of his activity, and knows his action as the product of his own determination or volition. Viewing human conduct in this way, we find that voluntary activity embraces a wide range of external or physical action, and also of internal or mental action. And these two phases of activity, the outer and inner, are so related to each other that the latter carries within it the key to the former. For scientific purposes, we must concentrate on what we name "mental" activity, in order to explain such a title as "voluntary" when it is applied to muscular action. And beyond this, we must seek a scientific explanation of the order and relation of mental acts, in so far as these are regarded as voluntary. Among the familiar facts of mental life are such things as these: personal concentration of thought, resulting in a process which is tested by the measure in which it is distinguished by clearness, connectedness, and force; deliberation as to the rightness of motive forces stirring within us; and, granting their rightness, as to the duty of giving them indulgence; consequently, conflict with dispositions which have much force; and self-control, implying mastery over inclina-

tions, by determination to act in accordance with a higher law of life, designated moral law. All these discover a voluntary element, thereby raising a problem which science and philosophy must acknowledge, and attempt to solve. If physiological science does not even reach this problem, it stands conspicuously within the region of psychological inquiry, and is there so prominent that the treatment of it must prove a crucial test for every system of philosophy.

The first requisite here is to distinguish the fact of volition, or personal determination of activity, so as to separate it completely from other phases of action. Let us, if possible, place beyond dispute what is the thing to be explained. This will be best done by careful exclusion. 1. Reflex action is excluded, that is, activity arising from the inter-action of two nerve fibres, presenting the simplest phase of automatic action. 2. Sensori-motor activity is excluded, that is, activity of the muscular system, on account of consciousness of excitation of the sensory system. 3. Physical appetite is excluded, that is, hunger, thirst, and sex, forms of spontaneous physical impulse, common to man with the lower animals. 4. Irritability of the physical nature impelling to resistance and conflict, common to man and animals, is also set aside as a purely spontaneous impulse. 5. Desires more properly mental, such as desire of knowledge (or curiosity), desire of power, and desire of fame, are out of account, being spontaneous impulses, as truly as the physical appetites. When we rise still higher, to include associations or recollections, the facts are more mixed, and discrimination becomes more difficult, for there is a voluntary element and an involuntary, needing to be distinguished. But in the five examples named, we have five forms of action which do not raise the will-problem. There is further help toward a rigid discrimination, if we notice that will-power is capable of *restraining* all these. This becomes, indeed, a natural measure of the degree of will-power exercised by an individual. The restraint of sensori-motor action, or of appetite, or of irritability, or of desire, is an illustration of personal determination—that higher form of power whose exercise illustrates personal agency. When sensori-motor action is checked, man shows that he is more than an automaton. When the power of appetite or irasci-

bility is held in check, the fact is exactly that which we are here seeking to signalize and explain, the activity of man is something more than merely spontaneous action. Passing from restraint to direct action, we complete the view of the fact described as voluntary activity. Taking this view, we see that voluntary power is associated with higher intellectual action. Appetite is restrained at the call of duty, that is, the intelligent agent shows regard to a higher law of conduct, and determines upon self-denial in accordance with that law. Perseverance in work is maintained at the call of duty. The intelligent agent recognizes a moral necessity—a law which says, "Thou shalt," and in submission to that, powers are concentrated, distracting considerations are shunned, and effort is maintained until the moral end is achieved. This presents the type of personal agency. This is voluntary action, specially calling for a clear explanation, if there is to be a science of human nature and of human life.

From these few illustrations, it appears that there are involuntary actions and voluntary actions, the latter including voluntary restraint upon involuntary action. This guides to some well-known and fruitful distinctions. In various directions, the voluntary and involuntary shade into each other, and that in such a manner as to indicate more strikingly the superiority of volition. The involuntary actions of childhood are largely absorbed into the voluntary actions of manhood. In this way, some actions disappear altogether; others appear in a new phase. What the child does, the man refuses to do; what the child does spontaneously, that is, quite unreflectingly, the man performs deliberately and of set purpose. On the other hand, there is a region of acquired facilities, from which volition gradually disappears. What the child at first finds to be impossible, that it gradually and by much effort acquires. Soon the need for effort disappears, and with it the absence of direct volition is manifest, even though the action continues to be regarded as a voluntary action. This class of actions, Dr. Carpenter has suggested, we may describe as voluntary, but not volitional; actions which really are under control of the will, though there is not a direct exercise of the will in their continuance. Of these we have an example in walking. Quite

above such actions, and showing the true superiority of human life, we have the whole range of actions which are accomplished only by persistent determination influencing every stage in our procedure. All these different phases of human activity are quite familiar, so that no room is left for disputation as to the reality of the distinctions, however much we may dispute as to their explanation. And it is only when we have them all in view, that we perceive the real nature of the will-problem, and recognize how certain it is that our mode of disposing of this problem will determine the whole character of our philosophy. In the power of Will, analyze our experience as we may, we find a real distinction of human life. We see how such life can become a system, an organized whole, with its subordinate and superior elements, arranged according to a recognized ideal. We perceive the conditions under which it becomes possible for each individual of the race to strive after the ideal of human life, making steady progress toward it, by throwing off what is obstructive and developing what is contributory. In the will-problem we find the greatest difficulty to be encountered in the structure of a philosophy of human nature. In the solution offered, we have the test of every philosophic system.

The alternative courses open to those who search for a philosophy of human nature are clear enough. On the one hand, we may inquire how far human action is found to maintain some analogy with the action common to lower orders of being. On the other hand, we may concentrate on the highest forms of personal determination, with the view of ascertaining the special distinction of human life. Either course is competent ; but it may be well to notice, that a risk of incompleteness belongs to an exclusive prosecution of either. In the study of analogies, there is danger of overlooking differences or reducing them to a minimum. In the study of the distinctive, there is a tendency to slight resemblances and underestimate their number. The history of philosophy gives ample illustration of these risks and their consequences. The two rival philosophic theories may be said to represent the two alternative lines of inquiry : the one affirming that men act as the animals do, only with the advantage of a more complex organism ; the other, that man is capable of acting, and does in a greater or

less degree act, in a manner altogether different, exercising a power of self-determination in harmony with an intelligible ideal. There is, however, this difference between the two theories, roughly represented as having been shaped according to the method preferred—the one seeks to account for all human actions as if they were of a single class; the other does not attempt to draw all human actions up to the level of self-determination. The latter thus professes to be more discriminating, and challenges criticism of the ground in which a radical difference among human actions is affirmed. The necessitarian or determinist theory brings all to a common level; the free-will theory lifts some actions to a higher level, and affirms that these higher actions are proper to human life, and become the governing actions in personal history. There is thus on both sides a theory and a criticism of a rival theory, and it may be desirable to give some attention to the theoretic and critical elements in both.

The theory which seeks to explain all mental phenomena by tracing their development from sensation, undertakes to include our volitions. As our sensations are determined by conditions around us, and within our organism, so, says the Determinist theory, are the efforts of our will determined by conditions without and within, over which we have no more control than we have over those which induce sensation. Voluntary activity is, according to this view, only a phase of determined activity. Of such a theory the test is twofold. First, *analytic*, resulting in the clear discrimination of volition from other facts of experience. Let us make certain that the fact to be explained is clearly distinguished from the various mental phenomena described by other terms. This is the first requisite for any theory, but it needs special attention when we would judge of a theory which professes to bring the complex from the simple, the higher from the lower. Second, *logical*, by application of which we may reach a conclusion as to the sufficiency of the philosophy of volition. By means of this test we shall judge of the philosophic worth of the Determinist theory of will.

1. Voluntary activity—what is it? By way of exclusion, we have seen it is neither reflex action, nor sensori-motor activity, nor the spontaneous moving of appetite, nor its increase

by means of external inducement, nor irritation, nor desire. All these belong to the class "involuntary." When we look down the enumeration, these are found to be examples of *determined* actions, that is, forms of activity which may arise without any choice of our own. They are indeed forms of activity to be controlled, but they contain no element illustrating self-control, or personal agency. By contrast with these, voluntary activity is of a higher nature. It is not of the nature of force, mechanical agency, or impulse acting in a single direction toward the accomplishment of a single end. From the days of Aristotle downward, it has been regarded as "deliberate determination," that is, an intelligent regard to alternatives, choice amongst them, and activity determined by this choice. Thus by negative and positive characteristics, we recognize a set of actions standing in direct contrast to another set, and calling for an explanation of their peculiar features.

2. The explanation offered by a Determinist theory. It is briefly this, that outward circumstances, passing dispositions, and general cast of individual nature account for the actions which we call voluntary. This is in substance the theory as it has appeared at all stages and under pressure of various intellectual requirements. Whether it is introduced to meet the demands of a Pantheistic scheme, such as that of Spinoza; or a Theistic scheme, such as that of Jonathan Edwards; or the sensational and materialistic philosophy of human life, as represented more recently by James Mill, J. S. Mill, Professor Bain, and others, it is in form quite similar. The theory is such as we have given, and under it the popular views of liberty of choice are explained by general ignorance of motives. Variety of motives is held to account for variety of action; similar motives occasion similarity of action. Theories of existence so opposed as to be at the opposite extremes, find a common meeting-place in the theory of will which they accept. The theory of voluntary action accepted by Edwards to meet the requirements of theologic necessitarianism, will be accepted as suitable for the materialistic scheme which assigns all human action to organism, if only the needful deviation in the use of "mind" be allowed for. It does, indeed, make an immense difference in the structure of philosophic theory

when on the one hand "mind" is regarded as higher and spiritual existence, and, on the other, it is taken to be a mere function, a manifestation of organic activity. But it is deserving of notice as a historic fact, and as raising an important logical problem, that theories the most opposite land in the determinist or necessitarian view of voluntary activity. To linger over this would occupy too much space, but it is something of moment to remark that the characteristics of certain theories of existence lead of necessity to a determinist theory of will. My present object, however, is to examine the determinist theory of voluntary action, and to that I restrict attention.

In its essence the theory is this, that all voluntary action is accounted for by susceptibility, natural or acquired, and the impulsive power attendant on such susceptibility. In other words, our so-called voluntary actions are determined by the impulsive tendencies of our nature; or, man's action is according to his prevailing desires. Man has a susceptible nature; it is acted upon by surrounding objects; he acts in a manner responsive to the influence exerted upon him; the oftener he acts in this way, the greater facility there is in repeating the exercise; and, making allowance for original bias and acquired tendency, the summary of his actions is according to the sum of his desires. He is, indeed, an intelligent being, and his intelligence greatly widens the range of his susceptibilities, and enlarges the area of acquired tendencies, but intelligence accomplishes no greater result in the history of human activity. Intelligence is an important tributary power, but Desire is the ruling power.

Under this theory of volition, the will-problem is reduced to a matter of arithmetic. Could any thing be more completely in harmony with the requirements of science, or contribute more strikingly to the vindication of the claim of mental philosophy to take rank among the "exact sciences"?

But a theory is nothing unless supported by sufficient evidence, and simplicity can always be attained by the simple method of omitting the perplexities. It is granted equally by materialists and upholders of the distinctive nature of mind that there are manifold perplexities involved in voluntary activity; are these perplexities examined, disentangled, and ex-

plained under the materialistic scheme of volition? If voluntary activity is only a phase of organic action, results should come out with mechanical exactness, and thus prove calculable. Materialists should, therefore, favor us with their enumeration and combination of impulses which account for a given action; and enable us to classify actions according to the motive forces which have determined them. This is a reasonable expectation of those who maintain that actions resulting from choice can be "classified with the ordinary phenomena of causation, in respect to their invariable order and conditional certainty." The doctrine of will must be established on "an objective basis, as an induction from the facts of human conduct." These quotations I take from an upholder of the determinist theory.¹ The tests applicable must be directed on both theories, and the adherents of determinism cannot object if we take guidance from themselves as to the manner in which a professed philosophy of voluntary action should be tried.

There is much in the determinist theory which belongs to it in common with the libertarian, and we need not dwell upon what is common. Nor can we overlook these elements, since our critical aim makes it essential that we do not credit either theory with that which belongs also to its rival. We must, therefore, enumerate the following points as common to both, being denied by no one. There are natural forms of sensibility; there are acquired tendencies; there are spontaneous appetites; there are higher forms of disposition natural to us, such as benevolence and pity; there are intellectual processes occupied with means and ends; and all these are concerned with human activity. These characteristics belong to human nature, and are admitted as data before we attempt to construct a theory of voluntary action. The will-problem, that is, the problem of voluntary, as contrasted with involuntary activity, rises out of the midst of them. The object of the determinist is to show that these are sufficient to account for voluntary as well as involuntary action. The object of the libertarian is to show that such facts only account for the involuntary, but do not solve the problem of volition. What

¹ "Sensation and Intuition," by James Sully, M.A., pp. 218, 219.

evidence have we that sensibility, appetite, higher disposition, and reflection as to means and ends afford a philosophy of volition?

The theory is not established on "an objective basis, as an induction from the facts of human conduct." When a man acts through appetite, or rage, the force of appetite or anger may be sufficient to account for what he does. But such action does not present the type of voluntary activity. He acts as an animal does, and gives us no illustration of the distinctive feature of human life known as voluntary activity. The example is very favorable for the theory, but worthless for the purpose contemplated by the theory. When a person is moved to pity by sight of extreme suffering, we account sufficiently for the facts by the sight and his natural susceptibility. This example also is favorable for determinism, but it contributes nothing by way of evidence for it, because it explains nothing of the nature of voluntary activity. When the angry man begins to reflect on the foolishness, unseemliness and wrongfulness of his rage, and begins to restrain its force; or when the person suddenly moved by pity, considers what he can do, and resorts first to one measure, then to another for mitigation of suffering, and help of the sufferer, we come upon illustrations more to our purpose, but the facts are less manageable under the theory. We come to thought as something different from impulse; thought which is not produced by appetite, or anger, or pity; thought which controls so as to restrain rage; thought which serves, so as to gratify, pity; yet is not caused or guided by pity, but is often obstructed and enfeebled by force of the emotion, so that the efficient helper has to restrain the direct action of pity, in order that he may truly act to the aid of the sufferer. We are here coming into the midst of the complexities of human action, and the simplicity of the determinist theory fails us, or adds to our perplexities by insisting that our whole philosophic task is a calculation of forces. The induction from the facts of human conduct is carrying us beyond the theory, and that on the very threshold of investigation, when we are beginning to move among the examples of voluntary activity. When passing beyond this, we note all that we regard as more properly characteristic of man in the control of his feelings, the moulding of

his character, and the achievement of ends greater than those which inclination or sensibility prompts—all that makes the individual a true man amongst men—we see what a troublesome problem human life presents to the determinist. In view of this, we readily understand how it happens that he speaks more boldly of “invariable order,” when he is theoretically enlarging on the laws of the universe as the laws of life for man ; and how, by contrast, when he is attempting to marshal evidence, to set in array the induction of facts, that he speaks more guardedly of “*an approximate generalization.*” We cannot wonder that this guarded phrase stands intrenched behind the acknowledgment, that “the peculiar complexity of volitional phenomena makes it a very difficult matter to prove the presence of a prevailing motive in all cases of voluntary action.”¹

Entering now more into particulars, we have to consider the influence of motives. The theory runs thus—Motives determine voluntary activity, as well as involuntary. Whence, then, the distinction between voluntary and involuntary among actions? If both are determined by motives, should not the distinction into two classes disappear? If there be a real difference, it must be a difference in the action of motives in the two cases, and that is a difference which the determinist is reluctant to allow. “Invariable order” is what is maintained ; but that is the express characteristic of involuntary activity ; how then shall we differentiate the “voluntary activity” of human life? The determinist offers no sufficient answer. He does indeed speak of greater complexity of motives, but this affords no definition of voluntary activity. It is not merely activity of which the motives are varied and complicated. For any true philosophy of our conduct, we must seek an explanation of the action of motives in the history of voluntary activity. It is not alleged by the libertarian that the action of motives is wanting in any case ; it is not suggested by any one who has the least faith in philosophy, that motives are forces which do not operate in accordance with law. We must, therefore, trace the action of motives in cases which clearly belong to the category of voluntary activity. When a man feels pity for

¹ Sully's “Sensation and Intuition,” p. 119.

one whom he sees suffering, his emotion is involuntary. The on-looker has a susceptibility of nature which is acted upon by the sight of anguish. The pity which he suddenly feels is not the result of personal determination, but the consequence of sensitiveness belonging to his nature. There is no dispute between determinists and libertarians as to this experience. If only determinists can as clearly make out the action of motive force in an exercise of voluntary activity, they have gained their case. But it is the complete contrast in the history of activity which constitutes a distinct problem. Pity is an involuntary experience; but when the person moved to sympathy begins to think what help he can render, and sets about doing something to soothe the sufferer, or abate his pain, that is voluntary. The contrast here between voluntary and involuntary is established on a clear objective basis, as well as by personal experience. As the physical frame shrinks under injury, so does the observer feel sad at sight of suffering. The accuracy of the latter statement is not affected by the fact that some men are found to look on with indifference while others suffer, and that some come even to take pleasure in inflicting injury. Such want of feeling, and wickedness of feeling are not the spontaneous expression of natural sensibility, but are pronounced "unnatural," and in reality illustrate the voluntary element, not the involuntary, thus presenting in the field of activity a contrast to the rise of the "natural" feeling of pity. Hence our condemnation of callousness and cruelty. When, however, the man moved to pity begins to reflect upon what service he can render, there is in that thought a new exercise of activity, which stands so much in contrast with the feeling of compassion, that we distinguish reflection as a voluntary exercise. How, then, is the rise of thought to be explained, and how do we account for the course of reflection which the on-looker pursues? Does pity cause thought, as the sight of suffering causes pity? Assuredly not. At the very least, we have no such simple and direct illustration of causality as in the former case. The sight of suffering acts upon susceptibility of nature, and does so inevitably and invariably, so that it needs a direct effort on our part to command our feelings if the example of suffering be of a serious nature. But pity does

not by a like direct and invariable influence produce thought. Neither by objective tests, nor by inward experience, can it be shown to be true that the more pity a man feels the more thought he exercises for the good of the sufferer. The converse is often true, and that by reason of the overwhelming power of emotion : the more of pity, the less of thought. Thus we break with the theory which makes susceptibility the key to thought, and thus far we dishonor the claims of determinism. But our analysis is not completed. Because pity is shown to lack the causal energy which would account for thought, it does not, therefore, follow that we are free to deny all relation between pity and thought, or regard the reflective process as exclusively voluntary. Though pity does not cause thought, the reflection of the on-looker would not have taken the course it has done had he not been witness of the anguish of another. Pity is thus an essential element in the whole state of mind, though it cannot account for all that belongs to that state. The emotion gives *direction* to thought in this respect, that the object which awakens pity gives *occasion* for thought, and the emotion implies *interest* in the object of sympathy. These two things, occasion and interest, are essential conditions in the exercise of an intelligent nature, and they are supplied in the case before us in part by the object which awakens the feeling, in part by the feeling awakened. But neither occasion nor interest account for thought, and we are still without the required explanation. The intelligent nature has, however, its associations with the past, and involuntary associations or recollections may play a part in the mental exercise. But recollections or associations only present past thoughts—do not account for the use made of these as applicable to the present circumstances. By reference to them, we recognize some additional elements of the mental state, showing how complex it is ; but we still want an explanation of the activity directed to meet present demands. If pity does not of itself cause thought ; if thought is not caused by the occasion or by the intelligent interest felt ; neither is it caused by the associations which arise from the stores of recollection. All of these do in a sense move to thought ; they may all be included among motives ; but all of them together do not produce thought, and the theory which

seeks to explain voluntary activity by the activity of motives fails to accomplish what it professes. Voluntary activity involves more than the movement of susceptibility and consequent impulse. Personality is more than a bundle of motive forces played upon by external agency. Tested by this illustration, determinism fails by reason of incomplete analysis and faulty logic.

So satisfied, however, are the upholders of the theory with the sufficiency of their scheme of motive agency, that determinism is prone to bring the whole philosophy of volition into the simple formula, "The strongest motive determines the will." The above analysis is sufficient as a test of the formula, whether we select some one out of the group of motive influences, or combine them into an aggregate of motive force. An additional test may, however, be found by aid of the formula, if we select the history of a single motive, and seek a theory of its increasing power. Let us take a motive exciting and naturally prone to show itself in action, thereby giving us the advantage of objective, as well as subjective tests, such as Revenge. We know something of the growth of a revengeful feeling, and we know something of its suppression. What is the history of these two opposite occurrences? The short answer according to the formula is, Revenge being strong masters the better dispositions of the mind; better dispositions being stronger, revenge is mastered by them. The strongest prevails. A short and easy answer, with all the dangers which come from a ready-cut formula. But where is will, and the whole will-problem? Revenge as against the better dispositions, or the better dispositions as against revenge, are two alternatives in which the voluntary power does not appear even in name. Whether we judge by observation of our fellow-men or by our own experience, we know that the conflict between revenge and benevolent feelings is not a matter of weights and measures. Human life does not so run its course, excitedly according as passion is heated, more quietly as passion is unstirred, by outward circumstances, making man the plaything of the elements. Such a representation caricatures our existence. The popular belief in free-will is certain to hold its sway against any thing which such a philosophy of human conduct can pre-

sent. It is true, indeed, as we all know to our cost, that a man may become the *slave* of revengeful feeling ; and it is no less true, though we are less ready to perceive and own it, that benevolent feeling may be a mere *spontaneous* disposition, drawn forth by favoring influences around, and giving no indication of power of will, or strength of character. The determinist theory has, indeed, enough hold on fact to find materials for its support, and these are materials which the libertarian theory allows as available, and recognizes as occupying an important place in the natural history of human activity. But besides dispositions with their varying strength, there is Will ; and in the midst of the variations of excitement and calm which belong to all experience, there is strength of Character, as well as strength of nature, and of these the determinist theory has no philosophy. In the history of revengeful feeling, there is a progress from less to greater. It gains in strength. What is the history of this increase ? The question is essential to the philosophic inquiry. The injury done does not account for it, since the revengeful feeling is often found to be much stronger long after the deed was done, than at the time. The tendency to such feeling in the nature of the man does not account for it, since the feeling did not blaze up in full force when the combustibles were applied to it. The feeling has been nourished within, not fed from without. Its growing strength is the consequence of the *thought* which has been given to the injury received. The man has brooded over it ; turned consideration to it time after time ; compared his experience with that of his injurer, and so “nursed his wrath.” The disposition threatening to break forth into violence, is the child of his own rearing, and if the strong arm of the law be required to keep it in check, full account will be made of the paternity. Now, the growth of this disposition is itself a course of activity. What determines this course of action ? The injury received causes irritation ; does irritation cause thought, and thought cause greater irritation ? Then a less irritation causes a greater ; less causal energy is the generating power of the greater energy ; and thus “the strongest motive determines the will.” Most admirable logic ! Revenge cannot be at once the cause of thought, and an effect of thought. Nor can we wait for

some outburst of revengeful feeling, to witness how truly the strongest motive determines the will. There is action of will throughout the course of development. When the motive is weak, the will is determining that it become stronger; the injured man is wilfully turning attention on the injury done him, and giving additional force to the evil disposition, in accordance with the recognized law of emotional development. The causal energy is found in thought—in the “deliberation” which leads to fresh decision; and of that, determinism has no adequate philosophy.

Taking the converse in human history—the conquest over revenge—the power of thought becomes more conspicuous. The intelligent nature rules over the emotional and brings it into subjection. As must be true in each conquest, the stronger overcomes the weaker, and there is room enough for use of the formula, “the strongest motive determines the will;” but analysis will show that the formula renders us little service, and that we are nearer the truth in saying that the will determines which motive shall be the stronger, when it determines that revenge shall not rule, even though the injury done, and the feeling stirred, conspire to favor an opposite result. Another power meets the rising disposition, staying its progress. Under what laws is the change of action induced? The disposition cannot cause the thought which resists it, and the determinist theory has special difficulty when it seeks to account for the result. The injury inflicted tends to but one result. The revengeful feeling when it arises seeks gratification. But, on a line directly antagonistic to both, intelligence deals with the question of duty, and setting it against indulgence of the existing disposition, and under its influence a new direction is given to feeling and action, so that the force of revenge is not allowed to appear in the field of external observation. Whence the lack of active result from a disposition naturally so turbulent; whence the force of thought determining the right in human action, and providing for the abatement of the disturbing feeling? Thought cannot be likened as a force to such a disposition as revenge. The law of action in the two cases is quite different, and any attempt to set the one against the other for measurement as if each were so much force, is misleading. A

reasoning process differs in nature from passionate feeling. If the former accomplishes results which include the suppression of passion, it does so not by laying so many more pounds weight of force against the force already existing in mind, but by a method entirely different, involving an action which must be differently explained. Intelligence reckons far more in human history than blind impulse ; discrimination clears the field of action, first making a better course visible, and thereafter attainable. The will-problem demands an explanation of the distinctive action of thought—for Intelligence and Will reign together or retreat in company. Blind passion is no manifestation of will : governed passion illustrates the action of both intelligence and volition. The determinist theory is driven from its line of operations, and fails to prove that all human activity finds its philosophy in the balance of contending forces. To account for voluntary discrimination is the real demand upon those who would solve the will-problem. Every thing which tends to drag intelligent reflection to the level of a competing force amongst clamorous passions, favors departure from the pathway of philosophy. Little better is done toward supplying a philosophy, when we are asked to make account of associations, education, and companionship. All attempts to show us that we are simply what we have been made, fall wide of the object. We have, no doubt, our stores of associations which play their part unbidden ; we are what our education has made us, and hence it happens that some have a harder battle to fight than others in striving to do the right : companionship affects us all less or more in what we do ; but no one of these, nor all of them together, can supply what we search for in order to solve the problem of voluntary activity. Associations are but recollections of what has been ; education has given a degree of fixedness to the pliable elements in our nature : companions can lend some influence of their own dispositions to give force to ours ; but the problem remains. Man is not a child in leading-strings, with the past as an ogre determining the future. Human nature is not even half understood, when it is treated of as a bundle of associations, habits, and sensibilities. Nor is human activity half explained if it be represented that intelligence does nothing better than open a

channel along which a rising disposition may flow to determine outward conduct. To seek the key to volition in appetite, rather than in intelligence, is to confuse the most obvious results of analysis. To say that appetite is a species of volition, as Professor Bain does,¹ and then to treat of appetites as "cravings," which they undoubtedly are, is to expose the confusion more effectually. To speak of a regard to the pleasurable and the painful as exciting to action is obviously legitimate, but it leaves still before us the problem how the regard to these forms of experience is controlled, so that the desire of pleasure is refused gratification, and suffering is bravely endured. Unfortunately for the theory, which is strong as to the impulsive power of the desire of the agreeable, it is weak in its account of the control of such desire. It is most true, as Mr. James Mill said,² "When we have obtained a command over the ideas, we have obtained a command over the motions;" but under a determinist theory, which accounts for voluntary action by the dominion of the strongest motive, we have no adequate philosophy of the mode in which we obtain command over our ideas, and by means of this command over our appetites and other desires.

I pass now to the libertarian theory as the one which seems to me to meet the requirements of the problem. Rational conduct is the only free action. There is no example of voluntary activity where intelligence is not the governing power determining what is prudent, appropriate, or right. There is, indeed, no action independent of motive power or inducement to act; but there is no voluntary action in which motive power is not regulated by rational power. The libertarian theory makes account of the power of motives, and of the laws in accordance with which an increase in motive force occurs; but it seeks to explain voluntary action, not by reference to appetite, or the relative force of motives, but by reference to the functions of intelligence and the possibility of determining personal action in accordance with its dictates.

This brief explanatory statement is sufficient to indicate that a large amount of misrepresentation or misunderstanding

¹ "Senses and Intellect," p. 225.

² "Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind," ii., p. 274.

of the libertarian theory appears in the numerous adverse criticisms from those who are the upholders of the opposite scheme of human activity. It is at the very outset a misrepresentation of the libertarian view of the problem to say that under this theory a free action is regarded as an uncaused action, or a motiveless action, or an action resulting from a mind in a state of indifference as to the act itself, and the end it is to serve. We have, indeed, had discussions on the libertarian side, as to "liberty of indifference," but no one who applies any adequate test to philosophic investigation will treat such discussions otherwise than as examples of recoil from the opposite extreme. "Liberty of indifference" may be laid on the shelf as a philosophic curiosity, along with the statement of Spinoza, "A thing is free which acts by the sole necessity of its nature." Activity implies adaptation of means to ends, and voluntary activity implies an intelligent and deliberate use of means for an end contemplated. The libertarian clearly recognizes this, and even insists upon it, so that the description of the libertarian interpretation of the problem of voluntary activity is so greatly at fault, as to amount to a caricature, which says that "voluntary actions are the unconditional products of perfectly spontaneous beings, . . . the fortuitous and unpredictable selection of an undetermined mind or will."¹ To suppose that libertarianism has so utterly mistaken the very nature of the problem to be discussed, is something surprising on the part of one who undertakes to trace "the genesis of the free-will doctrine." A philosophy of "unconditional products" would be a curiosity greater than any thing found in history; and it is certainly a natural thing after this description of a voluntary action that the belief in such a form of activity should be designated a "curious tenet." By universal agreement voluntary activity involves the play of motive, direction of energy, and contemplated end. No terms could be more unsuited for its description than "unconditional" and "spontaneous." When we speak of "human actions done consciously and with choice," we expressly indicate certain conditions of their performance; both the consciousness and the choice must be ac-

¹ Sully's "Sensation and Intuition," p. 118.

counted for ; and it is only in this way that we can profess to offer a theory of voluntary activity. As, then, consciousness is the test of certainty in all cases, the specialty to be explained is the "choice," and in attempting this, we must recognize alternatives, with selection and rejection deliberately carried through. It will thus appear from the nature of the thing to be explained, that whatever account the libertarian theory gives of the nature of man as a voluntary agent, it does not reach any such conclusion as this, that we are "perfectly spontaneous beings," but a conclusion as far removed from that as any thing can well be.

Brushing aside the confusion which has arisen on account of the tendency to treat of freedom of choice as equivalent to uncaused activity, we should find common ground for both theories in the facts to be explained. Such common ground we have, first, presence and power of *motives* within consciousness—sensibilities inclining to action—appetites, dispositions, tendencies of our nature which stimulate to action, and are in themselves a form of activity. Again, it is admitted that these motive forces vary in strength, growing in power and abating in influence. An explanation of these varying degrees of strength is required under any theory. Further, as consciousness testifies to the presence of motives, *intelligence* concerns itself with their presence, their varying power, and their government. We need a philosophy of this intellectual action. Again, under the guidance of intelligence, there is *choice* between motives, in accordance with which some are checked, others are encouraged and directed for the attainment of a deliberately preferred end. We need a philosophy of this choice, and of the activity which flows from it. These are the facts. Whether a complete philosophy of the facts can be supplied, or whether there is a large degree of the unknown connected with mind, as there is with brain, remains to be seen. I have indicated why the determinist scheme of human action seems to me to be no philosophy of voluntary activity ; I shall now endeavor briefly to indicate the grounds on which the libertarian scheme appears to have a claim to acceptance.

To admit that motives rise in consciousness, gain in strength, and fade away, in accordance with fixed laws ; that there are

besides definite and fixed laws of intellectual action ; and that there are also laws in accordance with which a personal choice can be exercised among conflicting motives : these are the necessary conditions on which any start can be made in attempting to construct a philosophy of voluntary action. The most outstanding and important feature here is *choice* ; it is this which makes the contrast between nature and mind, when the former term is employed to designate the material universe ; it marks the contrast between the mechanical and the voluntary ; and round this distinctive feature the main difficulties gather.

The first stage toward a philosophy of voluntary activity is passed without raising dispute. We possess a sensitive nature, liable to be acted upon by external influence, and awakening inclination toward action by the laws which pertain to its own life. According to impressions made upon us, or the operation of forces within us, we are moved to act. The greater the impression made on us, the stronger the tendency to act. The libertarian does not dispute with the determinist at this point. So far as the *rise* of motives is concerned, we are determined *toward* action without exercise of choice. The dispute begins when we say that these motives present the materials of choice to man, and do not of themselves determine his action.

The second stage is that by which the transition is made from tendency, inclination, or impulse to choice. We possess an intellectual nature, capable of contemplating our dispositions, comparing them, and judging of their fitness in the circumstances. Without the possibility of such contemplation, comparison, and judgment, there could be no choice ; the possibility of these provides an essential requisite for choice. That the intelligent nature concerns itself with the motive forces which arise in our experience, distinguishing between them as to nature and quality, and that it *should* so distinguish, are things insisted upon under the utilitarianism expounded by the upholders of determinism. These considerations, therefore, do not afford legitimate ground for dispute.

But the third and last stage is, that along with a power of discrimination, there is in our nature a power of control in the exercise of which motives can be developed or restrained. This

is Will. As intelligence is essential for its exercise, will is exercised only in so far as intelligence is employed for the direction of motives. The value of the guidance depends upon the value of the intellectual exercise which gives it direction, and hence it may be wise or unwise, right or wrong in conduct ; but in either case the fact of direction illustrates choice ; the contrast between the wise and the unwise establishes the difference between Intelligence and Will. In this relation we come at once on the "peculiar complexity of volitional phenomena." The Will uses the Intelligence, and by it controls motives, yet this control proceeds only in accordance with the fixed laws which determine the rise and fall of motive-force. Will cannot change the nature of the objects which influence us, and cannot alter the sensibilities of our nature ; but, these remaining as they are, will takes government over the action allowed to objects, and the play given to our sensibilities, and this is accomplished in the exercise of rational direction of the life. The mystery of man's nature is the control he has over his thoughts, and this it is which occasions the speciality in his conduct which we call freedom of choice. It is only as a thinker that man escapes being the slave of passion ; only as a thinker that he gives illustration of what is involved in true control of his life ; only as he persists in regulating his conduct in accordance with intelligence that he forms a character which can prove itself superior to sensibility and appetite. Here there is more than can be fully explained ; but no philosophy of the will can be reached otherwise than by study of the relations of intelligence to activity. I have already shown that to make intelligence only an instrument for more widely gratifying current dispositions is to miss the interpretation of voluntary activity. What remains to be shown is that a philosophy of the application of intelligence to activity will give us a philosophy of voluntary action.

Intelligence is a governing power in our nature ; it governs by directing how dispositions and passions should be allowed exercise ; this direction is practically efficient in each case by observation and use of the laws which regulate the rise and fall of motive force ; and, in a wider measure, in accordance with the laws which regulate the formation of character. In saying

these things we do not remove the mystery of free choice, but only indicate the laws of its exercise, showing that it is always and necessarily separated from the uncertain, spontaneous, and wayward. Freedom is the supremacy of rational law, and is calculable accordingly, though not always "predictable," for man is not always rational; but in proportion as conduct is rational, it is predictable. Freedom does imply the *possibility* of many things, but its true manifestation is not in the doing of any thing at random; or the doing of a particular thing under passion; but in the doing what reason directs. If, then, complexity and uncertainty belong to human conduct, as assuredly they do, it is because the motive forces of our nature are many, and the authority of reason is not fully established over these subordinate powers.

When we say that control of our thoughts is the key to our voluntary activity, and that such activity implies freedom of choice, there are two conditions essential to the power of choice in the government of life. The one is *power to regulate our attention*, and so control the avenues to our sensibility and the development of motive force. By this we are delivered from subjection to the susceptibilities of our nature in contrast with what holds true in animal life. The other is *a fixed and common law of rational life*, determining what rational conduct is, and presenting an invariable standard—an ideal of excellence—which a rational being is required to aim after. By this all the diversities of individuality are brought under regulation by a common rational law for all. To be able to recognize such rational law, to strive after its fulfilment, to attain to a certain degree of harmony with it, and to make such attainment helpful for still higher achievement: these are the characteristics of a life of rational freedom. Such is the libertarian scheme of voluntary activity; a scheme which will harmonize with the demands of moral law, whether represented under Utilitarian or Intuitionist forms; a scheme which its critics will find to be wide as the poles asunder from a theory which would make men "perfectly spontaneous beings," and would represent a free action as an act of "sudden caprice."

THE LAWS OF WAR IN THEIR BEARING ON PEACE.

IT was a maxim of the arch-thief Jonathan Wild, as recorded by Fielding, his biographer, that he and his comrades should "never do more mischief to another than was necessary to the effecting his purpose ; for that mischief was too precious a thing to be thrown away." The last twenty-five years have been distinguished by a series of conscious efforts to give a practical application to this doctrine ; and these efforts have been made as much by the people who delight in war as by those who have become the reluctant victims of it. Laws for the limitation of severity in war are of very ancient date in European history ; and it may be important to consider the modes in which these laws originated, as well as the moral justification on which they rest. But before entering on the broader inquiry, it will be convenient to recapitulate briefly the more patent efforts that have been made of late years to establish on a firmer basis, to codify, and to amend the chief rules which, in practice, have long regulated and restricted the extreme use of the so-called rights of war.

The Crimean war, in 1854, which first broke up the calm of forty years of peace, was happily signalized not only by an extremity of courteous regard, on the part of all the belligerents, for the interests of neutrals, but also by an almost unprecedented consideration for the claims of non-combatants in the belligerent States, of prisoners of war, and even, in some respects, of the private commerce conducted by citizens of the belligerent States themselves. This courtesy and amenity in practical action were embodied as a principle and starting-point for the future in the Declaration annexed to the Treaty of Paris

of 1856, signed by the representatives of France, Austria, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia, Turkey, and England, and to which about forty other States have since given in their adhesion. The immediate object of this Declaration was the conciliation of neutral interests ; but it was in practice impossible to conciliate these interests, so far as maritime warfare was concerned, without mitigating the severity of war in its effects on citizens of the belligerent States. The abolition of privateering and the protection of an enemy's merchandise under a neutral flag, as well as the stricter interpretation to be thenceforward applied to blockades, were benefits conferred not only upon neutral States, but in which the private citizens and traders of the belligerent States also have their share.

The next epoch in the republication and amendment of the Laws of War is marked by a code, which was drawn up by Professor Lieber, and—after being submitted to and approved by a committee of officers—sanctioned by President Lincoln just before the commencement of hostilities between the Northern and Southern States of America. This code is entitled “Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United States in the Field.” Professor Lieber, the author, was a Prussian by birth, and in his youth had served in the Prussian army, taking part in the campaigns of 1814 and 1815. This is a matter of some interest, because of the close relationship observable between these “Instructions” and the regulations of the so-called “Prussian Military Code”—a code which has never been published, but the substance of which can be pretty accurately collected from the constant references made to it by Prussian commanders in the proclamations and manifestoes issued in the course of the late invasion of France. The Instructions here referred to were, in fact, the first attempt to make a comprehensive survey of all the exigencies to which a war of invasion is likely to give rise ; and it is said on good authority that, with one exception (that of concealing in an occupied district arms or provisions for the enemy), no case presented itself during the Franco-German war of 1870 which had not been provided for in the American Instructions.

The interval between the outbreak of hostilities in America and the Franco-German war was marked by two humane and

successful efforts, known as the Conventions of Geneva and St. Petersburg, to mitigate by systematic compromises and arrangements the effects of warfare on the sick and wounded, and to discourage the use of barbarous implements which might inflict torturing pain in excess of any military advantage to be gained by the use of them. The Convention of Geneva was signed on August 22d, 1864, by the Plenipotentiaries of Switzerland, Baden, Belgium, Denmark, France, Hesse, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Prussia, Spain, Würtemberg, and subsequently by Great Britain. The Convention provided, in a series of Articles, for the neutralization of ambulances and military hospitals, and of all persons engaged in the medical service or the transport of the wounded, and also of chaplains. A distinctive flag and arm-badge were to be adopted, which were to bear a red cross on a white ground. The Convention of St. Petersburg, in 1868, was entered into, on the proposition of Russia, by Great Britain, Austria and Hungary, Bavaria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Persia, Portugal, Prussia and the North German Confederation, Russia, Sweden and Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, and Würtemberg. The instrument recited that "the only legitimate object which States should endeavor to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy; that for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the greatest possible number of men; that this object would be exceeded by the employment of arms which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men or render their death inevitable; that the employment of such arms would, therefore, be contrary to the laws of humanity." The contracting parties thereupon "engage to renounce, in case of war among themselves, the employment by their military or naval troops of any projectile of a weight below 400 grammes which is either explosive or charged with fulminating or inflammable substances."

The most ambitious effort which has been made in recent times to review and include in a general survey all the chief branches of the Laws of War was inaugurated in 1874 by the Society for the Amelioration of the Condition of Prisoners of War, and was greatly advanced by the proceedings of the Brussels Conference, convoked by the Emperor of Russia in the

course of the same year. The Society owed its existence to the Universal Alliance Congress, which sat at Paris in June, 1872 ; and its scheme was mainly confined to carrying still further, in the interests of prisoners of war, the beneficent projects to which the Conventions of Geneva and St. Petersburg had already given substantial effect. In the original circular letter addressed by the Comte de Houdetot, President of the Executive Committee of the Society, to foreign Governments, soliciting them to send delegates to a Conference to be opened at Paris in May, 1874, it was said that "the disparity in the "rules already existing relative to the treatment of soldiers who "become prisoners of war, and the absence of any rule whatever "in most countries, have suggested the formation of a Society, "composed of members of various nationalities, with the view of "moving the Governments to conclude an agreement upon a "question so highly interesting to civilization and humanity." This letter was dated March 28th, 1874 ; and on the 6th of April the Russian Government, in the person of Prince Gortschakof, sent a communication to the foreign Governments, announcing the answer which it had already returned to the proposal of the Society, and further declaring that it had arrived at the intention of "laying before the Cabinets a project for an International Code, with the object of determining the laws and usages "of warfare." The words of Prince Gortschakof in this despatch are noticeable. He says that he incloses the project therewith, and adds : "The motive by which it is inspired is one of humanity, which, we are convinced, will meet a general feeling, "a general interest, and a general need. The more that solidarity becomes developed which tends in these times to bring "together, to unite, nations as the members of one family, the "more their military organization tends to give to their wars "the character of conflicts between armed nations ; the more "necessary does it become, therefore, to determine with greater "precision than in past times the laws and usages admissible in "a state of war, in order to limit the consequences and to diminish the calamities attendant upon it, so far as may be "possible and desirable. With this end in view, it seems indispensable to establish, by common accord, upon a basis of complete reciprocity, rules which may be made binding on all Gov-

“ernments and their armies. We believe this to be both the “duty and the interest of every State. The project which we “submit to the examination of the Cabinets is only a starting- “point for ulterior deliberations, which we trust will prepare the “way for a general understanding. To this end, we are of “opinion that a Conference of special Plenipotentiaries might be “convoked to discuss these questions and to decide upon a “definite code, which might thenceforth be clothed with an inter- “national character.” Prince Gortschakof goes on to suggest the city of Brussels as particularly appropriate for such a Congress, and names the 15th of July as a convenient date of meeting.

The Congress met accordingly at Brussels in July, the English Government having specially guarded itself against doing more than “sending a military officer as delegate, who would “not be invested with any plenipotentiary powers, and who “would simply report the proceedings, reserving to Her Majesty’s Government entire liberty of action in regard to them.” Lord Derby, the British Foreign Secretary, had also expressly stipulated that such a delegate could only be sent upon his Government receiving from the Russian Government, as well as from the Governments of all the Powers invited to take part in the Conference, the most positive and distinct assurance “that their delegates at the Conference should be instructed to confine themselves to the consideration of details “of military operations of the nature of those dealt with in the “Project of the Russian Government, and should not entertain “in any shape, directly or indirectly, anything relating to maritime operations or naval warfare.”

The results of the Congress are of the highest interest, though no actual convention has as yet resulted from them. The discussions between the representatives of the larger and of the smaller states served to bring to light many of the inherent, but scarcely suspected, obstacles to unanimity in the attempt to codify the Laws of War at the present time, and to expose in the clearest light some insuperable difficulties in the way of conciliating opposing interests, owing to the mere transitory influence of passions already excited by recent wars. A careful review of the original text of the Project for the amendment of the

Laws of War proposed by the Russian Government, of the text as finally "modified by the Conference," and of the arguments or almost desultory conversations in which the different representatives expressed their views on every part of the scheme, will be found to afford the best attainable instruction on the whole subject of the Laws of War, as applicable, and as in fact applied, to the present circumstances of European States.¹ The text, as modified by the Conference, embodies in clear and legal, though not technical, language all the best recognized, as well as all the unwritten, rules and usages relating to the conduct of land warfare. In two clauses it summarily includes all the regulations of the Conventions of Geneva and of St. Petersburg. It further reduces to precise expression the least vague and uncertain of the rules of practice which the more modern requirements of war had already suggested and partially enforced. The distinction between combatants and non-combatants, the treatment by an invading army of invaded territory and of its inhabitants, the conduct of sieges and bombardments, and, according to the original purport of the whole movement, the situation of prisoners of war, form a series of topics each of which is handled with minuteness, but not with prolixity. Taken together, they constitute a code which, whatever its legally binding force, cannot be henceforth left out of account in any attempt to ascertain the actual customs and usages, as well as the moral sentiments, of many of the most enlightened Governments of the world at the present time. Specimens of the provisions of this code are given at a later page. Two deductions from its value have to be made. One is, the persistent reluctance of England—in the interests, as asserted by the Foreign Secretary, Lord Derby,² of all the smaller States and of England itself—to assent to the terms of the modified text, or to assent to the renewal of the Conference in the following year (1875) for the purpose of giving more cogent effect to its recommendations. Lord Derby went so far as to say that "the result of the Brussels Conference had been to prove that it was not possible to create an understanding with respect to the really important articles of

¹ Supplement to the *London Gazette*, Oct. 24, 1874.

² Despatch of Lord Derby to Lord A. Loftus, 20th January, 1875.

“the Russian project ; that the interests of the invading and
“of the invaded State are irreconcilable ; and that, even could
“certain Laws of War be published in terms which admitted of
“general adhesion, they would only exercise in fact that fictitious
“influence which the Russian Government had protested against
“at the opening of the Conference. In these circumstances,
“Her Majesty’s Government could not consent to pursue the
“matter, nor to take any part in further negotiations or con-
“ferences on the subject.”

The second deduction from the value of the results of the Congress is the glaring imperfection of those results in some important respects. This is manifested, for instance, in the total omission from the modified text of the subject of Reprisals, which was a prominent topic of the original scheme, and was discussed at the sittings of the Congress. This omission seems to have been owing to the strong feelings, not yet abated, which had been aroused in the late Franco-German war. The language in which Baron Jomini, the Russian delegate, expressed his regret for the total omission of the topic is interesting, as pointing out the expectations and conceptions which the Russian Government, at all events, professed to have entertained :

“I regret that the uncertainty of silence is to prevail with respect to one of the most bitter necessities of war. If the practice could be suppressed by this reticence, I could but approve of this course. But if it is still to exist, this reticence may, it is to be feared, remove any limits to its exercise. Nevertheless, I believe that the mere mention in the Protocol that the committee, after having endeavored to regulate, to soften, and to restrain reprisals, have shrunk from the task before the general repugnance felt with regard to the subject, will have a most serious moral bearing. It will, perhaps, be the best limitation we have been able to affix to the practice, and especially to the use which may be made of it in future.”

Without considering too minutely the motives of the various States which took part in this celebrated Congress, or weighing the amount of the separate interests they may be presumed to have had in its issue, it may be broadly laid down that both the most military and the most pacific States are deeply concerned in the adjustment, in one direction or another, of Laws of War. During the last quarter of a century war

has been conducted on a scale of magnitude, and with the help of scientific inventions, wholly unknown in former times. The notion of an "armed nation" is no longer confined to the attitude of a country at the exceptional crisis of suffering an invasion. The notion has been extended, and is being increasingly extended, to the chronic condition of all the leading States in times of what is apparently the most profound peace. Thus, whenever war actually takes place, its effects on life, limb, commerce, wealth, and honor radiate to a far wider circumference and are intensified at every point to which they reach. The provision for the limitation of war to the combatants professionally engaged, laboriously as it is attempted in form, rather expresses the ever-increasing difficulty of such limitation than indicates any natural tendency towards the separation of the fighting from the non-fighting part of the population. The German Landsturm may be taken as one of the most modern instances of the possible extension of the area of organized warfare. Every member of this force is liable to serve in the national army of defence up to the age of sixty years, the organized German army to be encountered by an invader being thereby raised, it is said, to three millions of men. It is obvious, then, that such questions as the treatment of prisoners of war, the modes of dealing with occupied districts, villages and towns, and their inhabitants, as well as the manner in which an invading army may support itself in a hostile territory, and even the kind of warlike instruments employed, must henceforth come home to private persons in obscure and outlying quarters, such as even in the most ruinous wars of former times have themselves had little to fear from the shock of arms. Thus it comes about that the modern inquiry as to what are, or ought to be, the Laws of War, becomes, in time of war, and so far as the belligerent States are concerned, an inquiry into the whole political constitution under which the population of those States is liable to be, for the time, compelled to live. By the fact of invasion, which, by the hypothesis, may be presumed as likely to befall the one State as the other, the male population may be converted into a standing army, martial law be substituted for the laws and customs of peace, and all the ordinary provisions for personal liberty, for the security of property, for the

just and orderly trial of offenders, be instantly overruled by regulations conceived in the interests of the war, and over which the smallest possible amount of popular control can at any time be exercised. The severer side of Laws of War has been rather epigrammatically expressed by Mr. Sutherland Edwards, one of the *Times* correspondents during the Franco-German war.¹

"Laws are not silent in the midst of arms, but the laws made to replace ordinary laws are of a primitive and barbarous type. In principle they might not unfairly be summed up as follows: 1. For every offence punish some one; the guilty if possible, but some one. 2. Better a hundred innocents should suffer than that one guilty man should escape. 3. When in doubt, shoot the prisoner."

It does not need any circuitous reasoning to show that, even apart from all considerations of humanity, States which, whether voluntarily or compulsorily, are devoting themselves to a military career, have a strong concern and private interest in ascertaining the limitations which are to be imposed on severity in war. The larger the army and the shorter and more superficial the training its magnitude involves, the more indispensable it is for commanders in the field to be able to apply the sternest rules to the conduct of their own troops. The Government to which an invading army belongs can have no interest whatever in exacerbating on every side the feelings of the population among which the army comes. Beyond the necessity of preventing opposition and securing supplies in the most economic fashion, all the interests of the invaders are in favor of conciliating the friendship, or at least the respect, of those not engaged in the war, and of sparing to the uttermost public as well as private property upon which they have an opportunity of laying their hands. These principles are now so fully acknowledged that the only difficulty remaining is where to draw a line between those persons who are and those who are not engaged in opposing the invasion, and how to impose efficient penalties on persons who disobey the military code in its spirit or its letter.

It may thus be expected that, for the purpose of conducting warfare in the most civilized manner compatible with fighting at all, much will yet be done by conventions, and by more or

¹ "The Germans in France," by H. Sutherland Edwards, p. 285.

less clearly understood practice, to circumscribe in every way now possible the area of war, to reduce its severity, and to substitute the notion of war as a means, rough but necessary, for the attainment of some worthy end, for the notion of war as a casual and ferocious struggle, in which no other end is even plausibly put forward than the satisfaction of cupidity or the indulgence of national animosities.

There are those, however, who are far from content even with this description of the prospect in view for the more civilized countries of the world. Educate your soldiers to the utmost pitch of moral self-restraint, or even of national heroism ; take from them all that imparts to them the character of butchers, and clothe them with all that is most worthy of admiration in the occupations of peace ; give them the highest spirit of self-sacrifice, unmarred even in the heat of conflict by any taste for bloodshed or rapine, or delight in the miseries of their fellow-men ; make your armies models of organization, of individual consecration to the corporate interest, and of loyalty to the State they serve and to the military end which that State has in view. When all this is accomplished, as it might be one day, and as, perhaps, it has been already in one army or another at different epochs, it may still be asked whether wars are likely to become any the less frequent, and whether a reign of permanent peace is any nearer than it was before. For those who attach practical importance to so momentous an issue as this, not only is the more general investigation here suggested one not too remote to attract immediate interest, but inasmuch as every detailed and progressive amendment of the Laws of War prepares the way for a total reconstruction of practices now looked upon with approval, the most far-sighted philanthropist must condescend to discuss even military details for which he naturally may have little taste.

From the times of Livy, writing at the epoch of the Christian era, to those of Grotius, whose great work owed its origin to the felt horrors of the Thirty Years' War, which closed in 1648, the coexistence on the battle-field of two systems of obligation, one to the claims of military necessity, the other to the claims of abstract morality, has been recognized by all the leading writers on the subject, and by those who have been

responsible for the actual conduct of war. The story told by Livy¹ of Camillus when besieging the city of the Falisci was no doubt an anachronism to the extent that the historian imputed to a far earlier age sentiments which had only been formulated in his own time. But the fact of sentiments so memorable being prevalently acknowledged even at that time—intervening between the wars of the Republic and those of the Empire—points out how congenial they are to the instincts of even the most bellicose human nature. In reply to the schoolmaster who, in the course of the siege, had treacherously delivered into his hands the sons of the chief men of the city, Camillus answers that it was true that “the Romans and the Falisci” were bound to one another by no obligations created by man, “but by the obligations which nature had created they were both” of them bound, and ever should be; there were rights of war “as well as of peace, and in conformity to them they had been” taught to do all that justice as well as all that courage prompted.² Grotius, always loyally if not servilely following the examples of former times, distinguishes in different chapters all that a military commander is licensed to do by the actual inhuman practice of war, and the modifications of the severity so permitted which a higher morality, or the desultory humanity of particular commanders, seem to recommend as doctrine or precedent. Mr. Ward, in his *History of the Law of Nations*,² fills up the chasm between the times of Livy and Grotius, and points out, with the aid of copious illustrations, how all the institutions and events, through the operation of which the modern States of Europe acquired their existing political form, combined to modify the severity of war and to circumscribe its effects. Mr. Ward passes in review the effect of chivalry, of ecclesiastical institutions, and of the feudal system, and throughout the whole region of International Law he demonstrates that while one series of influences tended to produce dislocation and animosities among the nascent States, another series, far more potent, more continuous, and more universal, was tending to bind the States together, and to make their Governments enter-

¹ Livy. Bk. V. xxvii. See also Cicero, *De Legibus* II. xiv.

² “*Inquiry into the Foundation and History of the Law of Nations.*” By Robert Ward. 1795.

tain sentiments of friendliness to one another. The conflict of these two classes of influences, uncertain and spasmodic as it appears on a narrow inspection of it, forms a large part of the history of European civilization ; and the whole of this process is mirrored in the gradual changes which have been brought about in the art and practice of war.

These historical considerations might of themselves suggest that there is some close though hidden connection between improvements in the practice of war, looked at merely from a military point of view, and the growth of those civilized habits which are the only augury of the final establishment of peace.

The amendments of the Laws of War have two distinct aspects and origins. These amendments either have in view the mere increase of efficiency of the army, by preventing insubordination, controlling licentious dispositions, maintaining discipline in exceptional and unforeseen circumstances, and generally securing that the soldier shall only differ from the most manageable of mechanical agencies in his ability to understand and act upon the word of command, and in the power of self-adjustment by which he can mould his own actions in conformity with a common plan ; or they have in view the benefit of those, whether combatants or non-combatants, who belong to the state against which the war is waged. The most highly elaborated system of laws of war would succeed, as far as is possible, in rendering the attainment of these two objects not incompatible ; and, looking at the most recent codes, previously adverted to, it would appear that both have floated simultaneously before the minds of those who have revised the laws, and, in fact, little discrimination has been attempted between them. There must, then, be some ground of unity on which all these amendments rest, and in view of which their value and bearing must be judged.

This ground of unity may perhaps be found in the fact that, whatever are the laws for the restraint and direction of those who carry on war, the differences between one class or kind of laws and another are of infinitely less importance than the difference which exists between a system of warfare in which Laws of War of some sort are recognized and a system in which the will of one who is going forth conquering and to conquer is the supreme and final rule of action for him and his. During

this terrific period of some thousands of years, in which the nations of the world are being made perfect through the suffering of war, the hope of ever attaining the perfection compatible with the natural conditions of human life must wholly rest upon the perpetual sustenance of those moral ties between man and man, and between nation and nation, from which all promising growths can alone spring. There can be no doubt but that by the union, in the way of alliances and of co-operation, which it has promoted, war has done something towards educating and preserving some moral instincts of the most precious kind. But there can also be no doubt but that so far as warfare has become habitual in a State, or as particular wars have lasted long and had their area widely and indefinitely extended, the most flourishing shoots of all moral unity between the populations to which the war has reached have been seriously threatened. So far as wars have incidentally favored fellowship and brotherhood, it has been by force of those very Laws of War on the subsistence of which all durable alliances, all effective co-operation, all concentration of purpose, have depended.

Savages, indeed, make occasional combinations and alliances, and the Book of Judges presents a picture of a more advanced stage, in which a momentary co-operation is secured for a definite end, and a brief warfare is followed by an anarchy of peace, in which everybody does what is right in his own eyes. But in all gradations of warlike practice, from the time of the most primitive and casual expeditions to the modern era of "armed nations" using up in times of peace most of the public revenue and the best physical resources of the country in preparation for ever-renewed war, there are still present the two counter agencies by which mankind is separated on the one hand and is bound together on the other. The hope of progress has turned and will turn upon the narrowing within the smallest possible compass what is casual, accidental, or capricious in warfare. It is in this region that individual passions, national prejudices, the indulgence of narrow and short-sighted selfishness, find their home and pasture-ground.

When once it is recognized that war is the most serious of all pursuits in which man can ever presume to engage, and calls for the contribution of all that legislative science and educated hab-

its of self-restraint can impart to it, the field is at least partially cleared for the natural play of those orderly instincts which belong to conditions of peace. It is in disorder, irregularity, hurry, and confusion that what is truly bellicose, ferocious, and purely animal in man can best range at large. It being assumed that the moral ties which bind man to man, as God's common creatures and children, are not matters of artificial and laborious construction, but are real and innate, only needing the order of social and political existence to discover them and to call them into their appropriate activity, it may follow that they may be hidden or destroyed by one sort of warfare, while they may live and even flourish by the very help of another. Thus, improvements in the mere technical regularity of warfare, which must imply restrictions upon an aimless and reckless severity, may be silently nurturing the very moral sentiments which in time will become the direct agency for the abolition of war itself.

For the main hope of permanent peace turns not so much on the casual adoption of more convenient, less expensive, and less circuitous processes than war for the defence of rights, as on the ultimate preponderance, diffusion, and strength of the sentiments which bind men together, as contrasted with the force of those which separate them. The conspicuous and alarming organization of war in the present day, with all the material appliances employed, and with all the special political and quasi-legal administration to which it gives rise, are far more patent to the eyes of all men, than facts of another class, not indeed so startling and lurid, but of far deeper and more lasting import. It is certain that the mere introduction of free popular institutions in two States, and a single glance or reminiscence of brotherly sentiment between the populations of those States, might supersede in a day all the elaborate contrivances for war which military dynasties had for years before laboriously collected together. It is not so much that novel expedients for terminating differences would be resorted to, as that the differences themselves, where existing in any portentous form, would be of a wholly novel kind. So-called national honor would have a very different interpretation put upon it when the alternative of fighting for it was so repugnant as to seem impossible. All questions capable of reference to arbitration would not be

tardily and hesitatingly referred to it, but such references would be eagerly sought for in anticipation, and as few unsettled questions left open as remain in an assize town after a general gaol delivery.

The impulse towards peace, or rather the dominant repulsion from war, would be favored by a number of circumstances, some of them slight in themselves and almost evading attention, but which in the aggregate would have long prepared the populations of the two States for concord, and indisposed them for quarrels or physical conflicts. Many of these circumstances are negative rather than positive, but none the less influential on that account. Such are the total abandonment of the lust of territory, an easy forgetfulness of transient animosities or disputes, the absence of dynastical apprehensions, the impossibility of those secret diplomatic mismanagements which so frequently generate widespread misunderstandings.

Chief among the more positive influences favoring a pacific disposition is a growing concern for the freedom of commercial intercourse, for unrestricted opportunities of travel and mutual acquaintance, and, in fact, for all that zealous co-operation which, as existing among the citizens of any one State, is the source of its vitality and growth.

These relations, which, stated in this abstract form, seem rather to wear the color of a gorgeous prophecy than the duller drapery of facts which meet the eye, are, really, already found to exist between more than one pair of States in the civilized world, of equal political importance and, so far as can be conjectured, military or naval strength. They have been described here for the purpose of clearly showing what is the state of things where the true moral ties, which everywhere in truth bind men and States together, have succeeded in attaining a supreme ascendancy over the accidental elements of selfishness, distrust, or mere dislike, the force of which is represented in armies and navies.

The exact antithesis of the above picture—that is, where the dislocating elements have attained a supreme ascendancy over the moral ties—has been, and still is, too faithfully imaged in such abuse of military strength, as characterized the English in their Chinese wars and in some of their Asiatic expeditions, the English again in their barbarous conflicts with the aboriginal

tribes in the neighborhood of some of their colonies, and the French in some of their exploits in the north of Africa. The effect of conduct such as is here alluded to, in which all Laws of War are superseded in the name of military necessity, or are treated as good enough for one hemisphere or country, but not for another, operates as an annihilation of the very idea of moral ties existing between belligerents. The very defence put forward for this unscrupulous indulgence in war, is that moral duties are not necessarily binding on one army, unless they are acknowledged and performed by the combatants on the other side. But this plea rests the performance of moral duties upon the basis of choice, caprice, charity, or bargain, and is nothing else than a repudiation of the absolute obligation of morality and a denial of the moral constitution of every single combatant on either side.

What, however, is important to notice for the purpose of the present argument is that where Laws of War, instead of being made or held obligatory on all combatants on both sides, are merely introduced so far as they are accidentally convenient for the purposes of one, the utmost is done to destroy the basis on which alone real pacific relations can be resumed and permanently maintained. Especially in conflicts with half-civilized races, it is in the exciting moments of battle that the most distinct lessons are taught by those who represent the best moral attainment of the civilized world. If the lessons taught are such as to misrepresent the moral responsibilities of the teacher, every war, or even every engagement, must only plunge the combatants on one side into a deeper abyss of hostility to all civilized institutions, and of general savagery, and react fatally on the other side by teaching the army, and those who follow its movements at home, that duties generally have only to be performed so far and so long as it is safe and convenient to perform them.

Thus, by taking two extreme cases, it has been shown that war, as modified by the laws and restrictions which the conscience of the civilized world, working in concurrence with the dictates of military and political convenience, imposes, marks an intermediate and, it may be hoped, transitory stage between an absolute oblivion of moral obligations and such an ascendancy of the sense of these obligations, as would render the cruel

hardships and bitter passions which are inevitable even in the best-conducted wars an anachronism. From this point of view it would be interesting to notice the real effect of some of the leading doctrines and regulations by which the conduct of war is now, so far as Europe is concerned, surrounded by limitations conceived in the interest of humanity, and therefore, as has been shown, of peace.

The "modified text" of the Brussels Congress may be taken as an approximate statement, if not of the actual practice now habitual in European wars, at least of the theoretical rules already either well established or on the verge of receiving such general approval as must lead to their being established. Take, for instance, the leading topic of prisoners of war. According to the resolutions of the Congress, prisoners of war are "lawful "and disarmed enemies;" "they are in the power of the enemy's "Government, but not of the individuals or of the corps who "made them prisoners;" "they should be treated with human- "ity;" "all their personal effects, except their arms, are to be "considered their own property;" while "liable to internment in "a town, fortress, camp, or in any locality whatever, under an "obligation not to go beyond certain fixed limits," they "may "not be placed in confinement, unless absolutely necessary as a "measure of security;" they may be "employed on certain pub- "lic works which have no immediate connection with the opera- "tions on the theatre of war, provided the employment be not "excessive, nor humiliating to their military rank if they belong "to the army, or to their official or social position if they do "not belong to it;" "the pay they receive will go towards "ameliorating their position, or will be put to their credit at "the time of their release;" their maintenance is to be provided for by the Government in whose power they are, and, in default of a mutual understanding on the subject between the belligerents, and as a "general principle," they are to be "treated, as regards food and clothing, on the same footing as "the troops of the Government who made them prisoners."

Take, again, the modified text agreed to, after a rather fiery discussion between the German delegate on the one side and the representatives of the Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland on the other, respecting the relations of an invading army

to the population of the invaded country. Leaving on one side, as presenting insuperable difficulties, the vexed question of the right of the population of occupied territory to rise in arms against the invader without being treated as rebels and traitors, the modified text confines itself to the following rules, which seem to have been treated as of indisputable authority :

“ The population of an occupied territory cannot be compelled to take part in military operations against their own country. The population of occupied territories cannot be compelled to swear allegiance to the enemy’s power. The honor and rights of the family, the life and property of individuals, as well as their religious convictions and the exercise of their religion, should be respected. Private property cannot be confiscated. Pillage is expressly forbidden.”

With respect to the last two clauses, the modified text introduces some explanations and definitions for the purpose of regulating the mode of exacting forced contributions for the support of the invading army.

The text, indeed, though reproducing the actual practice in recent wars of invasion on the European continent, is behind the requirements of some of the most competent authorities on the subject, and, as will be seen lower down, the strong recommendations and experience of the Duke of Wellington. The text says that the enemy, in levying contributions, should proceed as far as possible according to the rules of the distribution and assessment of the taxes in force in the occupied territory ; that for every contribution a receipt should be given to the person furnishing it ; that requisitions should be made only by the authority of the commandant of the locality occupied ; and that for every requisition an indemnity should be granted or receipt given. The text says nothing about the kind of materials to which requisitions may extend, and is certainly most unsatisfactory in respect of the modes of payment which it contemplates. The passage of the text in which it introduces the necessities of war as a ground for determining the sorts of payments and services which may be demanded from parishes and their inhabitants, in fact does nothing more than leave the whole matter to the irresponsible will of the officer in command.

Before leaving this last-mentioned topic, it may be well to recall more precisely the views held by the Duke of Wellington

in 1815, as reported by Lord Palmerston on his visit to Paris in September of that year. The Duke told Lord Palmerston that "the system of individual plunder had been the ruin of the French army, and would be the destruction of the Prussian. "When officers were allowed to make requisitions for their troops, they soon began to make them for themselves; and "those who demanded provisions to-day would call for money to-morrow. War then assumed a new character; the profession of arms became a mercenary speculation, and the officers' thoughts grew to be directed to the acquisition of plunder instead of the attainment of glory." Lord Palmerston adds that the Duke had succeeded in keeping his army well in hand; no officer was permitted to make any requisition himself, but was obliged to state his wants to the commissary, who applied to the agents of the French Government for the articles required; and the supply being made through channels known to the people, and by authorities recognized by them, the burden was not felt to be so oppressive as if the exaction had been made by the immediate order of an enemy and at the caprice of individual officers. The consequence was, that though both the Prussians and the English lived equally at the expense of the country, the first were detested and the latter liked.¹

The general reasoning is applicable to all cases of invasion, though the passage of the allied armies through France could only be called an invasion in a special sense.

In citing the above extracts from the amendments of the Laws of War agreed to at the Brussels Conference, it is not here even so much as hinted that they are anything more than imperfect and tentative approximations to the rules which a pure regard to the interests of humanity would enact, and still less that the rules themselves represent the actual practice even of those States which have been most loud in the vindication of them. It is notorious that in the Franco-German war the most cruel hardships were inflicted on the French nation, not from the want of sufficient rules for restricting severities, or of a sincere desire on the part of the Germans to conduct the war in a civilized manner, but from the wide scope for license which—

¹ "Selections from Private Journals of Tours in France in 1815 and 1818." By the Rt. Hon. Viscount Palmerston, K. G. 1871.

in the hurry and confusion of an invasion—the strictest rules still leave open, and from the unscrupulous rigor with which an observance of the rules affecting the invaded population was enforced. The mode, indeed, of enforcing Laws of War must always leave a dangerous latitude of discretion to commanders in the field, where it is quite impracticable to substitute for prompt and rough remedies the tardy and dignified procedure of peace. It is in this region of discretion that the perplexed question of reprisals and of what are called military executions—which, in fact, are nothing else than the punishment of the innocent with or for the guilty—would seem destined always to lurk. A special hardship is also involved in the fact that the new crimes which the Laws of War invent are measured on a wholly different principle from the crimes recognized in legislation for peace, and their magnitude bears very little proportion to moral guilt. Thus, in the new circumstances of modern war, there are scarcely any offences which it is more indispensable for an invading army to repress by every method within its reach than those of taking up railway lines, destroying railway bridges, and cutting telegraph wires. Such offences have effects far more serious than the old-fashioned offences of creating impediments on roads of march or of casually intercepting individual messengers. The whole safety of an army and the success of an expedition may be involved in the possibility of a sure reliance on rapid conveyance from point to point, or on communication being maintained hour by hour between widely removed detachments of the army.

These criticisms point to the fact that in discussing the bearing of Laws of War it must be borne in mind that (1) all imaginable Laws of War are imperfect from a purely humanitarian point of view; and however near they approach to perfection from a point of view which is at once military and humanitarian, they must, by their very nature, leave open wide gaps to be filled by the discretion of individual commanders or the peculiar emergencies which the changing events of the war may from time to time present; that (2) the Laws now actually in existence are very far from approaching even the degree of perfection which the philanthropist might be entitled to demand of the military legislator, and express, in fact, nothing

more than the maximum amount of agreement which, in the present circumstances of Europe, the European States, great and small, can, in view of all the separate interests involved or supposed to be involved, arrive at ; and that (3), so far as recent experience has gone—an experience which involves wars conducted on the European continent on a wholly unprecedented scale of magnitude—the Laws themselves are most imperfectly obeyed, often scandalously outraged, and, if the conflict long endure, more and more cast on one side and forgotten.

Nevertheless, with all these deductions, the existence of such Laws for the mitigation of severities in war as professedly govern the conduct of modern armies is a great boon to humanity; and affords the best of all guarantees for the gradual abolition of war itself. Over and above the public and constant testimony which any Laws for the limitation of war present to the moral ties which in spite of the war itself continue to bind together the citizens and soldiers of both States, some more particular effects of these Laws on the promotion and maintenance of peace are brought about in certain distinctly intelligible ways, which may be recapitulated as follows :

1. Laws of War, whatever their character and merit, have at least the effect of assigning limits, lines, and boundaries to the conduct of war. If ferocity or individual license cannot be eradicated, they are, at least in outward form, put into fetters, If the distinction between the private citizen and the armed soldier is drawn recklessly or harshly, at any rate the notion of such a distinction is persistently maintained. War, in profession at least, as the Emperor William said at Forbach, in his proclamation on entering France, is made on soldiers and not upon citizens. In this proclamation the Emperor added that French citizens would “continue to enjoy entire security for “their persons and property so long as they did not themselves “deprive him, by hostile enterprises against the German troops, “of the right of granting them his protection.” Even if the humane treatment of prisoners of war cannot be absolutely ensured, the moral duty of securing their persons from outrage, and of providing for them with all the care due to the stranger and the guest, is openly confessed. Even if private property is exposed to the utmost risks, and, in spite of every formal

restraint, is still recklessly stolen or injured under the name of requisitions, still a distinct protest continues to be made against the supposition that war can be waged for purposes of self-enrichment, or that unpermitted spoliation is any less robbery in a time of war than in a time of peace.

All these lines and boundaries, imperfect, uncertain, fluctuating, and often undecipherable as they are, at least have the effect of sustaining the idea that war is only made in order to promote a distinct political object outside itself, and not for the purpose of giving vent to those passions and dispositions which are in truth, or ought to be, the disfigurements, and not the characteristic features, of war. The general result must be to bring into ever clearer view the notion of war as merely a means to an end, and therefore possibly one among many other means to the same end. The political use of war is thus constantly encroaching on the mere military appetite for it ; and, simultaneously, the various defects of war, as an instrument the most costly, the most uncertain, the most injurious to both belligerents, and the most outrageous to humanity, become matter of grave political consideration in the course of calculating the worth of the object to be attained, and the material or moral expensiveness of various competing means at hand for attaining it. It is obvious, then, that to the extent that war is, in public profession and even in desultory practice, restricted and circumscribed, the arguments for choosing the alternative of peace obtain a better chance of being heard and deliberately weighed. The issue in the course of time can hardly be doubtful.

2. A minor consequence of the imposition of bounds and limits to war by the laws introduced for the mitigation of its severity is that commanders in the field and their Governments thereby retain in their hands the only effective means for bringing the war to an instant close so soon as the political object is attained. The history of long wars, such as the Hundred Years' War of the English in France, the Thirty Years' War in Germany, and even the Bonapartist wars, shows how hard it is to maintain from the outset one steady political purpose, or limited assemblage of purposes, as the cause of the war, without the war itself and its events generating in their progress an

ever-enlarged variety of new purposes which themselves tend to give to the war an indefinite perpetuity, only prevented, in fact, by total exhaustion on one side or on both. It is one of the hardest problems of diplomatists, and exercises all the self-restraint of commanders in the field, upon whom are always cast diplomatic functions of the first importance, to prevent this incessant generation of fresh causes of dispute ; and, of all causes, those due to the license of individual soldiers or the reckless violation and destruction of property are among the most potent. So far as Laws of War are wisely conceived, strictly interpreted, and sternly as well as impartially administered, the original objects of the war are kept free from all perplexing or confusing images which, mostly unreal, are the fruit rather of passion and hatred than of any genuine political differences.

3. It has sometimes been said by the most thoughtless writers on war that the more cruelly and recklessly war is conducted, the more likely it is to become matter of general abomination, and therefore the more effectually are the ultimate interests of peace provided for. Such persons would reduce Laws of War to the narrowest proportions, and would do little more than provide against usages familiar only among the lowest of the savage races. They would connive at, if not applaud, the indiscriminate use of all the implements and all the force in the hands of a commander. Unrestricted violence, even amounting to depopulation, is looked upon with approval as likely to wean the suffering nation forever from a warlike career ; and even the horrors of a long siege followed by bombardment and barbarous assault are counted among the necessities of war, the absence of which might make it only too pleasant and attractive a pastime.

Those who write and speak in this way can only have taken a most superficial view of the meaning of St. James's account of why "wars and fightings" come. They come not from any studied preference for war as an occupation, nor from any misapprehension as to the sufferings it causes, nor even from any forgetfulness of the losses and calamities which a very recent war may have brought with it. So far as war is used as any other than the roughest, the nearest, and the most familiar instrument for the attainment of political ends, it owes its

sustenance to the force of those brutal and unbridled passions which St. James designates as the lusts which war in our members. It is not most, it may be even least of all, the soldier who is easily possessed with the uncontrollable desire to fight. It needs, under the modern conditions of easy communication, but a few paragraphs in any largely circulated daily newspaper about some alleged violation of the national honor, prestige, or what not, or even the narrative of some accidental conflict on the frontiers between the inhabitants of outlying villages, to rouse throughout a whole country the most vindictive and savage passions of which human nature is capable, and which years of civilization and centuries of Christianity seem only to have cloaked, and never disciplined. These feelings become, by means of civil and domestic association, and of all the facile machinery for ascertaining and concentrating public opinion, a dominant rage of a strength far greater and more lasting than is possible in the isolated brute beast. Governments are perforce led or driven by the incendiary vehemence of those they rule ; and they can only maintain their own existence by finding some diplomatic artifice for precipitating a war and glutting the popular thirst for blood.

In such a state of things as this, the recurrence of which at frequent intervals is one of the most harrowing phenomena of modern times, it is far more the severities of war than the mitigations of it which are its recommendation to the popular mind. If the people have themselves suffered in previous wars, they wish now to make others suffer equally and in the same way. The strength and blindness of passion make them callous to the possible sufferings of themselves and their countrymen ; the familiar experience of the murderer who, with the certainty of conviction and of bringing on himself a shameful death, takes no count of the future in the presence of the enemy who for the moment is before him, is repeated and multiplied over half a continent.

If this be a true explanation of the deep-lying causes which, in the teeth of all the civilizing influences operating directly the other way, continue to make war possible and popular, the remedies for it must be in the exactly opposite direction from that to which the advocates of reckless severity are looking.

The main and only hope for maintaining throughout large populations a balance of mind and moral self-restraint in the presence of irritating incidents and diplomatic controversies, is to be found in such a popular training as shall bring the brutal passions of an associated crowd under exactly the same chronic discipline as the civilized individual man, not to say the Christian, has long learned to exercise in the culture of his own spirit. Human society in a single country could never have existed, or its artificial maintenance would be an intolerable burden, if every occasion of discord, every act or suspicion of an act of wrong-doing, every question of disputed rights, were instantly to call into action, offensive or defensive, the strongest passions of the human breast.

The progress of civilization has been marked, not by the annihilation nor even the weakening of these passions, but by the effective subordination and use of them to the loftiest ends. The disuse of private wars, of trial by battle, and of duelling, has marked the gradual and more overt steps of this great moral achievement. It is only in the relations between nation and nation that it is still believed that brutality, passionateness, cruelty, and selfishness may not only riot to the uttermost, but may legitimately begin to riot on the very slightest provocation. It is impossible for any believer in the progress of the human race, and in the redemption which, day by day and century by century, is searching out all the dark places of the earth and bringing them under a truly Divine dominion, to admit that war represents more than one transient spasm, be it of hard necessity or of still untamed passion, which the world will in no long time have outgrown, and, except for purposes of wholesome reminder, have forgotten. So far as Laws of War exist and operate, their action has been shown to help forward the arrival of this kingdom which cannot be moved, and which alone can hold its own in those moments when the heathen rage and the people imagine a vain thing.

SHELDON AMOS.

SECULARIZED EDUCATION.

WHO is the agent entitled to control education? What is right education? These questions are interdependent. Two answers have been proposed to the first in history: The State, the Church. In Europe, Liberalism says the State, and insists on secularizing education, by which it means its release from the control of popery. Liberals see clearly that, under that control, there will be no true freedom. But, as they also insist on secularizing the State, their idea of a free education is of one devoid of religion, separating the mental from the spiritual culture. Thus they conclude that education must be Godless, in order to be free. Rome has herself to blame for this error, as for most of European scepticism. She claims that she alone is Christian: independent minds reply, "Then Christianity is evil." So if her education were the only Christian, freemen would have to reject Christian education. If private judgment is sin; if the hierarchy is the Church; if the teacher is a real priest and essential "proxy" between men and salvation; if his teaching is infallible; if the real end of the culture is to enslave the soul to a priesthood with a foreign head; if that head is absolutely superior to the secular sovereignty, such ecclesiastical education will be civil slavery. It is not strange that men seeking civil liberty spurn it.

The mistake is in confounding ecclesiastical with Christian education. Let the Scripture be heard: "The kingdom of God is within you," consisting, not in a greedy hierarchy, but in the rule of Truth; the clergy are not lords over God's heritage, but only "ministers by whom we believe;" it has no penalties but the spiritual, reaching no man's civil rights; its only other function is didactic, and its teaching only binds so far as the

layman's own conscience responds ; it is the Church's duty to instruct parents how God would have them rear their children, and enforce the duty by spiritual sanctions ; but there its official power ends. It does not usurp the doing of the important task it inculcates. As a Christian private man the minister lends other parents his knowledge and virtues to co-operate in their work. But all this implies no danger either to spiritual or religious liberty.

But it will be well for the modern Liberal to pause and ask whether he secures anything by this transfer of the educating function from Church to State ? Does he point to the results of Jesuit teaching, spurious, shallow scholarship, an enslaved and morbid conscience, which dares not even wish to break its fetters, the insatiable greed of the hierarchy for influence and money, the hateful perversion of the sacred task to inspire falsehood and prejudices for this end ? The picture is sufficiently repulsive. But are only ecclesiastics grasping ? Is human nature depraved ? Is it essentially the same in all men ? Then why are they not to be expected to act in similar ways, when subjected to the same temptations ? And the modern Liberal is the last man to overlook this truth ; since he is sceptical of all professions of spiritual principles in clergymen, and prone to ascribe secular motives. He should, then, expect the demagogue to show a misguided ambition exactly like the priests. What is the hierarch but a ghostly demagogue ? The demagogue is but the hierarch of Mammon's altar. Does he not, for instance, pervert that other educating agency, the press, just as violently as the Jesuit the school ? Now, let him become ruler in the State and the State become educator ; and there is just the same risk that the education of youth will be perverted to subserve a faction, and that, by the hateful means of imbuing their minds with error and passion in place of truth and right. The result is despotism of a party instead of a pope. One may be as bad as the other.

But if the State is the educator, in America, at least, education must be secularized totally. In theory our State is *the institute for realizing secular justice*. It has absolutely severed itself from all religions equally ; has pledged itself that no man's civil rights shall be modified or equality diminished by any re-

ligion or the lack of any ; and has forbidden the establishment of any religion by law, and the imposition of any burden for a religious pretext on any. But the State school teacher is her official, and teaches by her authority. All school-officials derive their authority from State laws, hence all their functions are as truly State actions as those of the sheriff in hanging, or the judge in sentencing a murderer. Especially is the school fund, raised by taxation, the common and equal property of the people.

But as our people are divided among many religions, that money ought no more to be used in schools to teach one religion in preference to the others, than in a church establishment. Once the people of a small State, like Connecticut, were so homogeneous, that any dissentient minority was minute, and the dominant religion was taught "on State account," without any protest loud enough to be inconvenient. But the mixture of our people, and especially the strength and audacity of popery, now make all this different. Papists make an effective issue, arguing that the State must not use the people's money to teach King James's version, which they, a part of the people, believe heretical. Zealous Protestants, usually zealous State school men, try to flout this plea. But would they assent to the State's teaching their children, with their money, the version which says : "Except ye *do penance* ye shall all likewise perish?" They exclaim : "That is an erroneous version, while King James's is faithful." Theologically that is doubtless true. But the very point of the State's covenant with the people is, *that the State shall not judge, either way, of that proposition*. It has been bargained that, in the State *arena*, we shall respect papists' religious views, precisely as we require them to respect ours. Suppose them, some day, in as large a majority in some State as Protestants are in New England, would we acquiesce in their forcing the study of the *Douay version* in State schools? So, unless we admit that our might makes our right, we ought not to inflict the parallel wrong on the Jews, Mohammedans, Atheists, and Buddhists among us, because they are still few.

It is sought to parry this conclusion thus : While all religions are equal, and no one established, the State is not an atheistic institute, but must ground itself in the will of God, which is the standard of all rights. That the State is an ethical institute,

and for ethical ends. That hence it enjoins the Sabbath, punishes blasphemy, etc. That equally the State, while not establishing one religion to the prejudice of others, ought to teach the divine truths common to all, by the unsectarian use of the Bible. But, whether this be the just basis of a commonwealth or not, our *States do not avow it*. And second, the question is not of the original Scripture in common schools, but of some one version, among other competing ones, which even Protestants do not claim to be infallible. Hence the question, Which version? raises sectarian issues. Third, we do not believe, any more than these reasoners, that the State can be atheistic, because it is an ethical institute, and the divine will is the only valid ethical rule. But the State finds the theistic basis in natural theology. The proof is, that pagan States, resting only on natural theism, were valid, and rightfully (Rom. 13 : 5) possessed the allegiance even of Christians. The evasion therefore is futile.

But be the logic of this question what it may, the actual result is certain. The papists will inevitably carry the point, as they have already done in many places. That they will triumph everywhere else that they care to try, is plain from the growing timidity of the Bible advocates, the poverty of the compromises they offer, and the spreading indifference of the masses to the value of biblical teaching. In fact, on American premises, the Bible advocates have no plea but a pious predilection, and sooner or later logical considerations, when so clear, must assert their force. The difficulty of the problem appears thus : That it agitates other free governments than ours, as the British and Holland, at this day.

For the solution there are, on the theory of State education, four suggestions. The first is the unjust one of forcing the religion of the majority on the minority. The second is what is called in Great Britain the plan of "concurrent endowments." Each denomination may have its own schools endowed by the State, and teach its own religion in it along with secular learning. This is virtually the plan by which New York papists have been partially appeased. It is justly rejected by Protestants everywhere. First, because it offers no solution save where the several denominations are populous enough to sustain a school for each in the same vicinage. Second, because the

State has no right thus virtually to assert the co-ordinate and equal value of opposing creeds, the truth of one of which may imply the positive falsehood of another. Third, because the State has no right to indicate of either of the creeds that it is, or is not, true and valuable. Fourth, because Protestantism is more promotive of thrift and wealth than the erroneous creeds; whence a given number of Protestants will pay more school-tax than the same number of errorists, so that this plan uses a part of their money to foster creeds they conscientiously believe mischievous. Fifth, it gives to error a pecuniary and moral support beyond what it would receive from the spontaneous zeal of its votaries. And last, it disunites the population by training youth in hostile religious camps. Irish and American papists have professed to approve because they gain by the plan. But who dreams that if they were in the majority they would be willing to see "good Catholic money" expended in teaching Protestant heresy?

The third plan proposes to give "unsectarian" religious instruction in the first hour of the day, while parents who dissent from it are allowed to detain their children from school until that hour is passed. This amounts to the State's establishing a religion and using the people's money to teach it, but *permitting dissent* without any other penalty than the taxation for a religious object which the taxpayer condemns. That is to say, it places the matter where England places her established religion, since the "Toleration Act" of William and Mary relieved dissenters of penal pains for absence from the Anglican churches. But the thing Americans claim is *liberty* and not *toleration*. They deny the State's right to select a religion, as the true and useful one, for anybody, willing or unwilling. Those who dissent from the selected religion deny that the State may thus expend the people's money as a bait to careless or erroneous parents to submit their children to the inculcation of error.

The only other alternative is to secularize the State's teaching absolutely, limiting it to matters merely secular, and leaving parents or the Church to supplement it with such religious teaching as they may please, or none. Some Christians, driven by the difficulty which has been disclosed, adopt this conclu-

sion. The larger number, notwithstanding the difficulty, reject it with energy. Let us see whether this plan is either *possible* or *admissible*.

This is really the vital question. It cannot be discussed until we agree what education is, and disperse deceptive misconceptions of it. It is properly the whole man or person that is educated ; but the main subject of the work is the spirit. Education is the nurture and development of the whole man for his proper end. The end must be conceived aright in order to understand the process. Even man's earthly end is predominantly moral. Now, if dexterity in any art, as in the handling of printer's type, a musket, a burin, a power-loom, were education, its secularization might be both possible and proper. Is not a confusion here the source of most of the argument in defence of that theory? For instance, "Why may not the State teach reading and writing without any religious adjuncts, as legitimately as the mechanic thus teaches his apprentices filing, planing, or hammering?" Because dexterity in an art is not education. The latter nurtures a soul, the other only drills a sense-organ or muscle ; the one has a mechanical end, the other a moral. And this answer cannot be met by saying, "Let it then be agreed that the State is only teaching an art, a dexterity—that, for instance, of letters." For the State refuses to be understood thus : it claims *to educate* ; as is witnessed by the universal argument of the advocates of this State function, that she has the right and duty of providing that the young citizens shall be competent to their responsibility as citizens. But these are ethical. Again, if the State professed to bestow, not an education, but a dexterity, equity would require her bestowing not only the arts of letters, but all other useful arts. For only the minority can ever live by literary arts ; the great majority of children have equal rights to be taught the other bread-winning arts. Thus government would become the wildest communism. No, the State cannot adopt this evasion ; unless she says that she *educates*, she can say nothing.

It should also be remarked here that the arts of reading and writing are rather means of education than education itself, and not the only nor the most effective means. As Macaulay showed, against Dr. S. Johnson, the unlettered part of the

Athenians were, in some respects, highly educated, while we see many minds, with these arts, really undeveloped.

But is a really secularized education either possible or admissible?

First, No people of any age, religion, or civilization, before ours, has ever thought so. Against the present attempt, right or wrong, stands the whole common sense of mankind. Pagan, Papist, Mohammedan, Greek, Protestant, have all hitherto rejected any other education than one grounded in religion, as absurd and wicked. Let Mr. Webster be heard against the Girard will, which enjoined, in order to exclude Christianity from his college, that no minister should ever enter its walls. The argument against the will here was, that the trust it proposed to create was, in this, so opposed to all civilized jurisprudence, as to make it outside the law, and so void. So formidable did the point seem to lawyers, that Mr. Horace Binney, of the defence, went to England to ransack the British laws of trusts. It was in urging this point that Mr. Webster uttered the memorable words :

“In what age, by what sect, where, when, by whom, has religious truth been excluded from the education of youth? Nowhere. Never! Everywhere, and at all times, it has been regarded as essential. *It is of the essence, the vitality of useful instruction.*” And this was not the assertion of Mr. Webster, the politician, but of the learned lawyer, face to face with able opponents, and making one of the most responsible forensic efforts of his life. He knew that he was uttering the weighty voice of history and jurisprudence.

Let another witness be heard, of equal learning and superior character.¹ “It must be acknowledged to be one of the most remarkable phenomena of our perverted humanity, that among a Christian people, and in a Protestant land, such a discussion” (whether the education of youth may not be secularized) “should not seem as absurd as to inquire whether school-rooms should be located under water or in darksome caverns! The Jew, the Mohammedan, the follower of Confucius, and of Brahma, each and all are careful to instruct the youth of their

¹ John B. Minor, LL.D., University of Virginia.

people in the tenets of the religions they profess, and are not content until, by direct and reiterated teaching, they have been made acquainted with at least the outline of the books which contain, as they believe, the revealed will of Deity. Whence comes it that Christians are so indifferent to a duty so obvious, and so obviously recognized by Jew and Pagan?"

We are attempting then an absolute novelty. But may not the tree be already known by its fruits? State education among Americans tends to be entirely secularized. What is the result? Whence this general revolt from the Christian faith in this country, so full of churches, preachers, and a redundant Christian literature, so boastful of its Sabbaths and its evangelism? What has prepared so many for the dreary absurdities of materialism? Why do the journals which seek a national circulation think it their interest to affect irreligion? Why so many lamentations over public and popular corruptions? He who notes the current of opinion sees that the wisest are full of misgivings as to the fruits of present methods. As a specimen, let these words, from the Governor of Massachusetts, at a recent anniversary, be taken: "He" [Gov. Rice] "lifted up a warning voice, with respect to the inadequacy and perils of our modern system of one-sided education, which supposed it could develop manhood and good citizenship out of mere brain culture."

Second, True education is, in a sense, a spiritual process, the nurture of a soul. By spiritual, the divines mean the acts and states produced by the Holy Ghost, as distinguished from the merely ethical. The nurture of these is not human education, but sanctification. Yet education is the nurture of a spirit which is rational and moral, in which conscience is the regulative and imperative faculty; whose proper end, even in this world, is moral. But God is the only Lord of the conscience; this soul is his miniature likeness; his will is the source of obligation to it; likeness to him is its perfection, and religion is the science of the soul's relations to God. Let these statements be placed together, and the theological and educational processes appear so cognate that they cannot be separated. Hence it is that the common sense of mankind has ever invoked the guidance of the minister of religion for the education of youth; in India the Brahmin, in Turkey the Imam, in Jewry the Rabbi, and

in Christian lands the pastor. So, everywhere, the sacred books have always been the prime text-books. The only exception in the world is that which Rome has made for herself by her intolerable abuse of her powers. Does the secularist answer that this sacerdotal education results in a Boeotian character and puerile culture? Yes, where the sacred books are false Scriptures, but not where it is the Bible which is the text-book. So that these instances prove that the common sense of mankind has been at bottom correct, and has only been abused, in some instances, by imposture.

The soul is a spiritual monad, an indivisible, spiritual unit, without parts, as without extension. Those powers, which we name as separate faculties, are only modes of function with which this unit is qualified, differentiated by the distinctions of the objects on which they operate. The central power is still one. From these truths it would appear that it cannot be successfully cultivated by patches. We cannot have the intellectual workman polish it at one place, and the spiritual at another. A succession of objects may be presented to the soul, to evoke and discipline its several powers; yet the unity of the being would seem to necessitate a unity in its successful culture.

It is the Christian ideas which are most stimulating and ennobling to the soul. He who must needs omit them from his teaching is robbed of the right arm of his strength. Where shall he get such a definition of virtue as is presented in the revealed character of God? Where so ennobling a picture of benevolence as that presented in Christ's sacrifice for his enemies? Can the conception of the inter-stellar spaces so expand the mind as the thought of an infinite God, an eternal existence, and an everlasting destiny?

Every line of true knowledge must find its completeness in its convergency to God, even as every beam of daylight leads the eye to the sun. If religion be excluded from our study, every process of thought will be arrested before it reaches its proper goal. The structure of thought must remain a truncated cone, with its proper apex lacking. Richard Baxter has nervously expressed this truth.¹

"Reformed Pastor," pp. 94, 96.

Third, If secular education is to be made consistently and honestly non-Christian, then all its more important branches must be omitted, or they must submit to a mutilation and falsification, far worse than absolute omission. It is hard to conceive how a teacher is to keep his covenant faithfully with the State so to teach history, cosmogony, psychology, ethics, the laws of nations, as to insinuate nothing favorable or unfavorable touching the preferred beliefs of either the evangelical Christians, Papists, Socinians, Deists, Pantheists, Materialists, or Fetisch worshippers, who claim equal rights under American institutions. His pædagogics must indeed be "the play of Hamlet, with the part of Hamlet omitted." Shall the secular education leave the young citizen totally ignorant of his own ancestry? But how shall he learn the story of those struggles, through which Englishmen achieved those liberties which the colonies inherited, without understanding the fiery persecutions of the Protestants under "Bloody Mary," over which the Pope's own Legate, Cardinal Pole, was sent to preside? How shall the sons of Huguenot sires in New York, Virginia, or Carolina know for what their fathers forsook beautiful France, to hide themselves in the Northern snows or the malarious woods of the South, and read nothing of the violation of the "Edict of Nantes," the "Dragonnades," and the wholesale assassination of St. Bartholomew's day, in honor of which an "infallible" predecessor of the Pope sang *Te Deums* and struck medals? Or, if the physicist attempts to ascend farther in man's history, can he give the genesis of earth and man, without intimating whether Moses or Huxley is his prophet? Or can the science of moral obligation be established in impartial oversight of God's relation to it, and of the question whether or not his will defines and grounds all human duty? Or can a Grotius or a Vattel settle the rights of nature and nations without either affirming along with the Apostle that "God hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth, and hath determined the times before appointed and the bounds of their habitation," or else denying it with the infidel ethnologist? How much of the noblest literature must be ostracized, if this plan is to be honestly carried out? The State teacher must not mention to his pupil

Shakespeare, nor Bacon, nor Milton, nor Macaulay. The *Index Expurgatorius* of free democracy will be far more stringent than that of despotic Rome ! But it is not necessary to multiply these instances. They show that Christian truths and facts are so woven into the very warp and woof of the knowledge of Americans, and constitute so beneficial and essential a part of our civilization, that the secular teacher, who impartially avoids either the affirmation or denial of them, must reduce his teaching to the bare giving of those scanty rudiments, which are, as we have seen, not knowledge, but the mere signs of knowledge.

Does some one say that practically this showing is exaggerated, for he is teaching some purely secular course, without any such maiming of his subject or prejudicing of Christianity ? If his teaching is more than a temporary dealing with some corner of education, the fact will be found to be that it is tacitly anti-Christian : overt assaults are not made ; but there is a studied avoidance which is in effect hostile. There can be no neutral position between two extremes, where there is no middle ground, but " a great gulf fixed."

Fourth, Of all rightful human action the will is the executive and the conscience the directive faculty. Unless these be purified and enlightened, to enhance the vigor of the soul's other actions by training is but superfluous mischief. If in a ship the compass be lost and the pilot blind, it is better that there should not be a great force to move her machinery. The more energetic its motion, the greater is the likelihood the ship will speedily be upon the breakers. Surely this is sufficient to show to the reflecting mind that right moral inculcation cannot be separated at any point or for any time from the intellectual without mischief.

One very obvious and yet not the weightiest application of this truth is to the discipline of the school itself. No training of any faculty takes place without some government. On what moral basis shall the teacher who wholly suppresses all appeal to religion rest that authority which he must exercise in the school-room ? He will find it necessary to say to the pupil, " Be diligent. Be obedient. Lie not. Defraud not," in order that he may learn his secular knowledge. But on whose au-

thority? There is but one ground of moral obligation, the will of God, and among the people of this country he who does not find the disclosure of that will in the Scriptures, most often finds it nowhere. But this teacher must not inculcate this Bible. Then his mere might must make his right, or else the might of the parent, or of the magistrate, to whose delegated authority he points back. Or his appeal may be to mere self-interest!

Will this government be wholesome for a youth's soul?

But from a pupil the youth becomes a citizen. He passes under wider and more complex obligations. The end of the State schooling is to fit him for this. The same question recurs, with transcendent moment, On what basis of right shall these duties rest? As a man, it is presumable he will act as he was taught while a boy. Of course then the grounds of obligation employed with him in school should be the ones he is to recognize in adult life. In the State school a non-Christian standard alone could be given him. He cannot be expected now to rise to any better; he may sink to a lower, seeing the ground then given him had no foundation under it.

That is to say, young Americans are to assume their responsibilities with pagan morals, for these are just what human reason attains from the non-Christian standard. Will this suffice to sustain American institutions? One may say: Natural theism may deduce quite a high ethical code, as witness the Greek philosophy. So could a man who rightly construed the *data* of his consciousness be an atheist; even the atheist might find in them proof that conscience ought to govern. But he does not, nor does the pagan reason *act* as Epictetus *speculated*. Let us begin to legislate for the people *as they ought to be*, and we shall have a fine card-castle. In fact, Americans, taken as we find them, who do not get their moral restraints from the Bible, have none. If, in our moral training of the young, we let go the "Thus saith the Lord," we shall have no hold left. The training which does not base duty on Christianity is, for us, practically immoral. If testimony to this truth is needed, let the venerable Dr. Griffin, of a former generation, be heard. "To educate the mind of a bad man without correcting his morals is to put a sword into the hands of a ma-

niac." Let John Locke be heard. "It is virtue, then, direct virtue, which is the hard and valuable part to be aimed at in education." . . . "If virtue and a well-tempered soul be not got and settled so as to keep out ill and vicious habits, languages and science, and all the other accomplishments of education, will be to no purpose but to make the worse or more dangerous man." Let Dr. Francis Wayland be heard. "Intellectual cultivation may easily exist without the existence of virtue or love of right. In this case its only effect is to stimulate desire ; and this, unrestrained by the love of right, must eventually overturn the social fabric which it at first erected." Last, let Washington be heard, in his farewell address, where he teaches that the virtue of the citizens is the only basis for social safety, and that the Christian religion is the only adequate basis for that virtue.

But, is not mental culture *per se* elevating? It is hard for us to give up this flattery, because hitherto education has been more or less Christian. The minister has been the American school-master. But are not the educated the more elevated? Yes. For the reason just given, and for another ; not that their mental culture made them seek higher morals, but their (and their parents') higher morals made them seek mental culture ! We are prone to put the cart before the horse. Again I cite evidence. James Anthony Froude, a witness by no means friendly to orthodoxy, quoting Miss Florence Nightingale, emphatically endorses her opinion, that the ordinary as the natural effect of the mere communication of secular knowledge to youths, is only to suggest the desire for more numerous, and, for the bulk of men whose destiny is inevitably narrow, illicit objects of desire. But they plead : In teaching the youth to know of more objects of desire you also teach him to know more restraining considerations. The fatal answer is that knowledge does not rule the heart, but conscience (if anything does) ; mere knowledge, without God's fear, makes desire grow faster than discretion. Says Sir Henry Bulwer : "I do not place much confidence in the philosopher who pretends that the knowledge which develops the passions is an instrument for their suppression, or that where there are the most desires there is likely to be the most order, and the most abstinence in their gratifica-

tion." Again, the soul should grow symmetrically. Let the boughs of a tree grow, while the roots (without actual disease) stand still; the first gale would blow it over, because of the disproportion of its parts.

Fifth, We need the best men to teach our children. The best are true Christians, who carry their religion into everything. Such men neither can nor will bind themselves to hold so influential a relation to precious souls for whom Christ died, and make no effort to save them. So the tendency must be towards throwing State schools into the hands of half-hearted Christians or of contemptuous unbelievers. Can such be even trusted with an important secular task? Railroads persist in breaking the Sabbath: so they must be served on the track exclusively by profane Sabbath-breakers or truckling professors of religion. The consequence is, they are scourged with negligent officials, drunken engineers, and defaulting cashiers. So the State will fall into the hands of teachers who will not even teach secular learning honestly; money will be wasted, and the schools will become corrupting examples to their own pupils of slighted work and abused trusts.

Sixth, To every Christian citizen, the most conclusive argument against a secularized education is contained in his own creed touching human responsibility. According to this, obligation to God covers all of every man's being and actions. Even if the act be correct in outward form, which is done without any reference to his will, he will judge it a shortcoming. "The ploughing of the wicked is sin." The intentional end to which our action is directed determines its moral complexion supremely. Second, Our Saviour has declared that there is no moral neutrality: "He that is not with him is against him, and he that gathereth not with him scattereth abroad." Add now the third fact, that every man is born in a state of alienation from God; that practical enmity and atheism are the natural outgrowth of this disposition; that the only remedy for this natural disease of man's spirit is gospel truth. The comparison of these truths will make it perfectly plain that *a non-Christian training* is literally *an anti-Christian training*.

This is the conclusive argument. The rejoinder is attempted; that Christians hold this theology as church mem-

bers, and not as citizens ; and that we have ourselves urged that the State is not an evangelical agent, and its proper business is not to convert souls from original sin. True, but neither has it a right to become an anti-evangelical agency and resist the work of the spiritual commonwealth. While the State does not authorize the theological beliefs of the Christian citizens, neither has it a right to war against them. While we have no right to ask the State to propagate our theology, we have a right to demand that it shall not oppose it. But to educate souls thus is to oppose it, because a non-Christian training is an anti-Christian training. It may be urged again, that this result, if evil, will not be lessened by the State's ceasing to teach at all, for then the training of youth will be, so far as she is concerned, equally non-Christian. The answer is, that it is one thing to tolerate a wrong as done by a party over whom we have not lawful control, but wholly another to perpetrate that wrong ourselves. For the State thus to do what she ought to condemn in the godless parent, though she be not authorized to interfere, would be the sin of "*framing mischief by a law*," the very trait of that "throne of iniquity" with which the Lord cannot have fellowship.

It is objected again, that if the State may govern and punish, which are moral functions, she may also teach. If we are prepared for the theocratic idea of the State, which makes it the universal human association, *To Havn* of human organisms, bound to do everything for society from mending a road or draining a marsh up to supporting a religion, then we can conclude thus. But then consistency will add to State schools a State religion, a beneficed clergy, a religious test for office, and State power wielded to suppress theological as well as social error. Again, while secular ruling and punishing are ethical functions, they are sufficiently grounded in the light of natural theism. But teaching is a spiritual function—in the sense defined—and for teaching beings fallen, and in moral ruin, natural theism is wholly inadequate, as witness the state of pagan society. Christian citizens are entitled (not by the State, but by one higher, God) to hold that the only teaching adequate for this fallen soul is *redemption*. But of this the State, as such, knows nothing. As God's institute for realizing secular justice, she does know

enough of moral right to be a praise to them that do well and a terror to evil-doers.

The most plausible evasion is this : Since education is so comprehensive a work, why may there not be a "division of labor"? Let the State train the intellect and the Christian parent and the Church train the conscience and heart in the home and the house of worship. With this solution some Christians profess themselves satisfied. Of course such an arrangement would not be so bad as the neglect of the heart by both State and parent.

Points already made contain fatal answers. Since conscience is the regulative faculty of all, he who must not deal with conscience cannot deal well with any. Since the soul is a *monad*, it cannot be equipped as to different parts at different times and places, as a man might get his hat at one shop and his boots at another; it has no parts. Since all truths converge towards God, he who is not to name God, must have all his teachings fragmentary; he can only construct a truncated figure. In history, ethics, philosophy, jurisprudence, religious facts and propositions are absolutely inseparable. The necessary discipline of a school-room and secular fidelity of teachers call for religion, or we miss of them. And no person nor organism has a right to seem to say to a responsible, immortal soul, "In this large and intelligent and even ethical segment of your doings you are entitled to be godless." For this teaching State must not venture to disclaim that construction of its own proceeding to its own pupil. *That disclaimer would be a religious inculcation!*

But farther : Why do people wish the State to interfere in educating? Because she has the power, the revenues to do it better. Then, unless her intervention is to be a cheat, her secularized teaching must be some very impressive thing. Then its impression, which is to be non-Christian, according to the theory, will be too preponderant in the youth's soul, to be counterpoised by the feebleness of the seventh day. The natural heart is carnal, and leans to the secular and away from the gospel truths. To the ingenuous youth, quickened by animating studies, his teacher is *Magnus Apollo*, and according

to this plan he must be to his ardent young votary wholly a heathen deity. The Christian side of the luminary, if there is one, must not be revealed to the worshipper! Then how pale and cold will the infrequent ray of gospel truth appear when it falls on him upon the seventh day! In a word, to the successful pupil under an efficient teacher, *the school is his world*. Make that godless, and his life is made godless.

If it be asked again: Why may not the State save itself trouble by leaving all education to parents? the answer is, Because so many parents are too incapable or careless to be trusted with the task. Evidently, if most parents did the work well enough, the State would have no motive to meddle. Then the very *raison d'être* of the State school is in this large class of negligent parents. But man is a carnal being, alienated from godliness, whence all those who neglect their children's mental, will, *a fortiori*, neglect their spiritual, culture. Hence we must expect that, *as to the very class* which constitutes the pretext for the State's interposition, *the fatally one-sided culture she gives will remain one-sided*. She has no right to presume anything else. But, it may be asked: Is not there the Church to take up this part, neglected by both secularized State and godless parent? The answer is, The State, thus secularized, cannot claim to know the Church as an ally. Besides, if the Church be found sufficiently omnipresent, willing, and efficient, throughout the commonwealth, to be thus relied on, why will she not inspire in parents and individual philanthropists zeal enough to care for the whole education of youth? Thus again, the whole *raison d'être* for the State's intervention would be gone. In fact the Church does not and cannot repair the mischief which her more powerful, rich, and ubiquitous rival, the secularized State, is doing in thus giving, under the guise of a non-Christian, an anti-Christian training.

It is also well known to practical men that State common schools *obstruct* parental and philanthropic effort. Thus, parents who, if not meddled with, would follow the impulse of enlightened Christian neighbors, their natural guides, in creating a private school for their children, to make it both primary and classical, now always stop at the primary. "The school tax

must be paid anyhow, which is heavy, and that is all they can do." Next, children of poor parents who showed aspiration for learning found their opportunity for classical tuition near their homes, in the innumerable private schools created by parental interest and public spirit, and kindly neighborhood charity never suffered such deserving youths to be arrested for the mere lack of tuition. Now, in country places not populous enough to sustain "State High Schools," all such youths must stop at the rudiments. Thus the country loses a multitude of the most useful educated men. Next, the best men being the natural leaders of their neighbors, would draw a large part of the children of the class next them upward into the private schools created for their own families, which, for the same reason, were sure to be Christian schools. The result is, that while a larger number of children is brought into primary schools, and while the statistics of the illiterate are somewhat changed, to the great delectation of shallow philanthropists, the number of youths well educated in branches above mere rudiments, and especially of those brought under daily Christian training, is diminished. In cities [where public opinion is chiefly manufactured] high schools may be sustained, and this evil obviated so far as secular tuition goes. But in the vast country regions, literary culture is lowered just as it is extended. It is chiefly the country which fills the useful professions—town youths go into trade.

The actual and consistent secularization of education is inadmissible.

But nearly all public men and divines declare that the State schools are the glory of America, that they are a finality, and in no event to be surrendered. And we have seen that their complete secularization is logically inevitable. Christians must prepare themselves then, for the following results: All prayers, catechisms, and bibles will ultimately be driven out of the schools. But this will not satisfy Papists, who obstinately—and correctly were their religion correct—insist that education shall be Christian for their children. Their power over the hopes and fears of the demagogues will secure, what Protestants cannot consistently ask for, a separate endowment out of the common funds. Rome will enjoy, relatively to Protestantism, a grand

advantage in the race of propagandism ; for humanity always finds out, sooner or later, that it cannot get on without a religion, and it will take a false one in preference to none. Infidelity and practical ungodliness will become increasingly prevalent among Protestant youth, and our churches will have a more arduous contest for growth if not for existence.

Perhaps American Protestants might be led, not to abandon but to revise their opinions touching education, by recalling the conditions under which the theory of State education came to be first accepted in this country. This came about in the colonies which at the same time held firmly to a union of Church and State. The Massachusetts and Connecticut colonies, for instance, honorable pioneers in State education in this country, were decidedly theocratic in their constitution. The Reformed religion was intimately interwoven. So all the Protestant States of Europe, whose successful example is cited, as Scotland and Prussia, have the Protestant as an established religion. This and State primary education have always been parts of one consistent system in the minds of their rulers in Church and State. A secularized education, such as that which is rapidly becoming the result of our State school system, would have been indigantly reprobated by the Winthrops and Mathers, the Knoxs, Melvilles, and Chalmers, and, it is presumed, by the Tholucks and even Bismarcks of those commonwealths, which are pointed to as precedents and models. It is submitted, whether it is exactly candid to quote the opinions and acts of all these great men, for what is, in fact, another thing from what they advocated? Knox, for instance, urged the primary education of every child in Scotland by the State. But it was because the State he had helped to reconstruct there was clothed with a recognized power of teaching the Reformed religion (through the allied Church), and because it was therefore able, in teaching the child to read, also to teach it the Scriptures and the Assembly's Catechism. Had Knox seen himself compelled to a severance of Church and State [which he would have denounced as wicked and paganish], and therefore to the giving by the State of a secularized education, which trained the intellect without the conscience or heart, his heroic tongue would have

given no uncertain sound. Seeing then that wise and good men, in adopting and successfully working this system, did so only for communities which united Church and State, and mental and spiritual training, the question for candid consideration is: What modifications the theory should receive, when it is imported into commonwealths whose civil governments have absolutely secularized themselves and made the union of the secular and spiritual powers illegal and impossible?

The answer may, perhaps, be found by going back to a first principle hinted in the outset of this discussion. Is the direction of the education of children either a civic or an ecclesiastical function? Is it not properly a domestic and parental function? First, we read in holy writ that God ordained the family by the union of one woman to one man, in one flesh, for life, for the declared end of "seeking a godly seed." Does not this imply that he looks to parents, in whom the family is founded, as the responsible agents of this result? He has also in the fifth Commandment connected the child proximately, not with either presbyter or magistrate, but with the parents, which, of course, confers on them the adequate and the prior authority. This argument appears again in the very order of the historical genesis of the family and State, as well as of the visible Church. The family was first. Parents at the outset were the only social heads existing. The right rearing of children by them was in order to the right creation of the other two institutes. It thus appears that naturally the parents' authority over their children could not have come by deputation from either State or visible Church, any more than the water in a fountain by derivation from its reservoir below. Second, the dispensation of Divine Providence in the course of nature shows where the power and duty of educating are deposited. That ordering is that *the parents* decide in what *status* the child shall begin his adult career. The son inherits the fortune, the social position, the respectability, or the ill-fame of his father. Third, God has provided for the parents social and moral influences so unique, so extensive, that no other earthly power, or all others together, can substitute them in fashioning the child's character. The home example, armed with the venerable authority of the father and the mother, repeated amidst the

constant intimacies of the fireside, seconded by filial reverence, ought to have the most potent plastic force over character. And this unique power God has guarded by an affection, the strongest, most deathless, and most unselfish, which remains in the breast of fallen man. Until the magistrate can feel a love, and be nerved by it to a self-denying care and toil, equal to that of a father and a mother, he can show no pretext for assuming any parental function.

But the best argument here is the heart's own instinct. No parent can fail to resent, with a righteous indignation, the intrusion of any authority between his conscience and convictions and the soul of his child. If the father conscientiously believes that his own creed is true and righteous and obligatory before God, then he must intuitively regard the intrusion of any other power between him and his minor child, to cause the rejection of that creed, as a usurpation. The freedom of mind of the child alone, when become an adult, and his father's equal, can justly interpose. If this usurpation is made by the visible Church, it is felt to be in the direction of popery ; if by the magistrate, in the direction of despotism.

It may be said that this theory makes the parent sovereign, during the child's mental and moral minority, in the moulding of his opinions and character, whereas, seeing the parent is fallible, and may form his child amiss, there ought to be a superior authority to superintend and intervene. But the complete answer is, that inasmuch as the supreme authority *must be placed somewhere*, God has indicated that, on the whole, no place is so safe for it as the hands of the parent, who has the supreme love for the child and the superior opportunity. But many parents nevertheless neglect or pervert the power? Yes, and does the State never neglect and pervert its powers? With the lessons of history to teach us the horrible and almost universal abuses of power in the hands of civil rulers, that question is conclusive. In an imperfect state of society, the instances of parental abuse of the educational function will be partial and individual. In the case of an unjust or godless State, the evil would be universal and sweeping. Doubtless God has deposited the duty in the safest place.

The competitions of the State and the Church for the educating power have been so engrossing that we have almost forgotten the parent, as the third and the rightful competitor. And now many look at his claim almost contemptuously. Because the civic and the ecclesiastical spheres are so much wider and more populous than his, they are prone to regard it as every way inferior. Have we not seen that the smaller circle is, in fact, the most original and best authorized of the three? Will any thinking man admit that he *derives his right* to marry, to be a father, from the permission of the State? Yet there is an illusion here, because civil constitutions confer on the State certain police functions, so to speak, concerning marriage and families. So there are State laws concerning certain ecclesiastical belongings. But what Protestant concedes therefrom that his religious rights were either conferred, or can be rightfully taken away, by civil authority? The truth is, that God has immediately and authoritatively instituted three organisms for man on earth, the State, the visible Church, and the Family, and these are co-ordinate in rights and mutual independence. The State or Church has no more right to invade the parental sphere than the parent to invade theirs. The right distribution of all duties and power between the three circles would be the complete solution of that problem of good government which has never yet been solved with full success. It is vital to a true theory of human rights, that the real independence of the smallest yet highest realm, that of the parent, be respected. Has it not been proved that the direction of education is one of its prerogatives?

But does not the State's right to exist imply the right to secure all the conditions of its existence? And as parents may so pervert or neglect education as to rear a generation incompetent to preserve their civil institutions, does not this give the State control over education? I answer, first, it is not even a pretext for the State's invading the parental sphere any farther than the destructive neglect exists, that is, to stimulate, or help, or compel the neglectful parents alone. Second, precisely the same argument may authorize the State to intrude into the spiritual circle and establish and teach a religion. But the

sophism is here : It is assumed that a particular form of civil institutions has a prescriptive right to perpetuate itself. It has none. So the American theory teaches, in asserting for the people the inherent right to change their institutions. Did our republican fathers hold that any people have ever the right to subvert the moral order of society ordained by God and nature ? Surely not. Here then is disclosed that distinction between *the moral order* and any particular *civil order*, so often overlooked, but so eloquently drawn by *Cousin*. So far is it from being true that the civil authority is entitled to shape a people to suit itself ; the opposite is true, the people should shape the civil authority.

It is a maxim in political philosophy, as in mechanics, that when an organism is applied to a function for which it was not designed, it is injured and the function is ill done. Here is a farmer who has a mill designed and well fitted to grind his meal. He resolves that it shall also thresh his sheaves. The consequence is that he has wretched threshing and a crippled mill. I repeat, God designed the State to be the organ for securing secular justice. When it turns to teaching or preaching it repeats the farmer's experience. The Chinese Government and people are an example precisely in point. The Government has been for a thousand years educating the people for its own ends. The result is what we see.

Government powerfully affects national character by the mode in which it performs its proper functions, and if the administration is equitable, pure, and free, it exalts the people. But it is by the indirect influence. This is all it can do well. As for the other part of the national elevation (an object which every good man must desire), it must come from other agencies ; from the dispensation of Almighty Providence ; from fruitful ideas and heroic acts with which he inspires the great men whom he sovereignly gives to the nations he designs to bless : chiefly from the energy of divine Truth and the Christian virtues, first in individuals, next in families, and last in visible churches.

Let us suppose, then, that both State and Church recognize the parent as the educating power ; that they assume towards him an ancillary instead of a dominating atti-

tude ; that the State shall encourage individual and voluntary efforts by holding the impartial shield of legal protection over all property which may be devoted to education ; that it shall encourage all private efforts ; and that in its eleemosynary character it shall aid those whose poverty and misfortunes disable them from properly rearing their own children. Thus the insoluble problems touching religion in State schools would be solved, because the State was not the responsible creator of the schools, but the parents. Our educational system might present less mechanical symmetry, but it would be more flexible, more practical, and more useful.

ROBERT L. DABNEY.

VIRGIL AS A PRECURSOR OF CHRISTIANITY.

SCRIPTURE and reason alike combine to show that before the world could possibly have received Christianity it needed to pass through many centuries of preparatory discipline. It was only when this had been undergone that what St. Paul speaks of as "the fulness of the time" was come. All historians of the Christian Church have dwelt on this—none with more power than Neander in the opening of his great work. If this preparation is an intrinsic part of the providential purpose that runs through history, we would naturally expect that while it embraced all nations it would be seen most eminently in those two nations which led the van of the ancient world's civilization. This has been generally recognized, and writers have agreed to look to the Hellenic race as the intellectual and in some measure the moral teachers of mankind ; to the Romans they have assigned pre-eminently the political and practical education of the world. But to confine the function of the Romans to this would not be to give them all their due. If they contributed little or nothing by speculation to the grand result, the Romans did as much as, probably more than, the degenerate Greeks of the Christian era, by their standard of character, as the best of them conceived it. In the ideal *Humanitas* of Cicero and of Virgil, though each of these would conceive it with a characteristic difference, there lies the best seed-ground which the ancient world supplied for the sowing of the heavenly grain. In spite of all his vanity and vacillation, in spite of the "many grave infirmities and defects of temper with which he stands justly charged," it has been.

truly said of Cicero that "he lived and died in faith. He has made converts to the belief in virtue, and had disciples in the wisdom of love." Such is the verdict of the historian of the "Romans under the Empire"—a verdict which we willingly accept. And as to Virgil, though he too has been much reviled for his acceptance of the Imperial régime and his friendship with Mæcenas and Augustus, yet there breathed no spirit of purer aspiration in the day in which he lived; and falling on a time of decadence in faith and morals he did the best he could, and kept himself unspotted from the world. And for openness of heart and quick susceptibility to whatever highest religious influence he knew, there are few even among Christian poets who can be compared to him. It is on this side of Virgil's character and work, his openness to religious impressions, on which I propose to dwell for a little. This is one aspect of him which has of late years been almost entirely put out of sight, while critics have been content to regard him only as the consummate artist. It was not always so. It was not in this way that the early Christian centuries and the middle age regarded him, but as the devoutest, most religious, among the ancient poets. And this view of him, which has in recent times been disregarded, it may be worth while for a little to consider.

It is well known in what special honor the early Christian Fathers held Virgil. St. Augustine styled him the finest and noblest of poets. St. Jerome, who looked severely on all heathen writers, allows that to read Virgil was a necessity for boys, but complains that even priests in his day turned to him for pleasure.

In the middle age he was regarded by some as a magician; by others as a prophet or a saint. His form was found sculptured in the stalls of a cathedral among the Old Testament worthies; in a picture of the Nativity where David and the prophets were singing round The Child, Virgil is seen leading the concert. His verses are found in the burial-places of the catacombs, associated with the cross and the monogram of our Lord. The power with which he has laid hold of the Christian imagination is proved by nothing more than by the place Dante assigns him in his "*Divina Commedia*" as his teacher

and his guide to the nether world. You remember the words with which Dante addresses him on his first appearance :

“ Art thou, then, that Virgil—that fountain
Which pours forth abroad so rich a stream of speech ?
O glory and light of other poets !
May the long zeal avail me, and the great love
That made me search thy volume.
Thou art my master and my author ;
Thou alone art he from whom I took
The good style that hath done me honor.”

This general consent of the primitive and middle ages to adopt Virgil among the possible if not actual saints of Christendom arose, no doubt, from the belief that in his fourth Eclogue he had prophesied the advent of Christ. Constantine in his discourse “*Ad sanctos*” quoted it as a prophecy. Lactantius agreed that it had a Christian meaning. St. Augustine accepted it as a genuine prophecy, and read in the thirteenth and fourteenth verses of that eclogue a distinct prediction of the remission of sins.

This interpretation of the Eclogue, which would seem to have lingered on till Pope’s time, when he imitated it in his *Messiah*, has for long been discredited. The Child that was to be born of which the eclogue speaks, whether the son of Pollio or the daughter of Augustus, was far enough from being a regenerator of the world. While, however, we reject the grounds which the early Fathers and the men of the middle age would have given for their belief in Virgil’s religious, even Christian, spirit, we need not reject the belief itself. Though the reason they gave for it was false, the belief may have been true. There is in Virgil a vein of thought and sentiment more devout, more humane, more akin to the Christian, than is to be found in any other ancient poet, whether Greek or Roman. The religious feeling which Virgil preserved in his own heart is made the more conspicuous when we remember amidst what almost overpowering difficulties it was that he preserved it. It was not only that, in the words of Dante, “he lived at Rome under the good Augustus in the time of the false and lying gods,” but he lived at a time when the traditional faith in these gods was dead among almost all educated men. As has been lately said, “The old religions were dead from the Pillars

of Hercules to the Euphrates and the Nile, and the principles on which human society had been constructed were dead also. There remained of spiritual conviction only the common and human sense of justice and morality; and out of this sense some ordered system of government had to be constructed under which men could live and labor and eat the fruit of their industry. Under a rule of this material kind there can be no enthusiasm, no chivalry, no saintly aspirations, no patriotism of the heroic type." But such was the rule of the Cæsars—"a kingdom where men could work, think, and speak as they pleased, and travel freely among provinces for the most part ruled by Gallios, who protected life and property," and cared for nothing else. This was the world into which Virgil was born, and it is his unique merit that he in some way maintained within himself a sense of poetry and faith and devoutness in a time when, if these things "were slumbering in the heart of humanity," they were nowhere else apparent.

A man of his spirit must have felt himself lonely enough among the literary men and statesmen whom he met at Rome. There must have been secret longings of heart within him for which among them he could find no sympathy. They had ceased to believe in any thing divine, probably mocked and ridiculed it. But, whatever else he might have done, a devout soul like Virgil could never do this. A severe and peculiar kind of trial it is for such a spirit as his to be born into an age when the old forms of religion which have sustained former generations are waxing old and ready to perish. We can imagine that Virgil himself must have felt that those old beliefs had no longer the strength they once had; but his innate modesty and reverence, his love for antiquity and for the scenes of his childhood, his imaginative sympathy, would not suffer him to treat them rudely, but would make him cling to them and make the best of them. In fact, at such a time there are always a few select spirits in whom the inner religious life lives on by its own strength, or, if fed at all from without, it is from sources of which it is unconscious. Instead of deriving nutriment from the old beliefs, it imparts to them from within whatever vitality they still retain. Such we can imagine Virgil to have been. Men of his kind, who still believe that, whatever scoffers may

say, there is "a higher life than this daily one, and a brighter world than that we see," if they fall among a set of acute dialecticians, are often sore bestead to give a reason for the faith that is still in them. If Virgil had been an interlocutor in Cicero's dialogue, "*De Natura Deorum*," he would probably have cut but a sorry figure against the arguments of Cotta and the sneers of Velleius, and certainly could not have produced any so clear-cut theory as Stoic Balbus did. But it is just the very beauty of such spirits that all the irrefragable arguments and demonstrations of the acutest logicians cannot drive them out of their essential faith in the supernatural and the divine.

My friend Mr. Sellar, in his admirable work on Virgil, has truly said that Virgil has failed to produce a consistent picture of the spiritual life out of the various elements, the popular mystical and philosophical modes of thought, which he strove to combine into a single representation. This may be at once conceded. How could he or any one produce harmony out of elements so discordant as his age supplied? But, nevertheless, inconsistent, irreconcilable, as these elements are, when they have passed through Virgil's mind one spirit pervades them all. Everywhere we see that the touch of his fine and reverent spirit tends to extract from them a moral, if it cannot reduce them into an intellectual harmony.

What were the elements out of which the very composite Virgilian theology was formed? First, there was his native love for the old rustic gods whom in his boyhood he had seen worshipped by the Mantuan husbandmen—Faunus and Picus, Janus and Pilumnus, and the like ;

"Ye gods and goddesses all ! whose care is to protect the fields."

His first impressions were of the country and of country people, and Virgil was not a man of the world to forget these among the life of the city and the society of the great. His imagination ever reverted to Mincio's side, and his heart clung to all the recollections of that early time with peculiar tenacity. And therefore we find that both in the *Georgics* and in the *Æneid* he dwells on the old rustic worships and the local divinities with something more than a mere antiquary's or poet's attachment. To those primeval traditions, those old

beliefs and practices, he adhered as to his earliest and surest ground of trust. He felt that to eradicate these would be to tear up some of the deepest roots of his spiritual life. Therefore he retained them fondly, and did his best to reconcile them with the beliefs which his later culture had superinduced.

The second element was the Olympian dynasty of gods, with which the influx of Greek literature had saturated the whole educated thought and imagination of Rome. Indeed, the literature of his day would not have allowed him to reject this poetic theology. At first sight it would seem that the Olympian gods had come to Virgil pure and unalloyed from Homer. But when we look more closely there is a deep change. Outwardly they may appear the same, but inwardly the modern spirit had reached and modified them. Virgil introduces his gods far more sparingly than Homer; they interfere far less with the affairs of men. When they do interfere, it is in a gentler and humaner spirit. It is with pity that they look upon men slaughtering each other. When Trojans and Rutulians are hewing each other down,

"The gods in Jove's palace look pityingly on the idle rage of the warring hosts—
Alas that death-doomed men should suffer so terribly!"

Again, Virgil's Jove is more just and impartial than Homer's. When Turnus and Æneas contend he holds the balance with perfect evenness:

"Jove himself holds aloft his scales, poised and level, and lays therein
the destinies of the two, to see whom the struggle dooms, and whose the
weight that death bears down."

When the gods meet in council their deliberations are more dignified; there is less of the democratic agora in their proceedings. Jove addresses them with a quite Roman dignity—indeed, approaches more nearly to a real king of the gods. Monotheism has evidently colored the conception of him. Venus appears no longer as the voluptuous beguiler, but rather as the mother trembling for her son.

If Virgil cannot altogether hide the follies and vices of the gods which mythology had given to his hands, he does his best to throw a veil over them. If Juno's wrath must still burn implacably, Virgil has for it the well-known cry of surprise—

"Can heavenly natures hate so fiercely?"

Thus we see that if the Homeric forms and even some of the strange doings of the old gods are still retained, the best ideas and scruples of Virgil's own age enter in to inform, to modify, and to moralize them.

But beside the primeval Italian traditions and the Olympian gods, there were probably other extraneous elements which entered into Virgil's very composite theology. Something, perhaps, he may have gathered from the teaching of the Eleusinian or other mysteries, but of this we know too little to speak with any certainty. Some tincture of Oriental worships, too, there is, as is indicated by his mention of the Phrygian goddess Cybele.

Perhaps nowhere in Virgil is the strange medley of faiths forced more upon us than in the invocation to the first Georgic. When we read that opening passage, in which Liber and Ceres, Fauni and Dryades, Neptune, producer of the Horse; Aristæus, feeder of kine; Pan, keeper of sheep; Minerva, discoverer of the olive; Triptolemus, the Attic inventor of the plough; Silvanus, planter of trees—are all jumbled together, we scarce know what to think of it. When finally Cæsar is invoked as a deity—Virgil doubts whether of earth, sky, or sea, surely not of Tartarus, for he would not wish to reign there—we are utterly at a loss whether we are to regard the whole passage fictitious and unreal, or as representing a state of belief not impossible to an imaginative mind in Virgil's day, though by us wholly unconceivable. As Professor Sellar has well said, "it is impossible to find any principle of reconciliation" for such multifarious elements. "Probably not even the poets themselves, least of all Virgil, could have given an explanation of their real state of mind" in composing such a passage. "So far as we can attach any truthful meaning to this invocation, we must look upon it as a symbolical expression of divine agency and superintendence in all the various fields of natural production." Just so. To a reverent mind like Virgil's, unwilling to break with the past, yet accessible to all best influences of the present, it may well have been that these multifarious relics of a fading polytheism expressed only the various functions, attributes, or agencies through which worked that Supreme Will, that one Pronoia in which his deeper mind really believed. Something of the same kind is seen in mediæval belief when the practical faith in

elaborate and active angelic hierarchies may have interfered with, though it did not supersede, the true faith in the divine unity.

If in the time of Augustus the majority of educated men believed nothing, those religious minds to whom as to Virgil belief was a necessity were more and more driven towards a monotheistic faith, towards the belief that the essential Being underlying the many forms of religion was one. The whole progress of the world, practical and social as well as speculative, tended this way. Of intellectual influences making in this direction, the most powerful was Greek philosophy, whether in the shape of Stoicism or of Platonism. Every great poet takes in deeply the philosophy of his time, and certainly Virgil was no exception. Of the three forms of philosophy then current at Rome, the Stoic, the Platonic, and the Epicurean, Virgil began with the last. At Rome he studied under Siron, the Epicurean, and had been profoundly impressed by the great poem of his predecessor, Lucretius, which had expounded so powerfully to the Roman world the Epicurean tenets. For a time he was held charmed by this philosophy, but there were in Virgil's devout and affectionate nature longings which it could never satisfy. When he wrote his *Eclogues* he may have been a disciple of Epicurus, but in the *Georgics* we see that if he still retained the physical views of that sect he had bid good-by to their moral and religious teaching. Every one remembers the passage in the second *Georgic* in which Virgil contrasts the path he had chosen for himself with the grand aim which Lucretius had in view. While according no stinted admiration to the great attempt of Lucretius to lay bare Nature's inner mysteries, he says that he has chosen a humbler path. The import of this passage may be, as the French critic interprets it, to acquaint us that, after having sounded his own nature, Virgil had found that he was not fitted to persevere in those violent speculations which had at first seduced his imagination, and that he had decided to abide by the majority, and to share their beliefs, yet not without casting a look of envy and regret at those daring spirits who were able to dwell without fear in the calm, cold heights of science. Perhaps another interpretation may be given to this famous passage, which evidently describes a crisis in Virgil's mental life, as well as in the direc-

tion of his poetry. After having been fascinated for a time by the seeming grandeur of the Lucretian view of things, he came to a crucial question which meets all thoughtful men in modern as well as in ancient times. He had to ask himself, In what way am I to think of this world ; how am I to interpret it ? From which side shall I approach it ? Shall I think of its central force, its ruling power, under the medium of nature or under that of man ? We cannot conceive it barely, absolutely, colorlessly : we must think it under some medium, and there are the only two media possible to us. Between one or other we must make our choice. If we take nature for our medium, we see through it vastness, machinery, motion, order, growth, decay. And the contemplation of these things may lead us to think of some great central power whence all these proceed. Centrality, organization, power, these are the results which mere nature yields. And if we cannot rest in mere abstractions, we may pass from these to the thought of a Being who is the spring of all this machinery, the central power of these vast movements, the arranger of these harmonies. Beyond this, by the aid of mere nature, we cannot get. The central power we thus arrive at is characterless, unmoral. Out of nature we can get no morality. " Nature is an unmoral medium." And this is very much all that Lucretius got to, and all that any ever will get to who start from his point of view and adopt his method.

But take the other medium : start from man—from what is highest and best in him, his moral nature, his moral affections ; make man with these moral affections, which are his proper humanity, our medium, and we are led to a very different result. Interpreting the world and its central power through this medium, we are led not to a mere abstraction, but to think of that ruling Power as a personal and moral Being, which is God. That which is chief, highest, central in the universe, cannot possibly be lower than that which is best in man. Using whatever is deepest and best in ourselves as the window through which we look out to what is highest in the universe, in this way alone can we see somewhat into the character divine. This, it may be said, is anthropomorphism ; and that is a big word which scares many. But there is an anthropomorphism

which is true, the only true theology—when we refer to God all those moral qualities, righteous love, righteous hatred, mercy, truth, of which there are some faint traces in ourselves—refer them to God as their true centre and source, not in a mere matter-of-fact way with our human adjuncts and weaknesses attached to them, but in a “high, transcendental, incomprehensible way.” High humanity, then, is our guide to God. There is no other medium through which we can see Him as a moral being. Of the two methods, the “physical view,” as has been said, “reduces God to a mechanical principle, the human and moral view raises him into a person and a character.” The day may come when these two may coalesce and be seen in perfect harmony. But that day is not yet. Till it comes we shall cling to that which is deepest, most essential, and must always be paramount, and regard man’s moral nature as the truest key to the interpretation of the universe—as our access to the divine nature.

All this, of course, is putting the matter in modern language, answering to the thought of our own day. But we may well conceive it was some such process of thought, though he would have expressed it very differently, which led Virgil to renounce the Lucretian philosophy and to attach himself to that humbler, more human mode of thought, which breathes through all his poetry. Not but that he once and again reverts in his poems to philosophic speculations. In the song of Silenus in the sixth Eclogue, he gives us a piece of the Lucretian cosmogony. In the fourth Georgic, when speaking of the wisdom of the bees, he alludes with evident sympathy to the theory, whether learnt from Pythagoras, or Plato, or the Stoics, that all creation, animate and inanimate, is inspired by the breath of one universal soul. To this theory he again returns in the sixth book of the *Æneid*, where Anchises in Elysium expounds it still more earnestly. Yet it is characteristic of Virgil’s happy inconsistency that his Pantheism, if he really did in some sense hold it, had not any of the results it usually has in more consecutive thinkers. It did not in the least obliterate for him moral distinctions, or make him at all less sensitive to the everlasting difference between right and wrong. This is at once apparent in the whole sentiment of the

Georgics. That greatest of didactic poems is Virgil's tribute to his love of Italian scenery and to his interest in Italian rustics, in converse with whom he had spent his childhood and youth. I cannot now even glance at the many and great beauties of the poem, and at the wonderful way in which, as all travellers testify, it conveys the feeling of the Italian landscape. A young poet, fresh from visiting the neighborhood of Mantua, has lately well expressed this :

“ O sweetest singer ! stateliest head,
And gentlest, ever crowned with bay,
It seemed that from the holy dead
Thy soul came near to mine to-day ;
And all fair places to my view
Seemed fairer ;—such delight I had
To deem that these thy presence knew,
And at thy coming oft were glad.”

But it is not of this, but of the religious sentiment which pervades the Georgics, of which I have now to speak. It is seen not only in that Virgil exhorts the husbandmen to piety—

“ First of all worship the gods”—

and throws himself as far as he can into the rustic's reverence for Ceres and other rural deities. This he does. But his religious feeling shows itself in a more genuine and unconventional way.

Virgil's whole view of the relation of man to nature is in marked contrast to that of Lucretius. He felt as strongly as Lucretius that the country is no mere Arcadian paradise ; that nature, if a nurse at all, is a rough and intractable one—often seems to fight against man—is traversed by what seems to us inherent defects and imperfections. Looking on these, Lucretius had maintained that the work which was so defective could not be divine :

“ This universe has by no means been fashioned for us by divine wisdom—with so deep a flaw it stands endowed.”

And among the defects he enumerates many features—mountains, seas, the arctic and the torrid zones, and other things which we now know to be essential blessings. Virgil saw and

felt the seeming defects, acknowledges them not less feelingly, but interprets them differently. He saw that one end of their existence was to discipline man, to draw out in him the hardy and self-denying virtues, and that if man so accepted them they turned to his good.

“The great sire himself would not have the path of tillage to be a smooth one, and first disturbed the fields by the husbandman’s art, and whetted human wit by many a care, nor suffered heavy sloth to waste his realm.”

He regards the husbandman’s lot as one ‘full of toil, often thankless, of suffering and disappointment. The first days of life are the best :

“Poor mortals that we are, all the best days of life are the first to fly—come on apace diseases and the gloom of age, and suffering sweeps us off, and the unrelenting cruelty of death.”

And again in such words as—

“all things are destined to hurry towards decay,”

here is a tone of deep sadness, almost of pessimism, but yet this does not engender in Virgil unbelief or despair, much less anger or revolt. Rather, in view of these acknowledged hardships and evils, he counsels perseverance, patience, watchfulness, self-restraint, reverence. In Virgil’s sadness there is no bitterness, but rather a sweet pensiveness, which looks to be comforted. His advice to the husbandman sums itself up into the mediæval motto, “*Ora et labora.*” For nature is not, any more than man, independent. Both are under the control of a spiritual power, a supreme will, and this will ordains that man should by patient toil subdue reluctant nature, and in doing so should find not his sustenance only, but his happiness and peace.

In fine, with regard to the religious sentiment of the Georgics, Mr. Sellar thinks that Virgil’s faith is purer and happier than that of Hesiod, because it is “trust in a just and beneficent Father, rather than fear of a jealous taskmaster.” But he thinks it less noble than the faith of Æschylus and Sophocles, because it is “a passive yielding to the longing of the human heart and to æsthetic emotion, rather than that union of natural piety with insight into the mystery of life” which characterize the religion of the two great dramatists. Without attempting

now to pass judgment on this contrast which Mr. Sellar has drawn, I leave it to the reflections of my readers.

As the *Georgics* are the poem of Italy, so the *Æneid* is the poem of Rome—the epic of the empire. Patriotism is its keynote, its inspiring motive : pride in the past history of Rome, her present prosperity, her future destiny—all these strangely interwoven with the fortunes of the Julian House. Yet along with this motive, behind it, in harmony with it, there moves a great background of religious sentiment, so powerful and omnipresent that the *Æneid* may be called a great religious epic.

In Virgil, however it may have been with other Romans, the sense of universal empire, the belief in the eternal existence of Rome, were founded not on presumption. They were guaranteed to her by her divine origin, and by the continual presence of an overruling destiny—a *Fortuna urbis*, *Fatum*, or *Fata*, whose behests it was Rome's mission to fulfil. This *Fatum* was something different from Jove. But "Jupiter Capitolinus in ancient, the living emperor in later times, were its visible vicegerents." This mysterious power which ruled the destiny of Rome was neither a quite personal nor moral power. But in Virgil's view it assumed a beneficent aspect, just as with him the mission of Rome was not merely to conquer the world and rule it, but to bring in law and peace, and to put an end to war—"pacificque imponere morem."

Another religious aspect of the *Æneid* is well seen, as the French critic has remarked, in the view taken of the mission intrusted to *Æneas*. It was not to conquer Italy, but to find there a home and refuge for the exiled deities and penates of Troy. This runs through the poem from end to end. It is seen in the opening lines of the poem. It is seen in the words which Hector's ghost addresses to *Æneas* :

"Troy entrusts to thee now her worship and her gods. Take them to share your destiny—seek for them a mighty city."

It is seen at the close, in *Æneas*'s own words :

"I will ordain sacred rites and divinities ; let my father-in-law
Latinus hold to the rule of war."

The Romans would never have tolerated to hear that their ancestors, Latin and Sabine, of whom they were so proud, were

conquered by Phrygians, whom they despised. But the East they looked on as the land of mystery, the birthplace of religion, and they were not unwilling to receive thence their first lessons in things divine. It is as the bearer of the Trojan gods to Italy that Æneas appears, from first to last. This is his main function, and this achieved, his mission is ended, his work done. At the close of the poem, when all difficulties are to be smoothed away, the last of these, Juno's vindictiveness, is appeased when she is told by Jupiter that her favorite Italians were to be unremoved, their place and name preserved, the Trojans were only to hand on to them their worship and their name, and then to disappear. "The Ausonians shall keep their native tongue, their native customs: the name shall remain as it is. The Teucrians shall merge in the nation they join—that and no more; their rites and worship shall be my gift; all shall be Latins and speak the Latin tongue" (*Æn.* xii., 834).

This view of the mission of Æneas as essentially a religious one throws, I think, some light on his character as Virgil portrays it. That character, as we all know, has generally been voted uninteresting, not to say insipid. Every one has felt the contrast between him and the hero of the *Iliad*, or even such subordinate characters as Ulysses, Hector, Ajax, even Nestor. These are living men, full of like passions with ourselves, only of more heroic mould. The glow of health is in their cheek, the strong throb in their pulses. Beside them, how pale, washed-out is the countenance of Æneas! No doubt he is in some sort a composite conception—an attempt to embody somewhat diverse attributes, rather than a man moved by one strong human impulse. On one side he represents that latest product of civilization, the humane man, in whom "humanitas," as Cicero and Virgil conceived it, is embodied. On another side, some of his traits are taken from Augustus and meant to recall him. These two elements are both present in him. But far more potent than either is the conception of him as the man of destiny, whom the fates had called to go forth he knows not whither, and to seek in some strange land which the fates would show him a home for his country's gods and for himself; a sad, contemplative man, to whom the present is

nothing, who ever feels that he has a mournful past behind him, and a great future decreed by fate before him. He has no strong impulses of his own ; natural interests have ceased to move him.

“ In him the savage virtues of the race—
Revenge and all ferocious thoughts, are dead.”

As the French critic has well expressed it : “ He has secured from heaven a mission which lies heavy on him ; and he accepts it pensively. He toils and endures hardness to find a resting-place for his Penates, a kingdom for his son, a glorious future for his race. Before these great interests his own personality has effaced itself. He obeys the behest of fate in spite of natural reluctance, and sacrifices himself to the commands of heaven.” Herein lies the “*pietas*” which Virgil has made his fixed characteristic. The chief motive-power within him is “*pietas*,” in its widest sense, including all human affections—love to family, love to country, fidelity to the dead, above all, dependence on a higher power, and obedience to it, controlling, sanctifying all his actions. To meet these duties, to fulfil the destiny he is called to, is his one absorbing thought. He has no other.

Even that part of his conduct which to moderns seems most unforgivable, his heartless desertion of Dido, is explained by this principle, if it is not justified. He leaves her not from heartlessness, but in obedience to an overmastering call from heaven. Whatever his attachment may have been, one word brought by Mercury from Jove suffices to startle him from his dream. At the god’s approach—

“ Art thou not helping to build the walls of lofty Carthage, and in the fondness of weak affection piling up a fair city !”

he at once awakes and longs to be gone.

“ He is on fire to fly, and leave the too-well-loved city, astounded at so unlooked-for a warning and at the command of the gods.”

Hence we see why the character of Æneas as portrayed in the first six books of the Æneid is so much more consistent than it appears to be in the last six. In the former he is entirely the absorbed, devoted man, obeying the behests of heaven. In the latter he has to do the fighting business, to

play the part of Achilles or Ajax. When we see him lopping off the heads of the Rutulians, we feel that this is not in keeping with the original conception of him. His bearing becomes unnatural, his words truculent, altogether unlike the humane, pensive, contemplative man of the earlier books. But it could not be avoided : the plan of the poem required that he should be the warrior as well as the religious exile, and, as the warrior, bloody work had to be done, and in describing this Virgil could not be original, but must needs fall back on imitation of the Iliad and of the Homeric heroes.

If we cannot get over an impression of baseness in his conduct to the Carthaginian Queen, we should remember that in Virgil's intention this but proves the greatness of his self-sacrifice, the depth of his conviction that Heaven had called him to another destiny. Had his abandonment of Dido been his own deed it would have been the basest treachery. If it does not become interesting, it is changed in character when we see it as done at the behest of Heaven, as an act of religious obedience.

" Cease to kindle by your complaints both yourself and me ;
it is not by my choice I follow Italy."

It makes him, no doubt, less interesting as a man, but it proves more entirely that he is a religious hero, that his inspiration comes from the sense of a divine mission. This was the poet's fundamental conception of him, so he wished to represent him. Unless we continually remember this, we shall misinterpret Æneas not only in his conduct to Dido, but we shall miss the key to his whole character and to the main purpose of the poem.

It has often been remarked how much more attractive is the character of Turnus than that of Æneas. Turnus and his companions represent the natural passions, the spontaneous impulses, in a much freer, more human way than Æneas and his Trojans. The individuality of these last is, as it were, obliterated by the weight of destiny which they feel themselves under. What is this but to say that in poetry or romance it is much easier to invest with interest an ordinary man, with all the human feelings and infirmities about him, than to portray a

religious hero in such verse that he shall at once command our reverence and win our affection. If Virgil has failed to do so, and I grant he has, who is there of poets or novelists that in this kind of portraiture has succeeded better?

But more than in any other portion of his work, the strength of Virgil's moral and religious feeling comes out in the sixth book of the *Æneid*. His whole conception of the condition of the departed souls is a thoroughly moral one—a projection into the unseen future of the everlasting difference between good and evil. That which lies at the bottom of all the elaborate imagery of the book is the belief that judgment awaits men there for what they have been and what they have done here; that their works follow them into the unseen state; that the pollution which men have contracted here must be purged away before they can attain to peace. To show in detail how these conceptions pervade that sixth book would require a whole essay devoted to itself, and space forbids me to do more than allude to it now.

It is not, however, the definite teaching either of the sixth or of any other book of the *Æneid* that most clearly reveals the essential piety of Virgil's soul. It is the incidental expressions, the half-uttered thoughts, the sighs which escape him unawares, that show what his habitual feeling about man's life and destiny was—how solemn! how tender! how religious!

Consider the great purity of his mind as seen in his poems. One or two passages only occur in all his works from which the most perfect modesty would shrink. And this in an age when the great men of the day, with few exceptions, were steeped in all impurity. When we first become acquainted with Virgil in boyhood we are not, of course, aware of this characteristic. It requires larger acquaintance with literature and with the world to make us feel how great is the contrast in this respect between Virgil and most of the ancient, and indeed many of the modern, poets. Horace, who lived much in society, was conscious of the rare beauty of Virgil's character, and speaks of him as one of the whitest souls among the sons of men. Indeed, Horace never alludes to Virgil but his voice hushes itself into a tone of tender reverence unusual with him.

Again, observe how though he is compelled to speak of war

and bloodshed, his soul evidently abhors it. We see this in such lines as—

“The fever of the steel, the guilty madness of bloodshed rage within him.—

By degrees crept in an age degenerate and of duller hue,
and the frenzy for war and the greed of gain.”

This sounds strange language from the lips of the great poet of the conquerors of the world, but it was the true language of Virgil's own heart, though not of his people's. Keble has remarked how from the thick of battle and slaughter he turns away to soothe himself with rustic images, as in the description of the conflicts of Æneas in the tenth book of the Æneid. Every death is described, not with stern delight, but with a sigh, as of one who felt for the miseries of men. As each warrior falls Virgil turns aside to recall his home, his family, his peaceful pursuits, as in the well-known—

“and dreams in death of his darling Argos.”

Note, again, Virgil's unworldliness of spirit. He had evidently no relish for the material splendors that fascinate lower natures. It would seem as if unworldliness were the very condition of all high poetry, and as if a great poet's heart could not be given to those things which the worldling admires. Yet no one of ancient and few of modern poets have shown so decidedly that riches, rank, splendor, have no charm for them. Homer in his simplicity, and being probably poor himself, looks with evident satisfaction on the riches of the great. Andromache is “rich in gifts;” Æneas boasts that his ancestor was “the wealthiest of mortal men.” For Virgil

“the high mansion with proud portals,
Discharging from all the palace its huge tide of early visitants,”

has no attraction. From the palace of Augustus and from the home of Mæcenas on the Esquiline he turns away instinctively to the woods and the fields and the men who lived among them. The country housewife going about her work more pleases him than the grandest of patrician matrons. You remember his picture in the eighth book of the Æneid of the thrifty dame at the middle of the night, “just when a woman compelled to support life by spinning wakes to light the fire that

slumbered in the embers, adding night to her day's work, and keeps her handmaids laboring long by the blaze, all that she may be able to preserve her wedded life in purity, and bring up her infant sons." Evidently this was more to his mind than all the Tyrian purple and fretted ceilings of Roman mansions.

Connected with this unworldliness is Virgil's continual remembrance of the poor, and his feeling for the miserable. This he has expressed in one immortal line.

—"Tears there are for human things,
and hearts are touched by mortal sufferings,"

is the spirit of all his poetry. If men forget or despise the unfortunate, he is sure that Heaven does not :

"If you defy the race of men, and the weapons that mortals wield,
yet look to have to do with the gods, who forget not right
and wrong."

No poet ever admired less mere outward success, and felt more sure that there is a tribunal somewhere which will test men and things by another standard, according to which

"a noble aim
Faithfully kept is as a noble deed.
In whose pure sight all virtue doth succeed."

You remember his

"Learn, O boy ! from me what virtue means and genuine toil.
Let others teach you the meaning of success."

While gentleness and natural piety, in the wide sense which I have already explained, are Virgil's characteristic virtues, not less inculcated by him is another virtue which might seem opposed to these ; I mean patience, fortitude, manly endurance.

"Whatever may befall, every misfortune must be overcome
by enduring it."

This is the undertone of all his morality.

Again, another side of his unworldliness appears in that his heart refuses to find full satisfaction in any thing here. Not wealth, not honor, nor future fame, not the loveliness of nature, not the voice of friend, are enough for him. For even if for a time they pleased, does he not keenly feel that—

"Poor mortals that we are, our brightest days of life
are ever the first to fly."

This has been called pessimism in Virgil. It is, however, only his keen feeling of the fleetingness and unsufficingness of this earthly life. He does not rail at it, as some poets have done—upbraids neither the world nor the power that made it, but accepts it and learns from it reverent patience. And this experience would seem to have wakened within him a longing and aspiration after something purer, higher, lovelier, than eye or ear here discover. His poetry has the tone as of one of whom it may be said in his own words :

“ He was stretching forth his hands with longing desire
for the farther shore.”

Therefore, while we may not, as former ages did, accept the fourth Eclogue as in any sense a prophecy of the Messiah, we need not be blind to that which it does contain—the hope of better things, the expectation that some relief was at hand for the miseries of an outworn and distracted world. This expectation was, we know, widely spread in Virgil’s day, and probably none felt it more than he. Likely enough he expected that the relief would come through the establishment and universal sway of the Roman Empire ; but the ideal empire, as he conceived it, was something more humane and beneficent than any thing the earth had yet seen—something such as Trajan may perhaps have dreamed of, but which none ever saw realized. His conception of the future work which he imagined the Empire had to do contained elements which belonged to a kingdom not of this world. In his enthusiastic predictions regarding it we may say, in Keble’s words,

“ Thoughts beyond their thought to those high bards were given.”

Taking, then, all these qualities of Virgil together, his purity, his unworldliness, his tenderness towards the weak and down-trodden, his weariness of the state of things he saw around him, his lofty ideal, his longing for “ a higher life than this daily one,” I think we may say that in him the ancient civilization reached its moral culmination. When that civilization could produce such a spirit as his, which it could so little satisfy, does it not appear that “ the fulness of the time was come” ? He was a spirit prepared and waiting, though he knew it not, for some better thing to be revealed.

J. C. SHAIRP.

